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Summary in English
Essay 1: The Value of Bond Underwriter Relationships
with Jens Dick-Nielsen and Mads Stenbo Nielsen
The first essay shows that corporate bond issuers derive value from bond underwriter
relationship capital. A strong underwriter relationship enables the underwriter to credibly
certify the issuer on the bond market which is fundamental for firms when issuing new
debt and refinancing maturing debt. In order to empirically verify this certification
hypothesis we study corporate bond issuing firms’ underwriter relations and analyze
their value for the issuing firm.
First, we look at the unconditional effect of switching underwriter and empirically test
the benefit of having a strong underwriter relationship by analyzing firms’ underwriter
relations and bond issuance cost. Within this framework we find that when a bond
issuer utilizes an existing underwriter relationship when rolling over bonds, it lowers
both the indirect and direct issuance costs. Accordingly, it is as a baseline costly for the
firm to switch underwriter. Second, we document that issuers are adversely affected by
underwriter distress as we find that the credit risk of the underwriter spills over to the
credit risk of the issuer. If an underwriter ends up in financial distress it weakens the
underwriter’s ability to connect the bond issuer with investors and to credibly certify
the issuer. As this is costly for the bond issuer when rolling over maturing bonds, we
argue that the weakened relationship leads to higher credit risk of the issuing firm. By
constructing an issuer specific measure of underwriter distress we explicitly find that the
variation in the credit risk of related underwriters helps explain the variation in the credit
risk of bond issuers. While we do find that the effect is pronounced in the case of an
actual default of an underwriter that will force firms to switch underwriter, we document
that the effect is also economically significant for just higher level of underwriter distress.
Consistent with the certification hypothesis we find that the credit risk spillover is
more pronounced for low-rated firms which are usually also more opaque and, therefore,
more dependent upon the underwriter certification. The impact of underwriter distress is
also stronger for firms with a high fraction of short-term debt, i.e., firms with an imminent
need for underwriter services for rolling over maturing bonds. Thus, underwriter distress
can be characterized as a rollover risk for the issuer. Overall, the essay shows that
underwriter relationships are valuable for corporate bond issuers.
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Essay 2: Corporate Hedging and Debt Extension
The second essay provides a detailed investigation of the implications of creditors’ use of
credit default swaps (CDSs) for the debt financing of related firms. CDSs are financial
derivatives that protect the buyer against default of a given reference firm. The availabil-
ity of CDS contracts has in general been outlined to improve bank lending by reducing
financial frictions on the supply side of credit. Using unique and comprehensive CDS and
credit registry data from Deutsche Bundesbank I explicitly study the CDS holdings of
banks with a credit relationship to the reference firm and analyze the role of the varia-
tion in creditors use of CDSs for the borrower’s debt financing. As outlined in the data
creditors typically hold multiple CDSs written on the same firm and are often also net
sellers of CDS contracts written on their own borrowers.
Focusing on firm-level credit exposures I find that the credit extension arising due to
the availability of CDSs significantly depends upon creditors’ net CDS positions. Specifi-
cally, I find that firms where the creditors are net credit protection buyers have relatively
less credit available relative to firms where the creditors are net credit protection sellers.
Although individual creditors may extend their credit exposure to firms for certain levels
of credit hedging, I find that the effect is not significant on the aggregated level. This is
probably due to the offset effect by the firm’s other creditors. While creditors typically
buy CDS contracts on more risky borrowers, I also show that the results are robust when
I explicitly control for firms’ credit risk. Furthermore, the effect is pronounced when CDS
contracts are illiquid.
In regards to firms’ refinancing risk, I find that firms with net CDS-buying creditors
relative to firms with net CDS-selling creditors have lower debt maturity and are more
constrained with respect to the type of debt they can issue when they refinance their
maturing debt. However, I do not find that the direct debt financing costs these firms are
higher. Accordingly, the results suggest that the change in firms’ refinancing conditions
are caused by creditors’ aim for lower monitoring costs that is supplementary to the
decrease in credit risk stemming from their credit hedging. Although firms with available
CDS contracts still have lower rollover risk compared to firms for whom CDS contracts
are not available, the essay provides evidence that the CDS positions of creditors may
imply an indirect cost to firms in form of credit rationing.
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Essay 3: Can Central Banks Boost Corporate Investment:
Evidence from ECB’s Liquidity Injections
with Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Dragon Y. Tang, and Sarah Q. Wang
The third essay investigates whether unconventional monetary interventions by cen-
tral banks can stimulate corporate investment and, thus, affect the real economy. Specif-
ically, we address this question by analyzing ECB’s three-year Longer-term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) as of 2011-2012. The LTROs were large liquidity injections that
were implemented to support the real economic recovery after the European Sovereign
Debt Crisis and provided cheap funding to Eurozone banks. For the empirical investi-
gation of the impact of such liquidity interventions, we make use of comprehensive data
on banks’ use of the LTRO funds and Eurozone non-financial corporations’ investment
policies around the LTRO implementation.
We start our analysis by documenting that corporations outside the Eurozone which
were not directly affected by LTROs reduced investments more than Eurozone corpora-
tions following the LTROs. Since corporate investment in the onset of the credit crisis was
decreasing, such a counterfactual analysis suggests that the massive liquidity injections
helped Eurozone corporations to decelerate their investment decline. However, against
our expectations of an increase in investment for corporations in the Eurozone after the
LTROs, we find that the investments of these corporations are negatively associated with
the amount of funds their banks obtained from the ECB. Studying the characteristics of
banks that made use of the LTROs, we find that riskier banks had a higher LTRO uptake
and that in particular borrowers of these banks reduced investment following the LTROs.
When further investigating the role of bank risk in explaining the decrease in corporate
investment, we find that the effect is pronounced for corporations with a greater exposure
to bank debt, which suggests that bank risk and the signaling role of the banks’ LTRO
uptake might have impeded the transformation of liquidity injection into real economic
outputs. In addition, we document that the negative investment effect of the uncon-
ventional LTROs varies across banks’ LTRO-repayment policies and show that smaller
corporations whose lenders’ held the LTRO funds for a longer period did increase invest-
ment after the LTROs. Furthermore, we find that when fiscal policies of local governments
were accommodative to ECBs interventions, corporate investment increased in response
to their lenders’ LTRO uptakes. Overall, the results in this essay suggest that central
banks’ liquidity injections can decelerate economic decline, but also highlight the signifi-
cance of bank and country characteristics that impede the effectiveness of unconventional
monetary policies in improving real economic output.
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Summary in Danish
Essay 1: The Value of Bond Underwriter Relationships
with Jens Dick-Nielsen and Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Det første essay viser at det er værdifuldt for udstedere af virksomhedsobligationer
at have underwriter relationer. En stærk underwriter relation gør det muligt for under-
writeren at afgive en troværdig certificering af udstederen p˚a markedet hvilket er essentielt
for virksomhedens refinansiering af gæld. Vi efterviser denne certificerings-hypotese em-
pirisk ved at undersøge udstederes underwriter relationer og at teste værdien af disse for
den udstedende virksomhed.
Først analyserer vi den ubetingede effekt af at skifte underwiter ved empirisk at teste
hvorvidt der er fordele ved at have en stærk underwriter relation i henhold til omkost-
ninger forbundet med obligationsudstedelser. P˚a baggrund af denne analyse kan vi kon-
statere at b˚ade de indirekte og direkte udstedelsesomkostninger er lavere n˚ar virksomhe-
den benytter sig af en eksisterende underwriter relation. Det er derfor som udgangspunkt
forbundet med omkostninger for virksomheden at skifte underwriter. For det andet viser
vi at udstedere er negativ p˚avirket af finansielt udfordrede underwritere, i og med at
vi finder at kreditrisikoen af relaterede underwritere spiller over til kreditrisikoen af den
udstedende virksomhed. Hvis en underwriter kommer i finansiel nød svækkes under-
writerens evne til at mægle mellem obligationsudstederen og investorer samt at afgive
en troværdig certificering af udstederen. Da det dermed er omkostningskrævende for
obligationsudstederen at refinansiere dens gæld vil den svækkede relation føre til en øget
refinansierings-risiko for udstederen. Ved at konstruere et udsteder-bestemt m˚al for un-
derwriteres risiko viser vi eksplicit at det ikke kun er deciderede konkurser af underwriter,
men ogs˚a blot øget kreditrisiko af underwritere, der kan forklare obligationsudstederes
kreditrisiko.
I overenstemmelse med certificerings-hypotesen finder vi at kreditrisiko afsmitningen
er mere udpræget blandt lavt-rangerede virksomheder der typisk er mere skrøbelige og
derfor ogs˚a i højere grad er afhængige af underwriterens certificering. Effekten er desuden
større for virksomheder med en stor andel af kortfristet gæld, det vil sige virksomheder
med et særskilt behov for underwriternes service i forbindelse med refinansiering af gæld.
Dermed kan underwriteres finansielle nød blive karakteriseret som refinansierings-risiko
for udstederen. Samlet set viser denne artikel at underwriter relationer er værdifulde for
udstedere af virksomhedsobligationer.
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Essay 2: Corporate Hedging and Debt Extension
Det andet essay analyserer betydningen af kreditorers brug af credit default swaps (CDSer)
for gældsfinansieringen af relaterede virksomheder. CDSer er finansielle derivater der
beskytter køberen mod fallit af en given reference virksomhed. Tilgængeligheden af CDS
kontrakter er generelt blevet udpeget for at være gavnligt i henhold til bankers udl˚an da
det reducerer finansielle friktioner p˚a udbudsiden af l˚an. Ved at gøre brug af enest˚aende
og omfattende CDS og kredit register data fra Deutsche Bundesbank analyserer jeg ek-
splicit CDSer der bliver holdt at banker med en kredit relation til den underliggende
virksomhed og undersøger betydningen af variationen i disse kreditorers brug af CDSer
for l˚antagerens gældsfinansiering. De detaljerede data viser at kreditorer typisk holder
mange CDSer skrevet p˚a den samme virksomhed og ofte faktisk ogs˚a er (netto) sælgere
af CDS kontrakter der relaterer sig til deres egne l˚antagere.
I henhold til virksomheders totale krediteksponering finder jeg at omfanget af den
kreditforøgelse der opst˚ar p˚a baggrund af tilgængeligheden af CDS kontrakter i høj
grad afhænger af kreditorernes netto CDS positioner. Nærmere sagt, finder jeg at virk-
somheder, hvis kreditorer er netto købere af kreditbeskyttelse har relativt mindre kredit
til r˚adighed end virksomheder, hvis kreditorer er netto sælgere af kreditbeskyttelse. P
trods af at individuelle kreditorer øger deres krediteksponeringer til virksomheder for
givne niveauer af kreditbeskyttelse, s˚a finder jeg ikke at denne effekt er signfikant p˚a det
aggregerede niveau. Dette skyldes formentlig at virksomhedens øvrige kreditorer opve-
jer effekten. Desuden finder jeg at resultaterne er robuste nr jeg eksplicit kontrollerer
for l˚antagernes kreditrisiko samt en mere udpræget effekt for virksomheder og i perioder
hvor likviditeten af CDS kontrakter er lav.
I forhold til virksomheders refinansierings-risiko finder jeg at virksomheder med netto
CDS-købende kreditorer relativt til netto CDS-sælgende kreditorer har kortere løbetid
p˚a gæld og er mere begrænset i henhold til den type af gæld de kan udstede n˚ar de
skal refinansiere deres gæld. Samtidig, finder jeg dog ikke at disse virksomheder har
højere direkte gældsomkostninger hvilket indikerer at effekten p˚a virksomheders refinan-
sieringsbetingelser først og fremmest skyldes kreditorers sigte efter lavere overv˚agnings-
omkostninger. Selvom virksomheder med udest˚aende CDS kontrakter generelt har lavere
refinansierings-risiko sammenlignet med virksomheder for hvilke CDS kontrakter ikke
er tilgængelige, s illustrer dette essay at CDS positioner af kreditorer kan indebære en
indirekte omkostning for virksomheder i form af kreditrationering.
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Essay 3: Can Central Banks Boost Corporate Investment:
Evidence from ECB’s Liquidity Injections
with Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Dragon Y. Tang, and Sarah Q. Wang
Det tredje essay undersøger hvorvidt ukonventionelle monetære interventioner kan
p˚avirke real økonomien ved at stimulere virksomheders investeringer. Vi undersøger
denne problemstilling ved at analysere ECB’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO’erne)
fra 2011/2012. LTRO’erne omfattede en stor likviditetsindsprøjtning der skulle un-
derstøtte et opsving i realøkonomien efter den europæiske gældskrise og indebar en billig
finansiering for banker i eurozonen. For at undersøge effekten af s˚adanne likviditets in-
terventioner benytter vi et omfattende datasæt der inbefatter oplysninger om bankers
brug af LTRO finansieringen og ikke-finansielle virksomheders investeringer omkring im-
plementeringen af LTRO’erne.
Vi starter med at dokumentere at virksomhederne udenfor eurozonen, som ikke (di-
rekte) var p˚avirket af LTRO’erne, reducerede deres investeringer mere efter LTRO’erne
end virksomhederne i eurozonen. I forhold til det generelle fald i virksomheders in-
vesteringer efter gældskrisen s˚a indikerer denne kontrafaktiske analyse at den massive lik-
viditetsindsprøjtning hjalp med at opbremse nedgangen i investeringerne af virksomhed-
erne i eurozonen. Mod vores forventning om at virksomhederne i eurozonen øgede deres
investeringer efter LTRO’erne, finder vi dog at virksomhedernes investeringer generelt
er negativ associererede med størrelsen af LTRO-finansieringen af deres banker. Ved at
belyser egenskaberne p˚a de banker der benyttede sig af LTRO’erne finder vi at risikobe-
tonede banker i langt højere grad gjorde brug af LTRO-finansieringen og at især l˚antagere
af disse banker reducerede deres investeringer efter LTRO’erne.
Ved endvidere at undersøge bankernes kreditrisiko og dens rolle for virksomhed-
ernes fald i investeringer finder vi at effekten er størst for virksomheder der er mere
eksponeret overfor bankgæld. Dette indikerer at kreditrisikoen af banker og signalvær-
dien af bankers optag af LTRO-finansieringen kan have forulempet den real økonomiske
effekt som oprindeligt var tiltænkt den givne likviditetsindsprøjtningen. Vi kan yderligere
dokumentere at den negative investeringseffekt af de ukonventionelle LTROer varierer
med bankernes tilbagebetalinger af LTRO-finansieringen og viser herunder at mindre virk-
somheder, hvis bank tilbagebetalte LTRO-finansieringen relativt sent, faktisk øgede deres
investeringer efter LTRO’erne. Ligeledes finder vi at virksomheder i lande med en lem-
pelig finanspolitik i forhold til ECB’s interventioner øgede deres investeringer som følge
af bankers optag af LTRO’erne. Derved indikerer resultaterne i denne artikel at central
bankers likviditetsindsprøjtninger kan opbremse økonomisk nedgang, men tydeliggør sam-
tidig ogs˚a at den real økonomiske effekt af likviditetsindsprøjtninger er meget afhængig
af bankers og landes karakteristika og h˚andtering af ukonventionel pengepolitik.
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2
Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. All three share the aim of providing a
better understanding of financial frictions in corporate lending markets, but can be read
independently. The first essay (co-authored with Jens Dick-Nielsen and Mads Stenbo
Nielsen) investigates the value of bond underwriter relationships for corporate bond is-
suers. The essay documents that bond issuing firms do derive value from underwriter
relationships capital by showing that corporate bond issuers benefit from utilizing exist-
ing underwriter relationships when rolling over bonds, but also are exposed to the distress
of related underwriters. The second essay analyses the impact of creditors’ use of Credit
Default Swaps (CDS) for the debt financing of reference firms. The essay shows that the
extent to which the availability of CDS contracts relaxes firms’ debt financing conditions
depends on creditors’ specific CDS positions and, in fact, may imply an indirect cost to
firms in the form of credit rationing. The third essay (co-authored with Marti G. Sub-
rahmanyam, Dragon Y. Tang and Sarah Q. Yang) considers the effectiveness of central
bank policies in terms of stimulating the real economy via significant liquidity injections
to the banking system. By investigating the ECBs Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
(LTROs) as of 2011/2012 and the effect of the LTROs on corporate investment policies
the essays shows that the LTROs helped to decelerate the decline in corporate invest-
ment following the 2008 credit crisis. However, the essay also highlights the difficulties
of stimulating corporate investment through liquidity injections to the banking system,
especially when the balance sheets of banks are impaired.
The first essay sets the stage by investigating the value of bond underwriter relation-
ships for corporate bond issuing firms. The role of a corporate bond underwriter is to
facilitate the sales of newly issued corporate bonds and a strong underwriter relationship
enables the underwriter to credibly certify the issuer on the bond market. In line with this
certification hypothesis, but contrary to the findings in prior studies, we find that corpo-
rate bond issuers do retain value from underwriter relationships. First, we document the
value of underwriter relationships by collecting data on U.S. non-financial firms’ bond
issuance costs and underwriter relations, and empirically test for the effect of a strong
relationship between the issuing firm and the bond underwriter. Within this framework
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we find that when a bond issuer utilizes an existing underwriter relationship in repeated
bond issuances it lowers both the indirect and direct issuance costs. Accordingly, loyalty
towards the underwriter is rewarded and as a baseline it is costly for the firm to switch
underwriter. Second, we document that the same corporate bond issuers do derive value
from underwriter relationship capital by showing that issuers are adversely affected by
underwriter distress. Specifically, we find that the credit risk of the underwriter spills
over to the credit risk of the issuing firm. We argue that if an underwriter ends up in
financial distress it weakens the underwriter’s ability to connect the bond issuer with in-
vestors and to credibly certify the issuer. As this is costly for the bond issuer when rolling
over maturing bonds, the weakened relationship leads to higher credit risk of the issuer.
By constructing an issuer specific measure of underwriter distress we explicitly find that
the variation in the credit risk of related underwriters helps explain the variation in the
credit risk of bond issuers. While we do find that the effect is pronounced in the case of
an actual default of an underwriter, that will force firms to switch underwriter, we doc-
ument that the effect is also economically significant for just higher level of underwriter
distress. It is in particular these findings of an anticipation effect and issuing firms’ invol-
untary switches of underwriters that distinguishes this study from the existing literature
and suggests the value of underwriter relationships. Furthermore, and consistent with
the certification hypothesis, we find that the credit risk spillover is more pronounced for
low-rated firms which are usually also more opaque and, therefore, more dependent upon
the underwriter certification. In addition, the impact of underwriter distress is stronger
for firms with a high fraction of short-term debt, i.e., firms with an imminent need for
underwriter services for rolling over maturing bonds. Thus, underwriter distress can be
characterized as a rollover risk for the issuer.
While, the first essay contributes to the literature by documenting that corporate
bond issuers derive value from underwriter relationships, the second essay investigates
firms’ credit relationships and focuses on the role of creditors’ use of CDS for firms’
debt financing. CDSs are financial derivatives that protect the buyer against default
of a given reference firm and the availability of CDS contracts has been outlined to
be accommodative in reducing financial frictions on the supply side of credit. While
prior studies have shown that the existence of CDS markets are positively correlated
with relaxed borrowing conditions for non-financial firms, this essay documents that the
significance of the impact of CDS on firms’ debt financing depends to a large extent
on creditors’ specific holdings of CDS contracts that are written on the firms’ debt.
Specifically, I find that CDS positions of creditors may imply an indirect cost to firms
in the form of credit rationing. The results provided in this essay are is based upon an
empirical investigation that makes use of unique and comprehensive CDS position and
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German credit registry data from Deutsche Bundesbank. First of all, the combination
of these data allows me to investigate the impact of CDS holdings by the firms’ own
creditors which is important for the channel of an effect of CDS on firms’ borrowing
conditions. Secondly, the use of detailed firm-bank-level CDS position data provides this
study with the unique feature to analyze the impact of the amount of creditors’ CDS
holdings at a given point in time, but in particular also allows to separate between the
impact of creditors which are are (net) buyer or seller of credit protection. This is of
particular importance as the data reveals that creditors typically hold multiple CDSs
written on the same firm and often also are net sellers of CDS contracts written on their
own borrowers. Accordingly, the main contribution of this essay is that it provides a
more detailed understanding of the implications of variations in creditors’ CDS holdings
across firms and time. Furthermore, this essay also contributes to the discussion of the
impact of the existence of CDS for corporate lending more generally by focusing on the
implications of creditors’ net CDS holdings for firms’ overall borrowing conditions, as well
as by evaluating the effect of variations in creditors’ use of CDS contracts conditional on
the general availability of CDS contracts. Focusing on firm-level credit exposures I find
that the credit extension arising due to the availability of CDSs significantly depends
upon creditors’ net CDS positions. Specifically, the results outline that firms where the
creditors are net credit protection buyers have relatively less credit available relative to
firms where the creditors are net credit protection sellers. Although individual creditors
may extend their credit exposure to firms for certain levels of credit hedging, I find that
the effect is not significant on the aggregate level probably because the effect is offset by
the firms’ other creditors. While creditors typically buy CDS contracts on borrowers with
higher credit risk, the results are robust when I explicitly control for firms’ credit risk.
Furthermore, the effect is pronounced when CDS contracts are illiquid. Investigating
firms’ debt financing conditions more generally, I find that firms with net CDS-buying
creditors relative to firms with net CDS-selling creditors have lower debt maturity and are
more constrained with respect to the type of debt they can issue when they refinance their
maturing debt. However, I do not find that these firms have significantly higher direct
debt financing costs. Accordingly, the results suggest that the change in firms’ refinancing
conditions are caused by creditors’ aim for lower monitoring costs that is supplementary
to the decrease in credit risk stemming from their credit hedging. However, the analysis
also outlines that firms with available CDS contracts on average have lower refinancing
risk compared to firms for whom CDS contracts are not available. Overall, this essay
highlights that although the existence of CDS contracts tend to reduce financial frictions
in lending market, the use of CDS contracts by the firm’s own creditors may come at an
indirect cost to the firm in form of credit rationing.
5
In contrast to the first two essays, the third essay exemplifies how frictions in lending
markets can have real economic implications. Specifically, the third essay investigates the
effectiveness of central bank policies in terms of stimulating the real economy via signif-
icant liquidity injections to the banking system. We address this question by analyzing
ECB’s three-year Longer-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) as of 2011/2012 that
were unconventional liquidity injections of significant size and scope and provided cheap
funding to Eurozone banks. By improving liquidity in the banking sector the aim of these
interventions were to help the real economic recovery after the European Sovereign Debt
Crisis. For the empirical investigation of the real effects of such central bank liquidity
interventions, we make use of comprehensive data on Eurozone banks’ use of the LTRO
funding, as well as investment policies of Eurozone non-financial corporations around the
LTRO implementation. We start our analysis by documenting that non-Eurozone cor-
porations, which were not directly affected by LTROs, reduced investments more than
Eurozone corporations following the LTROs. Since corporate investment in the onset of
the credit crisis in general was decreasing, such a counterfactual analysis suggests that the
massive liquidity injections helped Eurozone corporations to decelerate their investment
decline. However, against our expectations of an increase in investment for Eurozone
corporations and after the LTROs, we find that the investments of these corporations
are negatively associated with the amount of LTRO funds their banks obtained from the
ECB. Studying the characteristics of banks that made use of the LTROs, we find that
riskier banks had a higher LTRO uptake and that, in particular, borrowers of these banks
reduced investment following the LTROs. When further investigating the role of bank
risk in explaining the decrease in investment, we find that the effect is pronounced for
corporations with a greater exposure to bank debt, which suggests that bank risk and the
signaling role of the banks’ LTRO uptake might have impeded the transformation of liq-
uidity injection into real economic measures. In addition, we document that the negative
investment effect of the unconventional LTROs varies across banks’ LTRO-repayment
policies and show that smaller corporations whose lenders’ held the LTRO funds for a
longer period did increase investment after the LTROs. Furthermore, we find that when
fiscal policies of local governments were accommodative to ECB’s interventions, corpo-
rate investment increased in response to their lenders’ LTRO uptakes. Overall, this essay
contributes to the debate about effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy by sug-
gesting that central banks’ liquidity injections can decelerate economic decline. However,
we also highlight the difficulties of stimulating corporate investment through liquidity
injections into the banking sector. Accordingly, the essay sheds light on the significance
of frictions in lending markets for the effectiveness of central bank policies that aim at
improving real economic measures via bank lending markets.
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Abstract
We show that corporate bond issuers benefit from utilizing existing underwriter relationships
when rolling over bonds, but at the same time become exposed to underwriter distress. A
strong relationship enables the underwriter to credibly certify the issuer resulting in lower
direct issuance costs and lower underpricing. However, if the underwriter becomes distressed,
this spills over to the issuer’s credit risk, because it weakens the relationship and increases the
risk of involuntary relationship termination. The credit risk spillover is more pronounced for
risky, opaque issuers with high rollover exposure, i.e., those issuers most in need of certification
by an underwriter.
1. Introduction
The value created by the relationship between an issuer of a security and the underwriter
can be characterized as relationship capital (Rajan (1992), and James (1992)). Prior
studies have shown that for equity offerings the issuer is able to capture part of the re-
lationship capital value (Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005), and Fernando, May, and
Megginson (2012)). However, the same studies do not find any evidence that the issuer of
a corporate bond retains value from the underwriter relationship and loyalty towards the
underwriter is therefore not rewarded. Contrary to this, we find that when bond under-
writer relationships are weakened it affects corporate bond issuers negatively, implying
that corporate bond issuers do derive value from underwriter relationship capital.
The role of a corporate bond underwriter is to facilitate the sales of newly issued
corporate bonds. This includes determining the proper offering price and finding poten-
tial investors using the underwriter’s investor connections (Nagler and Ottonello (2017)).
There is ample evidence in the literature that the choice of bond underwriter will affect
the success of the bond issue on the primary market (Fang (2005), Yasuda (2005), An-
dres, Betzer, and Limbach (2014), and Carbo´-Valverde, Cuadros-Solas, and Rodr´ıguez-
Ferna´ndez (2017)), as well as on the secondary market (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and
Lando (2012)). Our results suggest that these benefits, at least partly, accrue due to a
strong relationship between underwriter and issuer. The strong relationship can be seen
in that the credit risk of the lead underwriter spills over to the credit risk of the issuing
firm which is consistent with relationship capital being valuable for the issuer.
When issuers derive value from underwriter relationship capital it suggests that the
issuers benefit from certification (Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005)). In line with
this argument, we show that certification by the lead underwriter is helpful in reducing
asymmetric information between the issuer and the investors, ultimately resulting in a
higher net price on the primary market (Fang (2005), and Carbo´-Valverde, Cuadros-
Solas, and Rodr´ıguez-Ferna´ndez (2017)). While it is often true that some information
such as credit ratings (Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012)) are available to investors,
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this does not satisfy investors. Certification is instrumental in finding the proper offering
price and investor allocation; The Credit The Credit Roundtable (2015) reports that new
bond issues are usually announced and priced (sold) within the same day, and usually
with only very limited information available to the investors. The books can close as soon
as 15 minutes after the announcement and the average is within one to two hours. While
there used to be an issuer conference call for the bond investors to ask questions, the
standard is now that there is no contact between the bond investor and the issuing firm.
Investors may not even have the preliminary prospectus and bond indentures before the
books are closed. The situations described by The Credit The Credit Roundtable (2015)
highlight that bond investors are dependent upon the recommendation (certification) by
the underwriter. Thus, it is crucial that the bond underwriter knows and has a strong
relationship to the issuing firm in order to be able to credibly certify the bond issuance.
If the underwriter ends up in financial distress it weakens the underwriter’s ability
to connect the bond issuer with investors. Investors may no longer believe in the un-
derwriter’s expertise to provide accurate recommendations if the underwriter itself is in
distress. To enhance their own chances of short-term survival, distressed underwriters
may even be prone to moral hazard resulting in biased recommendations. Thus, distress
of the underwriter increases the risk that the issuers lose their valuable underwriter rela-
tionship capital. Consistent with this, we find empirically that underwriter distress affects
the financial health of those firms with strong relationships to the underwriter. Our re-
sults show that establishing a new relationship to another underwriter with other investor
connections is costly and the issuer would therefore, everything else equal, be worse off
by switching underwriter. While firms may benefit from switching underwriter (see, e.g.,
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005)), this
switch usually occurs voluntarily and not because of outside pressure. Ultimately, if an
underwriter ends up in distress it takes time for the issuer to establish an equally good
relationship to a new underwriter. We show that not utilizing an existing underwriter
relationship when issuing bonds, in general, increases both the direct issuance costs, as
well as the underpricing in the secondary market. These findings are in contrast to those
of Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) who find no benefits of underwriter loyalty for
corporate bond issuers.
For a given firm, we measure the distress of the issuer-underwriter relationship by
first identifying the lead underwriters of all bonds currently outstanding. The credit
default swap (CDS) spread of each lead underwriter, as a proxy for their credit risk,
is then weighted in proportion to how many of the firms’ currently outstanding bonds
the underwriter has underwritten. Hence, our firm-specific relationship distress measure
will be high if a dominant lead underwriter ends up in financial distress. Using this
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measure, we show that the firm-specific underwriter credit risk helps explain the CDS
spreads, i.e., credit risk, of bond issuers, both in levels and in changes. Consistent with
the certification hypothesis, we find that the sensitivity of firms’ credit risk to underwriter
distress is larger for speculative-grade issuers, i.e., exactly those who would benefit the
most from certification. Furthermore, within our time period from 2004 to 2012 there
are several large underwriters which default, most prominently, Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and Wachovia. We show that there is a clear difference in the evolution of the
credit risk for firms with a strong relationship to these underwriters compared to the rest
of the market.
If the underwriter relationship capital is valuable, we expect underwriter distress to
have a larger impact on firms with an imminent underwriting need. This would be the case
for firms with a high fraction of short-term debt. Because firms usually rollover maturing
debt, these firms would need to issue bonds again soon (Opler, Saron, and Titman (1997),
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001)). We find support for this hypothesis as our
results suggest that underwriter distress matters more for firms with a large amount of
debt maturing over the coming year, i.e., firms with a high rollover exposure. Hence,
our findings indicate that underwriter distress increases the rollover risk for bond issuers.
Furthermore, we verify that the increased rollover risk is not caused by a more illiquid
secondary market as in He and Xiong (2012).
The spill over from underwriter distress to the issuer’s credit risk is statistically, as
well as economically significant. While the first order determinants of issuer credit risk
continues to be firm fundamentals, we find that variation in underwriter distress has the
same explanatory power as variation in, e.g., firm leverage. For a firm with a median
distressed underwriter relationship, underwriter distress can explain around 8 percent of
the firm’s credit spread. Contrary to this, Chen, Cui, He, and Milbradt (2017) calibrate
the impact of rollover risk on the credit spread as defined in He and Xiong (2012). They
find that rollover risk in their calibration accounts for 5 percent of the credit spread.
Our study is closely related to that of Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) and Fer-
nando, May, and Megginson (2012). Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) find that switch-
ing bond underwriter decreases fees on average. However, their result is driven by issuers
who voluntarily graduate to higher-quality underwriters while obtaining lower fees. In
this study, we find the opposite result, namely, that switching underwriter increases fees
and underpricing. The contrasting results hinge on the distribution of voluntary versus
involuntary underwriter changes within the sample. To circumvent this issue, we take
an approach similar to Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012) and Kovner (2012), and
look at the effect of underwriter distress. In particular, Fernando, May, and Megginson
(2012) investigate the impact of the Lehman Brothers default and find, in contrast to us,
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no significant impact for bond underwriter clients. However, as their paper only looks
at the impact over the few days surrounding the default announcement and, hence, ig-
nores any anticipation effect, the effect they find is a lower bound for the total impact
of underwriter distress. Consistent with their results we find little incremental effect of
the default itself. However, we do find a significant and large anticipation effect for bond
issuers. Our underwriter relationship distress measure based on CDS spreads exactly
measures the degree to which underwriter defaults are anticipated by the market.
Firms that seek to borrow money can broadly speaking choose between obtaining
bank loans or issuing corporate bonds, and, accordingly, our study is also related to
the banking literature. First, firms often choose bond underwriters based on their prior
banking relations (Yasuda (2005), and Drucker and Puri (2005)). A distressed bond
underwriter could therefore imply a distressed bank lending relationship. However, we
verify empirically that bank loan underwriter distress (see, e.g., Acharya and Mora (2015))
and bond underwriter distress are separate contributors to issuer credit risk. Second, in
the banking literature the role of a bank is often emphasized as being able to overcome
asymmetric information about the quality and effort of the borrowing firm. In contrast,
investors in the corporate bond market are assumed to rely only on public information
(see, e.g., Diamond (1991a), Rajan (1992), Besanko and Kanatas (1993), and Bolton and
Freixas (2000)). Theoretically, firms with higher observable quality therefore go to the
corporate bond market, while more risky and opaque firms choose to build a relationship
with a bank. However, we show that this distinction is not a clear cut and that bond
issuers also benefit from certification.
2. Underwriter Relationships and Issuance Costs
Before we investigate the impact of underwriter distress on relationship capital, we look
at the unconditional effect of switching underwriter. Underwriter distress is potentially
costly for the bond issuer because it weakens the underwriter’s ability to certify the is-
suer and connect the issuer to investors. To avoid this, the issuer could in principle just
switch underwriter and, thereby, prevent any costs associated with having a distressed
underwriter. However, this can only be done if bond issuers do not derive value from rela-
tionship capital. Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) show that it, in general, is costly to
switch underwriter between equity offering, whereas Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)
and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) show that it, under some circumstances, can
be beneficial.1 We investigate the potential benefits of loyalty for corporate bond issuers
1The authors show that firms may obtain additional and influential analyst coverage from the new
lead underwriter and typically choose to graduate to higher reputation underwriters.
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by looking at the gross spread paid to the underwriter for providing the underwriter
service, as well as the underpricing in the secondary market.
To investigate the underwriter relationship benefits on gross spreads of corporate
bonds, we collect the spread as a percentage of the offering price from FISD for all
corporate bonds available. We label this variable Gross Spread. In the spirit of Gande,
Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997), we let the gross spread depend upon credit rating,
bond type, issuer industry, time to maturity, offering amount, and whether it is an
issuance under rule 144a. Furthermore, we add a dummy for whether the issuer is utilizing
an existing lead underwriter relationship. We label the dummy Existing UW Relation,
and in our definition, the issuer is using an existing relationship if one or more lead
underwriters involved in the new issuance also have been used for the issuance of a
currently outstanding bond. We restrict the analysis to issuers classified as industrial by
FISD and summary statistics are given in Table 1, Panel A. More specifically, we look at
the following regression:
Gross Spreadi = α + β1 × Existing UW Relationi + β2 × Time to Maturityi (1)
+ β3 ×Offering Amounti + β4 × Rule 144ai + β5 × Bond Typei
+ β6 × Credit Ratingi + β7 × Industryi + i
where i is the i’th bond issue.2 The estimated regression coefficients can be seen in
Table 2. Looking at specification (a) and (b), we see that a larger issuance size and a
shorter time to maturity both lowers the gross spread, and that issuing under Rule 144a
is more expensive. However, we also see that using an existing relationship lowers the
gross spread. In other words, switching underwriter, on average, is costly. In the special
case of an initial public bond offering (IPO) the issuer does not, by definition, have any
existing bond underwriter relationship. To address this, the third regression specification
includes a dummy for IPOs, IPO dummy. Consistent with the certification hypothesis,
we find that IPOs have higher costs as the issuers in these types of offerings have no
existing benchmarks or underwriter relationships. For seasoned issuances it is beneficial
for the issuer to utilize existing underwriter relationship capital, rather than switching
underwriter, as it lowers the direct rollover costs for the issuer.
While the gross spread measures the direct issuance costs, we can also look at the
implicit costs of underpricing in the secondary market (Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007),
and Nagler and Ottonello (2017)). We define the variable Underpricing and measure
underpricing as the relative difference in prices between the average transaction price
from TRACE over the first two weeks of trading and the offering price on the primary
2Bond Type and Industry are given on the levels available from FISD. Credit Rating is an indicator
for investment-grade issuer versus speculative-grade issuer.
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market.3 A positive underpricing return means that the bond is traded at higher prices
on the secondary market compared to the primary market, which is an implicit cost for
the issuer as known from the IPO literature. Using the same regression specifications as
for gross spread, we see from Table 2, specification (d) to (f) that utilizing an existing
relationship also lowers the indirect issuance costs in the form of lower underpricing.4
Looking at the marginal regressions (a) and (d), the effect of having an underwriter
relationship is quite significant. It lowers direct issuance costs by almost 20 basis points,
i.e., from 103 bps to 84 bps, and it lowers underpricing from an average of 75 bps to 24
bps. For seasoned bond issuers approximately 60 percent of the bonds are issued using
an existing underwriter relationship. In general, bond issuers can switch underwriter
either because they are forced to do it or because they choose to do it. A forced shift
of underwriter is most likely costly whereas a voluntary switch may be an advantage.
The disadvantage we find from switching underwriter should therefore be interpreted
as a lower bound for the costs of a forced new underwriter relationship across all bond
issuers. In that regards, our contrasting findings compared to those in Burch, Nanda,
and Warther (2005) are driven by sample difference in terms of the voluntary versus
involuntary underwriter changes. In the following sections, we look at the impact of
underwriter distress which is a more direct identification of the risk of being forced into a
new relationship (see, e.g., Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012), and Kovner (2012)).
3. Underwriter Distress and Issuer Credit Risk
An involuntary switch of underwriter is most likely costly for the bond issuer, especially,
if there is an imminent need for the underwriting service. In this section, we test to what
extent underwriter distress can help explain issuer credit risk. We expect the sensitivity
towards underwriter distress to be most pronounced for firms with high rollover exposure,
as well as for opaque firms who stand to gain the most from certification. We first define
an underwriter distress measure and, then, use this measure to test several hypotheses
relating underwriter distress to the distress of their client firms.
3.1 Underwriter Distress Measure
Each corporate bond issuer has underwriter relationships to one or more banks.5 When
measuring how distressed a firm’s underwriter relationships are, it is important to dif-
3Transaction prices from TRACE are cleaned as in Dick-Nielsen (2009).
4The results are robust to alternative specifications of the underpricing measure where we use shorter
time windows of the trading period.
5Every time we refer to underwriter we implicitly mean the lead underwriter(s) of the bond issuance
in question. Most bonds are issued using only a single lead underwriter.
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ferentiate between whether a given underwriter is core or periphery to the firm. We
therefore count the firm’s number of bonds currently outstanding that are underwritten
by a particular underwriter. Based on this, we calculate the average CDS spread of all of
the firm’s underwriters weighted by the number of bonds they each have underwritten.
In this way, we get an issuer-specific underwriter distress measure, UW Risk, where we
proxy for underwriter distress by the underwriter’s CDS spread. Hence, if several of a
firm’s bonds have been issued using a single underwriter, which typically is the case, then
that underwriter’s CDS spread will be given a larger weight in the distress measure. The
issuer-specific underwriter distress measure is defined as:
UW Riskit =
∑Nt
j=1 UW CDSjt × Number of bondsijt
Total number of bondsit
(2)
where i is the i’th issuer, j is the underwriting bank, UW CDSjt is the five-year log CDS
spread of the j’th underwriter in month t, and Nt is the number of underwriter connections
in month t.6 An underwriter may be close to default, but if that underwriter has only
been used for the issuance of a tiny fraction of the bonds outstanding, then it should not
matter much for the issuing firm. On the other hand, if the firm’s main underwriter is
in distress then this will have a large impact on the issuer-specific underwriter distress
measure. In order to determine the lead underwriter relationships for each U.S.-corporate
bond we use the Mergent FISD database. Table 3 shows the 20 most active underwriter
banks for bonds outstanding at some point during the period 2004-2012. As shown in
Column (b), the most active underwriters are JP Morgan, Citibank, and Goldman Sachs.
Hence, these are the banks with the most corporate bond client firms during our sample
period. We restrict our underwriter sample to the list of the 20 most active underwriter
banks so that our empirical results do not get distorted by atypical underwriters which
have only been used by very few issuers. For each of the top 20 underwriters, we collect
CDS spread data from Markit.7
3.2 Firm Fundamentals and Market Data
For all firms with a CDS spread in the Markit database, we collect quarterly firm funda-
mentals from Compustat (North America). As financial and utility firms typically have
special capital structures we exclude these from the analysis (SIC codes 4900 to 4999
and 6000 to 6999), as well as firms with no SIC code. The remaining firms constitute
our sample of corporate bond issuers. Table 3, Column (c), shows the number of client
firms in the final sample for each of the top 20 underwriters. The distribution of under-
6Our results are robust to the alternative specification where each underwriter is weighted by the
amount outstanding of each bond issue.
7Markit data is available from 2004 which thereby determines the starting point of our sample.
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writer relationships is almost the same as in the full sample except with fewer issuers.
The reduction in client firms is mainly driven by the availability of CDS spreads. All
CDS spreads are for the five-year CDS contract recorded at the beginning of the month.
Therefore, our sample is naturally biased towards larger firms, i.e., firms with access to
financing through corporate bonds and, furthermore, bond issuers with a CDS spread.
This selection bias helps differentiating our sample from the typical banking relationship
firm sample which usually consists of medium and smaller sized firms.
For the choice of potential determinants of issuer credit risk we largely follow Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), and Longstaff,
Mithal, and Neis (2005) and collect a standard set of firm fundamentals from Compu-
stat.8 Leverage is measured as the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities, divided by total assets. Equity Volatility is calculated using total stock returns
for the preceding 90 days. Following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and Subrahmanyam,
Tang, and Wang (2017), we measure Cash as the corporations’ cash holdings and cash
equivalents, scaled by total assets. Firm Size is measured by the natural logarithm of
total assets. Profitability is measured as operating income to total revenue. Furthermore,
we collect market wide variables to proxy for the business cycle. These are the one-year
swap rate from the Federal Reserve Bank, 1yr Swap, and the CDX index (CDX.NA.IG),
CDS Index provided by Markit. The CDX index is an average of the top industrial
investment-grade CDS spreads. Table 1, Panels B and C, provides summary statistics for
all variables. Finally, we collect bond rating data from FISD and stock price information
from CRSP.
3.3 The Impact of Underwriter Distress
If a financial institution, acting as an underwriter, is in distress it may not be able to
assist client firms in issuing new bonds. This could impair future investment decisions
in these firms and, in particular, make it costly for the firms to roll over maturing debt.
The firms could potentially switch to a new underwriter, but this would also be costly
as shown in the previous section. Furthermore, the firms may have other relationship
ties to the underwriter which could amplify the effect of underwriter distress (we return
to this issue in Section 4). The expected implication for the issuing firm is that when
the underwriter is in distress it will have a negative effect on the financial health of the
issuing firm. Hence, the credit risk of the underwriter spills over to that of the issuing
firm.
As a first rough indication of the impact of underwriter distress, we investigate the
impact of the loss of an underwriter relationship, caused by the default of the underwriter.
8All quarterly data are interpolated to obtain monthly data.
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Figure 1 shows the time series of the bond issuing firms’ average CDS spread based upon
their existing underwriter relationships. We split the sample of issuers into two groups;
those with a relationship to a defaulting underwriter, i.e., Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
or Wachovia, and those without. Figure 1 indicates that the group of bond-issuers with
a connection to an underwriter which defaults is more credit risky than the other group.
In order to test this hypothesis more formally, we use the underwriter distress measure,
UW Risk, defined above. We look at several versions of the following regression:
CDS Spreadit = α + β × UW Riskit + Controlsit + it (3)
= α + β × UW Riskit + γ1 × Leverageit + γ2 × Equity Volatilityit
+ γ3 × Profitabilityit + γ4 × Cashit + γ5 × Firm Sizeit
+ γ6 × 1yr Swapt + γ7 × CDS Indext + it
where i is the i’th issuing firm and t is the month. As a proxy for firms’ credit risk we
use CDS Spread which is the natural logarithm of the CDS spreads consistent with the
approaches in both Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) and Bai and Wu (2016). To
mitigate the effect of potential outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
The results of the regressions are listed in Table 4 and the full sample refers to
the sample that includes all available data from 2004 to 2012. In the first regression
(specification (a)), we include underwriter distress as the only regressor. Our underwriter
distress measure is highly significant in this marginal specification, and the size of the
coefficient on UW Risk is robust to including firm characteristics (specification (b)). The
firm characteristics used here are leverage and equity volatility, which are known to be
important predictors of credit risk (Merton, 1974) and have been shown to be the main
predictors of CDS spreads (Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) and Bai and Wu (2016)).
We also add cash holdings, firm size, and profitability.
We expect that higher leverage and higher equity volatility implies higher credit risk,
which is also what we see in Table 4. Furthermore, the results show that larger and more
profitable firms are less credit risky, while firms with higher cash holdings are more credit
risky. The latter finding is consistent with Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) who show
that cash holdings are used as a buffer for risky firms when rolling over their debt.
While there is cross-sectional variation in the underwriter distress measure, there
is also a strong time series correlation with general market conditions. During the 2008
financial crisis both bond-issuing and bond-underwriting firms were constrained, indepen-
dently of them having an underwriter relationship. Hence, when UW Risk is significant
in the regression we could just be picking up this time series correlation. In order to
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control for this, we include 1yr Swap and CDS Index to take account of general market
movements. This limits the sample to 2006 to 2014 because the CDX index data is not
available before 2006. In Table 4, we see that including the market variables reduces
the influence of the underwriter distress measure. However, the measure is still highly
significant even after controlling for general market movements.
Since CDS spreads are not defined after a default, underwriters naturally exit our
underwriter distress measure calculation upon their default. However, excluding the
relationship with a defaulted underwriter is counter-intuitive because we expect issu-
ing firms to be affected the most by underwriter distress exactly when the underwriter
defaults. Instead, the measure UW Risk will by construction outline a drop after an
underwriter defaults, as the remaining underwriter relationships are less credit risky. We
explicitly investigate the effect of an underwriter default in Section 3.7, but, at this point,
we merely exclude firms from the regression in the six months following the default of an
underwriter. In Table 4, specification (d), we see that excluding these firm observations
has very little impact on the estimated coefficients and, for now, we therefore continue
to work with the sample where relationships to a defaulted underwriter are excluded.
Overall, the results in Table 4 support the hypothesis that underwriter distress spills
over to the credit risk of the bond issuer. In Table 5, we run the same set of regressions,
but this time we use changes instead of levels. Again, we see that the UW Risk measures
is highly significant.
We can refine the connection between underwriter distress and bond issuer distress
even further: To the extent that the underwriter certifies the quality of the bonds, a
strong relationship should matter most for risky, opaque firms. These are the type of
bond issuers who would benefit the most from certification, and also the type of issuer
for whom we expect it to be most costly to build a new underwriter relationship. We
therefore split the sample into investment-grade and speculative-grade rated bond issuers.
Table 6 shows that the UW Risk measure is highly significant for both investment-grade
and speculative-grade rated issuers. However, the coefficient for issuers with a speculative-
grade rating is larger, both for the regression in levels and in changes. Hence, the results
in Table 6 indicate that the underwriter relationship, consistent with the certification
hypothesis, is more important for riskier firms.
While we argue that the causality is a spill over from underwriter to bond issuer, one
could also consider the reverse causality. If causality was reversed it would imply that
firms with excessive risk choose more credit risky underwriters.9 However, we do not find
evidence for such an effect in the data. The reverse causality is most easily investigated
9By excess risky we here mean that the firm’s CDS spread could not be explained by the other controls
in the regression, i.e., firm fundamentals and business cycle proxies.
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by considering the time series dimension. Before the crisis, Lehman Brothers was not
significantly more risky than other underwriters. As Lehman Brothers’ CDS spread rose
during the crisis, reverse causality should then have implied that excess credit risky
firms establish new underwriter relationships to Lehman Brothers. However, rather than
finding this to be a dominant behavior, we find that relationships are very sticky. In
particular, we observe that in the 12 months leading up to the default only 11 firms
established new underwriter relationships to Lehman Brothers out of a total of 63 firms
with a connection to Lehman Brothers. Furthermore, we find that these new firms are
not excess credit risky at the inception of the relationship.10 In other words, those firms
which experience an increase in credit risk because of a connection to Lehman Brothers
had, for the vast majority, also a connection to Lehman Brothers before it became more
credit risky than other underwriters. Hence, we do not find evidence for the presence of
a reverse causality in our results.
3.4 Rollover Risk
Firms often aim at maintaining a target leverage ratio (Opler, Saron, and Titman (1997),
and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001)) and, hence, often roll over maturing debt
by replacing maturing bonds with newly issued bonds. In order to roll over bonds, firms
need to make use of their underwriter relationship. If the underwriter is distressed, then
the bond-issuing firms are exposed to higher costs when rolling over their debt which may
further translate into higher credit risk (He and Xiong (2012)). It is therefore interesting
to investigate to what extent the underwriter distress measure is specifically connected
to rollover risk.
In order to test this rollover exposure hypothesis, we identify all firms with an immi-
nent need for rolling over maturing debt. Specifically, we follow He, Wang, and Qi (2014),
and Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) and use Debt ≤1yr/ Assets which is defined as
the amount of long-term debt maturing within one year relative to total assets. When the
rollover exposure is high, we would expect underwriter distress to have a larger impact.11
We test the hypothesis by including the interaction between rollover exposure and the
underwriter distress measure into the regression from before:
10Specifically, we investigate whether firms with a connection to, respectively, Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and Wachovia, at the time of their default, already two years prior to the default had higher
CDS spreads than the average firm in our sample. We do not find significant differences.
11Again one could consider the reverse causality. However, the capital structure and, thus, rollover
exposure is chosen at a point before there are any significant differences between underwriters’ credit
risk.
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CDS Spreadit = α + β1 × UW Riskit + β2 ×
Debt ≤1yrit
Assetsit
+ β3 × Debt ≤1yrit
Assetsit
× UW Riskit + Controlsit + it (4)
where i is the i’th issuing firm and t is the month. The controls are the same as in our
base regression model (3). The coefficients are shown in Table 7. For brevity, and as all
control variables are significant with the expected signs, we have excluded the coefficients
for the control variables.
In Table 7, Panel A, specification (a) and (d), we see that when underwriter distress
increases, the credit risk of bond issuers increases more for firms with higher rollover
exposure. The coefficient is not significant for investment-grade firms but is significant
for speculative-grade firms. When UW Risk is high enough, i.e., slightly above the
median for speculative-grade firms, credit risk is also an increasing function of rollover
exposure. In other words, as the amount of short-term debt increases so does the CDS
spread as long as the underwriter distress measure is above a certain threshold. Related
studies have shown that firms roll over part of their debt already two to three years before
maturity (Xu (2017)). Therefore, we also investigate firms’ holdings of long-term debt
maturing within two and three years. For the two-year horizon the effect is still present
(although the coefficients are smaller), whereas for the three-year horizon the results are
insignificant. Hence, there seems to be an amplifying effect of higher rollover exposure,
but when increasing the debt maturity horizon the effect gradually vanishes, intuitively,
because the rollover exposure approaches total debt.
As a robustness check we look at an alternative definition of firms’ rollover exposure
calculated as maturing long-term debt scaled by total long-term debt instead of by total
assets. The results are shown in Table 7, Panel B, and are very similar. In robustness tests
we also replace the five-year bond-issuer CDS spread with a one-year CDS spread. The
results show that long-term debt due within one year remains significant for speculative-
grade issuers, but that debt due within two and three years are not significant. This again
supports the hypothesis that higher rollover exposure increases the sensitivity towards
underwriter distress.
3.5 Underwriter Distress and Bond Illiquidity
Both theoretical (He and Xiong (2012)) and empirical (Valenzuela (2015), and Nagler
(2017)) findings suggest that secondary market illiquidity could spill over to the primary
market and induce rollover risk because of depressed offering prices. Hypothetically, this
effect could be attributed to underwriter distress as well. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and
Lando (2012) show that when the lead underwriter of a bond goes into distress, the bond
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becomes less liquid in the secondary market. This is because the underwriter often also
acts as market maker in the secondary market. Since underwriter distress leads to a
less liquid secondary market it would indirectly spill over to a price discount for new
bonds on the primary market. This price discount is what is defined as rollover risk in
He and Xiong (2012). Note that this market making hypothesis is complementary to the
certification hypothesis, i.e., these are two different ways in which underwriter distress
might impact issuer credit risk.
To test the market making hypothesis, we first verify that underwriter distress leads
to a less liquid market (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012)) by estimating the
following regression:
Bid-Ask Spreadit = α + β × UW Riskit + it (5)
where i is the i’th issuing firm and t is the month. Bid-Ask Spread is the average effective
bid-ask spread across all outstanding bonds from the same issuer. The bond specific bid-
ask spread is calculated as the monthly average across the daily difference between volume
weighted bid and ask transaction prices.12 From Table 8, Panel A, we see that the UW
Risk measure is significant in explaining the bid-ask spread so that higher underwriter
distress leads to more illiquid bonds for the client firms. This suggests that part of the
underwriter distress effect could be due to a spill over from a less liquid secondary market.
To test whether there also exists a bond liquidity effect on corporate credit risk that is
independent of underwriter distress, we first calculate Bid-Ask Spread Residual as the
residual from the bid-ask spread regression specified in Equation (5) and then include
this bid-ask spread residual in the base regression from Equation (4).
Table 8, Panel B, first of all shows that bond issuers’ bid-ask spreads on their own
are significant in explaining issuer credit risk (specification (a)). That is, when the mar-
ket becomes more illiquid, the issuer credit risk is higher consistent with the findings in
Valenzuela (2015) and Nagler (2017). However, as we will show in the next section, the
impact from illiquidity is not economically significant despite being statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, while we do find evidence for positive correlation between bond liquidity and
corporate credit risk, we do not find strong support for the market making hypothesis in
our sample.
In the remaining specifications in Panel B we include the bid-ask spread residual
instead of the bid-ask spread directly. The results show that in all specifications, un-
derwriter distress remains significant. In some of the specifications the bid-ask spread
residual also comes out as significant, while the interaction between the firm’s rollover
12We only use institutional size transactions above $100,000 as in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and
Xu (2009).
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exposure and the bid-ask spread residual never comes out significant. It is mainly this
latter interaction which has been taken as evidence that rollover risk (in the sense of
He and Xiong (2012)) matters for issuer credit risk. Thus, in contrast to the related
literature our results suggest that the market maker effect is small in our sample and,
furthermore, to a large extent is due to underwriter distress causing the bonds to be less
liquid in the secondary market.
3.6 Economic Significance
So far, we have shown that underwriter distress contributes significantly to explaining the
credit risk of bond issuers. In this section we further investigate whether the effect is also
economically significant. We evaluate the economic impact by investigating how much
of the variation in issuer credit risk that can be explained by variation in underwriter
distress. If large differences in underwriter distress also lead to large differences in CDS
spreads of bond issuers, then we will conclude that the effect is economically significant.
Using the regression specification from Table 8, specification (c), we calculate the
contribution of our underwriter distress measure for each issuer, i, and each month, t, as:
UW Risk contributionit = βˆ1 × UW Riskit + βˆ3 × Debt≤1yrit
Assetsit
× UW Riskit (6)
= CDS Spreadit − Non-UW Risk variablesit
After having calculated the underwriter distress contribution for each CDS spread obser-
vation we calculate the distribution of this contribution across time and issuers. Following
the approach in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012), we then calculate the width
of the distribution by looking at the difference between the 50% percentile and the 5%
percentile:
UW Risk contribution50% − UW Risk contribution5%
This difference can be interpreted as the part of the variation in the CDS spread, between
an issuer with a median distressed underwriter and an issuer with a minimum distressed
underwriter, which can be explained by the difference in underwriter distress.13 We split
the sample into issuers with an investment-grade rating versus a speculative-grade rating
and form separate distributions for each of these rating classes.
Table 9, Panel A, shows the estimates of economic significance (distribution widths)
of the underwriter distress measure, as well ad of some of the other control variables.
13This approach is essentially equivalent to evaluating the impact of, for example, a one standard
deviation shock to UW Risk. However, it should be more robust as it controls for possible covariation
between UW Risk and other independent variables.
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Relative to each of the other variables, the impact from underwriter distress is rather
large. However, the combined effect of all firm fundamentals is still larger than the
underwriter distress effect (although adding up the individual effects of fundamental
variables ignores possible correlation). Since the log difference can be interpreted as a
relative difference, we can see that the underwriter distress impact is approximately 35
percent larger for an investment-grade rated median underwriter-distressed bond issuer
compared to an issuer with a minimum distressed underwriter. The effect for speculative-
grade firms is larger at 46 percent.
Another way to evaluate the impact, also following Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and
Lando (2012), is to measure the underwriter distress contribution relative to the size of
the total issuer CDS spread. We therefore calculate the relative spread contribution as
follows:
UW Risk contributionit − UW Risk contribution5%
CDS Spreadit
where i is the ith issuer and t is the month. Finally, we form the distribution of this
ratio and look at the median of the distribution. Table 9, Panel B, shows the median
numbers for investment-grade and speculative-grade rated firms. Using this approach
we see that underwriter distress explains around 8 percent of the total credit risk for
both investment-grade and speculative-grade firms. This fraction is again comparable to
the best single firm fundamentals factor. It can also be compared to the credit spread
contribution of 5 percent from rollover risk in Chen, Cui, He, and Milbradt (2017).
Note that the bond illiquidity residual can only explain around 1 percent of the spread.
Since the coefficient on bid-ask spread alone in the regressions in Table 8 was twice that
of the residual, then illiquidity cannot explain more than 2 percent of the credit spread.
Hence, the economic impact of the market making hypothesis is rather small compared
to the total effect of underwriter distress of around 8 percent.
3.7 Default of an Underwriter
Most of the previous tests have excluded the CDS spread of an issuing firm if it had an
underwriter default within the past six months (except Tables 4 and 5). This was done
because underwriter default is a rare event which could be biasing results when analyzing
issuer distress after an underwriter defaults. In this section, we revisit the effect of having
an underwriter defaulting.
The underwriter distress measure does at all times consist of the CDS spreads of
underwriters 1) who are currently alive, i.e., not in default, and 2) with whom the firm
currently has bonds outstanding. Hence, the measure has the counter-intuitive behavior
that right after an underwriter defaults the underwriter distress measure will most likely
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improve because the riskiest underwriter is taken out. This is counter-intuitive as we
would think that the loss of an underwriter is the ultimately worst case of underwriter
distress. Given a default of an underwriter relationship the firm is forced to build a new
relationship (or tighten the relationships with other existing underwriters). Furthermore,
the default of an underwriter is likely to happen when the market and other underwriters
are distressed as well.
We consider three specific cases where an underwriter defaulted or experienced a
situation similar to a default. First, we consider the default and takeover of Bear Stearns
in March 2008. Second, we consider the default of Lehman Brothers. After some turmoil
starting in August 2008, Lehman Brothers defaulted in September 2008. Third, we look
at Wachovia. In April 2008, Wachovia reported large losses and ended up being acquired
by Citigroup in September 2008. The most important dates and events for each of these
underwriter defaults are listed in Table 10.
Figure 3 shows the time series of the average CDS spread for firms with an underwriter
relationship to Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Wachovia, respectively.14 In each
sub-figure, the sample of firms is split into two types of bond-issuers; those with an
underwriter relation to Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, or Wachovia, respectively, at
the point of their defaults, and those without a relation to any of these underwriters
(control group). After normalizing the average CDS spread of the sub-samples to the
same starting point, we see from Figure 3 that the group with a defaulted underwriter is
more credit risky than the control group.
Similar to the former regressions, we tease out the effect of a defaulting underwriter
by looking at the regression specification from Equation (4). Now we also include firms
that have had an underwriter defaulting within the last six months, but control for this by
adding a time-dependent dummy to the regression in the following way. For the default
of Lehman Brothers, we add a dummy variable which is equal to one only in the first
month after the default of Lehman Brothers, and only if the issuer had an underwriter
relationship with Lehman Brothers. We subsequently replace this variable with another
dummy which is equal to one in the two month following the default etc., all the way up
to six months after the default. These dummies account for the special circumstances of
losing an underwriter relationship after a default over different time horizons. We produce
the same dummies for the default of Bear Stearns and the default of Wachovia. Table 11
shows the estimates from these regressions. The table only reports the coefficient for the
default dummy for each of the regressions.
The defaulting underwriter coefficient is significant for the first three to five months
14In order to provide a clearer study, we exclude in this analysis all firms that had a relationship to
more than one of the three defaulted underwriters.
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after the default. This indicates that the credit risk of the issuer is at an elevated level
right after the elimination of an underwriter relationship. As we extend the time horizon
of the default dummy the issuing firm has time to build new relationships. The combined
effect of the increase in CDS spread from the dummy and the drop in UW Risk from
eliminating the riskiest underwriter almost cancels out in the sense that the drop in the
UW Risk measure is offset by the increase in the dummy. Thus, the resulting issuer credit
spread is fairly constant at the level from when the underwriter defaulted. The credit
spread then improves after four to six months at which point the underwriter distress
measure for the issuer’s remaining underwriters is no longer affected by the default event.
It is difficult to extrapolate too much from these three default events. First, defaults
are rare. Second, the types of default differ significantly from each other. Both Bear
Stearns and Wachovia are effectively taken over immediately by other firms. The issuing
firms then need to rebuild their relationship with the new owners. On the other hand,
for the case of Lehman Brothers there is no one who takes over their responsibilities.
Therefore, it would be natural to expect that this default had a larger impact on issuer
credit risk than the other two events, but this does not seem to be the case. Figure
3 reveals that the elevated level of credit risk maybe last slightly longer, but it is not
materially different. This may be caused by the fact that all other underwriters at the
same time experience a large shock to their default risk and becomes distressed. In other
words, as the entire market is distressed it may be difficult to distinguish the underwriter
risk of one issuer from that of another issuer.
4. Bond Underwriter versus Bank Loan Provider
The bond issuer underwriter relationship is different from the traditional banking rela-
tionship. The syndicate members in a bank loan directly contribute funds to finance
the loan whereas the bond underwriter primarily acts as an intermediary. However, it is
common for the bond issuer to find its underwriter among existing banking relationships
(Yasuda (2005)). The underwriter distress effect we find could therefore be a proxy for
a distressed banking relationship. As a robustness test and, in order to separate the two
effects, we construct a bank loan relationship distress measure similar to the underwriter
distress measure. For each firm we collect information on syndicated loans from SDC
Dealscan and the bank loan distress measure is then the weighted average of the syn-
dicate members’ five-year log CDS spread for all loans currently outstanding. We limit
the banks to the same list of top 20 underwriter banks that we used for the underwriter
distress measure but we add any top 20 syndicate bank which was not part of the bond
underwriter sample (see Table 3).
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In order to distinguish between a firm’s dependence on its bank loan connection versus
its bond underwriter connection, we multiply the underwriter distress measure with the
ratio of outstanding corporate bond debt to the sum of bond and bank loan debt, Bond
Debt / Total Debt, and, similarly, multiply the bank distress measure with the fraction of
outstanding bank loan debt, Bank Debt / Total Debt. The idea is that if corporate bond
debt only accounts for a small fraction of the overall debt, then it is unlikely that the
underwriter relationship should be important compared to the bank loan relationship,
and vice versa. Table 1, Panel D, reports summary statistics for the sample and shows
that the dependence upon bank loan debt is rather evenly distributed between firms with
low and high dependence, respectively.
We add the two distress measures along with the bond debt fraction to the base
regression from Equation (3). The results are reported in Table 12. The coefficient on
the bond debt fraction is negative, indicating that firms financed with more corporate
bond debt compared to bank debt are less risky. This is consistent with the idea that
more opaque firms seek out a banking relationship (see, e.g., Rajan (1992)). However,
for the firms with a high bond debt fraction, we see that underwriter risk is equally
important. Both the underwriter risk and the bank risk coefficients are significant, i.e.,
both types of relationships impact the credit risk of the firms. Which of the two types of
relationships is most important in the end then depends on the primary financing source
for the specific firm.
5. Conclusion
We show that corporate bond issuers derive value from bond underwriter relationship
capital. When a bond issuer utilizes an existing underwriter relationship, it lowers both
the indirect and direct issuance costs. Furthermore, issuers are adversely affected by
underwriter distress and the credit risk of the underwriter spills over to the credit risk
of the issuer. We show this by constructing an issuer specific measure of underwriter
distress. This measure captures the average weighted stress of the issuer’s underwriter
connections. Our findings suggest that bond underwriters benefit from certification by
the underwriter. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that the effect of underwriter
distress is stronger for speculative-grade rated firms which are usually also more opaque
and, therefore, more dependent upon certification. The impact of underwriter distress is
also stronger for firms with a high fraction of short-term debt, i.e., firms with an imminent
need for underwriter services for rolling over maturing bonds. Thus, underwriter distress
can be characterized as a rollover risk for the issuer.
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Figure 1
CDS Spreads of corporate bond issuers
This figure shows the development in the CDS spreads of U.S.-based firms for the period 2006 to 2012. The CDS spread
is the average (median) of monthly primo-months observations of five-year CDS spreads, given in basis points. Issuers are
separated into Defaulted Underwriter and No Defaulted Underwriter samples based upon whether the firm had a relation-
ship to an underwriter that defaulted within the sample period. Specifically, the figure includes the issuer relationships to
top-20 underwriters within the sample period, where the sub-sample of defaulted underwriters includes the default of Bear
Stearns (BS) on March 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers (LB) on September 15, 2008, and Wachovia (WH) on September 29,
2008.
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Figure 3
The impact of underwriter default on issuer CDS spreads
These figures show the development in CDS spreads of firms that have an underwriter relationship to Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers or Wachovia, as well as for firms that do not have an underwriter relationship to these underwriters. Bear Stearns
defaulted on March 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers defaulted on September 13, 2008, while Wachovia defaulted on September
29, 2008. The CDS spread is the median beginning of month five-year CDS spread in bps across issuers in the sample.
The average CDS spread of each sub-sample is normalized to the same starting point two years before the default of the
respective underwriter. The sample of firms is based on Compustat and Mergent Fisd. The CDS data is taken from Markit.
27
Table 1
Summary statistics
Panel A: Gross Spread and Underpricing
Gross Under- Existing Time to Offering Rule
Spread pricing UW Relation IPO Maturity Amount 144a
Mean 0.93 0.40 0.47 0.19 11.20 0.36 0.25
SD 0.95 1.05 0.50 0.39 9.07 2.25 0.43
Q1 0.35 -0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.08 0.00
Q2 0.65 0.14 0.00 0.00 9.64 0.20 0.00
Q3 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.00 10.30 0.40 1.00
Bonds 41,465 41,465 41,465 41,465 41,465 41,465 41,465
Panel B: Firm Characteristics and Market Measures
CDS UW Eq. Firm Pro- UW Bonds 1yr CDS
Spread Risk Lev. Vol Size fit. Cash Rel. Outst. Swap Index
Mean 4.63 4.26 0.31 0.11 9.09 0.12 0.09 2.75 5.48 2.42 4.27
SD 0.89 1.05 0.16 0.15 1.11 0.09 0.09 1.79 4.70 1.91 0.50
Q1 3.96 3.23 0.20 0.06 8.24 0.06 0.03 1.50 2.00 0.54 3.88
Q2 4.53 4.64 0.27 0.08 8.99 0.10 0.06 2.00 4.00 2.07 4.32
Q3 5.26 5.08 0.39 0.10 9.83 0.18 0.12 4.00 7.00 4.28 4.50
Firms 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329
Panel C: Firm Characteristics by Credit Rating Group
Investment-grade Speculative-grade
CDS UW Eq. Firm Pro- CDS UW Eq. Firm Pro-
Spread Risk Lev. Vol. Size fit. Cash Spread Risk Lev. Vol. Size fit. Cash
Mean 4.22 4.32 0.26 0.10 9.42 0.15 0.09 5.47 4.19 0.41 0.14 8.41 0.08 0.09
SD 0.63 1.03 0.12 0.16 1.05 0.08 0.09 0.73 1.09 0.18 0.15 0.90 0.07 0.08
Q1 3.79 3.28 0.18 0.06 8.62 0.08 0.03 5.12 3.11 0.26 0.08 7.73 0.03 0.03
Q2 4.24 4.69 0.24 0.07 9.38 0.13 0.06 5.49 4.42 0.40 0.10 8.25 0.07 0.06
Q3 4.62 5.10 0.32 0.09 10.1 0.20 0.13 5.99 5.02 0.51 0.13 8.97 0.13 0.12
Firms 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel D: Firm Characteristics and Bank Risk Measures for Subsample
CDS UW Eq. Firm Pro- Bond Bank
Spread Risk Lev. Vol. Size fit. Cash Ratio Risk
Mean 4.81 4.17 0.36 0.11 9.08 0.13 0.07 0.61 4.06
SD 0.92 0.85 0.17 0.14 1.20 0.09 0.07 0.23 0.93
Q1 4.24 3.29 0.24 0.06 8.12 0.07 0.02 0.44 3.08
Q2 4.77 4.49 0.31 0.09 8.95 0.11 0.05 0.61 4.45
Q3 5.44 4.87 0.45 0.11 9.88 0.18 0.09 0.80 4.82
Firms 188 186 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
The table provides summary statistics for all regression variables. Gross spread is the bond issuance costs as a fraction of
offering price. Underpricing is the relative price difference between the offering price and the average transaction price of
a bond over the two weeks after issuance. Existing UW Relation is a dummy which is one if one or more lead underwriters
for the new issuance have also been used for an currently outstanding bond. IPO is a dummy which is one if it is the first
bond issuance by the firm. Time to Maturity is measured in years. Offering Amount is the natural logarithm of the offering
amount in millions. Rule 144a is a dummy which is one if the bond was issued under Rule 144a. CDS Spread is the natural
logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. UW Risk is the natural logarithm of the average
related underwriter CDS spread weighted by number of outstanding bonds underwritten for each issuer. Leverage is the
book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Equity Volatility is calculated using
total stock returns for the preceding 90 days. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is operating
income to total revenue. Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. UW Relations is the number of
underwriter relations of the average firm across time. Bonds Outstanding is the number of bonds held by the average firm
across time. 1yr Swap is the one year swap rate from the Federal Reserve Bank. CDS Index is the natural logarithm
of the ’CDX.NA.IG’-index spread provided by Markit. Bond Ratio is the ratio of bonds to bank debt. Bank Risk is the
natural logarithm of the average related bank syndicate members’ CDS spreads weigthed by loan size. Investment-grade
(Speculative-grade) refers to a firm with a S&P credit rating that is equal to ’BBB’ or higher (’BB’ or lower). The sample
period is 2004-2012, and the variables are based on monthly observations. The data are obtained from Compustat N.A.,
CRSP, Mergent FISD, TRACE, Markit, and SDC Dealscan.
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Table 2
Underwriter relation effect on gross spread and underpricing
Gross Spread Underpricing
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Intercept 1.030*** 0.747***
(106.39) (34.49)
Existing UW Relation -0.194*** -0.237*** -0.077*** -0.509*** -0.167*** -0.079***
(-14.14) (-17.26) (-5.54) (-19.32) (-6.39) (-2.88)
Time To Maturity 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.004***
(6.39) (10.88) (2.43) (2.86)
Offering Amount -0.004* -0.003 0.115*** 0.130***
(-1.91) (-1.22) (4.93) (5.61)
Rule 144a 0.194*** 0.036 0.405*** 0.312***
(5.77) (1.09) (12.38) (9.14)
IPO Dummy 0.699*** 0.408***
(38.50) (9.14)
Bond Type Dummy N Y Y N Y Y
Credit Rating Dummy N Y Y N Y Y
Industry Dummy N Y Y N Y Y
R-square 0.010 0.310 0.360 0.051 0.296 0.304
N 19257 19107 19107 6992 6990 6990
This table presents estimates of the effect of utilizing an existing underwriter relationship on the gross spread and under-
pricing. Gross Spread is the fees paid to underwriter as a fraction of the offering price. Underpricing is defined as the
return between the offering price and the average price of the bond over the first two weeks of trading on the secondary
market. Existing UW Relation is a dummy which is equal to one if the bond is issued using an underwriter which has
also been used for another currently outstanding bond from the same firm. IPO Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the
respective bond issue is the first bond issuance for the firm. For gross spread (in percentage points), we use all bonds from
FISD and for underpricing (in percentage points) we use all bonds available in TRACE. (*** denotes significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 3
Top-20 bond underwriters (2004-2012)
Country Number of clients Number of clients
Financial institution of origin within sample period within firm sample
(Lead underwriter) (a) (b) (c)
ABN Amro Bank NLD 60 6
Banc of America USA 1419 109
Barclays GBR 633 32
Bank One USA 71 7
BNP Paribas FRA 170 10
Bear Stearns USA 239 9
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CAN 34 1
Citibank USA 1743 123
Credit Suisse CHE 884 57
Deutsche Bank GER 909 61
Goldman Sachs USA 1605 68
HSBC Bank GBR 200 7
JP Morgan USA 2610 143
Lehman Brothers USA 910 42
Merrill Lynch USA 1270 59
Morgan Stanley USA 1324 66
Salomon Brothers USA 563
Union Bank of Switzerland CHE 615
Wells Fargo USA 365 23
Wachovia USA 433 28
The table presents the 20 most active banks serving as underwriters of corporate bonds outstanding in the period from
2004 to 2012. The list counts the number of U.S. corporate bond issuances where the respective financial institution acted
as the lead underwriter. The number of clients in column (b) refers to the number of non-financial firms that issued bonds
using the given underwriter, while the number of clients in column (c) refers to the number of non-financial firms within
our sample.
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Table 4
Underwriter distress effect on credit risk
CDS Spread
Full sample Full sample Full sample Sample without default
(a) (b) (c) (d)
UW Risk 0.400*** 0.404*** 0.156*** 0.151***
(14.35) (18.45) (3.97) (3.77)
Leverage 2.203*** 2.087*** 2.059***
(8.89) (8.12) (8.23)
Equity Volatility 1.394*** 1.951*** 1.934***
(5.56) (5.71) (5.88)
Firm Size -0.276*** -0.246*** -0.254***
(-7.48) (-6.34) (-6.83)
Profitability -2.585*** -2.429*** -2.398***
(-5.99) (-5.89) (-5.85)
Cash 0.692** 0.527 0.515
(2.14) (1.59) (1.57)
1yr Swap -0.038** -0.045***
(-2.43) (-2.94)
CDS Index 0.407*** 0.383***
(5.87) (5.36)
Adj. R-square 0.150 0.560 0.580 0.577
N 18588 18553 15016 14767
This table presents estimates of the effect of underwriter distress on issuer credit risk. CDS Spread is the natural logarithm
of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. UW Risk is the natural logaritm of related underwriters’
average CDS spreads, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds outstanding. Specification (d) excludes observations
for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. The main sample period is
2004-2012, based on monthly observations. When using market measures, the sample period is reduced to 2006-2012 due
to lack of data availability. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at
the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 5
Changes in underwriter distress and credit risk
∆ CDS Spread
Full sample Full sample Full sample Sample without default
(a) (b) (c) (d)
∆ UW Risk 0.259*** 0.245*** 0.151*** 0.150***
(5.87) (5.61) (3.23) (3.11)
∆ Leverage 0.253*** 0.183*** 0.192***
(3.56) (3.10) (3.23)
∆ Equity Volatility 0.135*** 0.080*** 0.081***
(2.93) (2.63) (2.63)
∆ Firm Size -4.444** -3.053 -3.325*
(-2.42) (-1.57) (-1.64)
∆ Profitability -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.39) (-0.79) (-0.74)
∆ Cash 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.78) (4.34) (4.45)
∆ 1yr Swap -0.163** -0.182***
(-2.34) (-2.63)
∆ CDS Index 0.605*** 0.613***
(11.13) (10.33)
Adj. R-square 0.129 0.161 0.335 0.334
N 18126 17576 14447 14208
This table presents estimates of the effect of changes in underwriter distress on issuer credit risk. ∆ CDS Spread is the
relative change in the natural logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm from month t-1
to month t, given in percentages. ∆ UW Risk is the relative change in natural logaritm of related underwriters’ average
CDS spreads from month t-1 to month t, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds outstanding. The regressions
exclude observations for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. The main
sample period is 2004-2012, based on monthly observations. When using market measures, the sample period is reduced
to 2006-2012 due to lack of data availability. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and
* significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 6
Credit ratings and underwriter distress effect
CDS Spread ∆ CDS Spread
Investment-grade Speculative-grade Investment-grade Speculative-grade
(a) (b) (c) (d)
UW Risk 0.154*** 0.211*** ∆ UW Risk 0.089** 0.307***
(4.41) (3.55) (2.30) (2.84)
Leverage 0.599** 1.464*** ∆ Leverage 0.201*** -0.032
(2.18) (6.65) (3.41) (-0.18)
Equity Volatility 1.446*** 1.441*** ∆ Equity Volatility 0.070** 0.116**
(3.77) (5.27) (2.01) (2.52)
Firm Size -0.186*** -0.059 ∆ Firm Size -2.540 -4.622
(-5.72) (-1.03) (-0.96) (-1.53)
Profitability -1.176*** -1.627*** ∆ Profitability -0.001*** 0.001*
(-2.61) (-3.42) (-2.87) (1.69)
Cash -0.081 0.668 ∆ Cash 0.001*** -0.020**
(-0.27) (1.18) (5.99) (-2.38)
1yr Swap -0.067*** 0.014 ∆ 1yr Swap -0.182*** -0.139
(-4.40) (0.58) (-2.87) (-1.33)
CDS Index 0.542*** 0.261*** ∆ CDS Index 0.702*** 0.355***
(8.20) (2.61) (12.04) (3.96)
Adj. R-square 0.532 0.446 Adj. R-square 0.366 0.327
N 10709 4019 N 10347 3825
This table presents estimates of the effect of underwriter distress on issuer credit risk conditional on firms’ credit rating.
CDS Spread is the natural logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contracts of the issuing firm. UW Risk is the natural
logaritm of related underwriters’ average CDS spreads, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds outstanding. We
separate between issuers that are investment-grade rated and speculative-grade rated firms. Investment-grade (Speculative-
grade) refers to a firm with a S&P credit rating that is equal to ’BBB’ or higher (’BB’ or lower). Specifications (a) and (b)
show the effect in levels, while specifications (c) and (d) show the effect in changes. The regressions exclude observations
for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. The sample period is 2006-2012,
based on monthly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance
at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 7
Rollover risk and underwriter distress effect
Panel A: Maturing Debt to Total Asset
CDS Spread CDS Spread
Investment-grade Speculative-grade
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
UW Risk 0.149*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.213***
(3.80) (3.08) (2.92) (3.12) (2.99) (3.39)
UW Risk × Debt≤1yrAssets 0.312 1.007*
(0.43) (1.91)
Debt≤1yr
Assets -0.272 -4.724**
(-0.08) (-2.05)
UW Risk × Debt≤2yrAssets 0.695 0.600*
(1.31) (1.75)
Debt≤2yr
Assets -2.725 -2.655*
(-1.14) (-1.76)
UW Risk × Debt≤3yrAssets 0.556 0.056
(1.43) (0.18)
Debt≤3yr
Assets -2.123 -0.032
(-1.19) (-0.02)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.531 0.531 0.531 0.447 0.447 0.445
N 10685 10625 10620 4028 4028 4028
Panel B: Maturing Debt to Total Long-term debt
CDS Spread CDS Spread
Investment-grade Speculative-grade
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
UW Risk 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.102** 0.175*** 0.150** 0.174***
(4.00) (2.96) (2.16) (3.01) (2.50) (2.83)
UW Risk × Debt≤1yrDebt -0.000 0.443**
(-0.00) (2.20)
Debt≤1yr
Debt -0.000 -2.265***
(-0.00) (-2.88)
UW Risk × Debt≤2yrDebt 0.142 0.448***
(1.00) (2.90)
Debt≤2yr
Debt -0.687 -2.190***
(-1.11) (-3.39)
UW Risk × Debt≤3yrDebt 0.191 0.165
(1.61) (1.40)
Debt≤3yr
Debt -0.870 -0.838*
(-1.63) (-1.65)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.530 0.529 0.530 0.452 0.455 0.447
N 10685 10594 10589 4028 4026 4026
This table presents estimates of the effect of rollover exposure and underwriter distress on issuer credit risk. CDS Spread
is the natural logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. UW Risk is the natural logaritm
of related underwriters’ average CDS spreads, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds outstanding. In Panel A the
rollover exposure is proxied by the outstanding debt due in one, two, and three years, scaled by total assets. In Panel B the
rollover exposure is proxied by the outstanding debt due in one, two, and three years, scaled by total long-term debt. We
separate between issuers that are investment-grade rated and speculative-grade rated firms. Investment-grade (Speculative-
grade) refers to a firm with a S&P credit rating that is equal to ’BBB’ or higher (’BB’ or lower). The regressions exclude
observations for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. The sample period
is 2006-2012, based on monthly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and
* significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 8
Bond illiquidity and underwriter distress effect
Panel A: Underwriter Distress Effect on Bond Illiquidity
Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread
Investment-grade Speculative-grade
(a) (b)
Intercept -13.902 -0.237
(-3.38) (-0.04)
UW Risk 11.053*** 8.231***
(9.45) (6.12)
Controls N N
Adj. R-square 0.111 0.079
N 12152 4862
Panel B: Bond Illiquidity and Underwriter Distress Effect on Corporate Credit Risk
CDS Spread CDS Spread
Investment-grade Speculative-grade
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Bid-Ask Spread 0.002*** 0.002**
(3.03) (2.46)
UW Risk 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.251*** 0.221*** 0.212***
(4.79) (4.21) (4.20) (4.17) (3.64) (3.57)
Bid-Ask Residual 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002**
(2.80) (1.73) (1.63) (2.59) (1.71) (2.01)
UW Risk
× Debt≤1yrAssets 0.305 0.952*
(0.40) (1.69)
Bid-Ask Residual
× Debt≤1yrAssets 0.019 0.015
(1.38) (1.37)
UW Risk
× Debt≤1yrDebt 0.057 0.423**
(0.36) (2.10)
Bid-Ask Residual
× Debt≤1yrDebt 0.006 0.001
(1.52) (0.27)
Debt<1yr
Assets -0.054 -4.532*
(-0.01) (-1.79)
Debt<1yr
Debt -0.159 -2.215***
(-0.24) (-2.85)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.531 0.535 0.535 0.533 0.428 0.448 0.450 0.455
N 10020 9919 9900 9900 3821 3790 3760 3760
This table presents estimates of the effect of bond illiquidity and underwriters distress on issuer credit risk. Panel A shows
the estimates of the regression of firms’ bond illiquidity on our measure for underwriter distress. Bond illiquidity is proxied
by Bid-Ask Spread which is calculated as the average effective bid-ask spread across outstanding bonds from issuer. UW
Risk is the natural logaritm of related underwriters’ average CDS spreads, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds
outstanding. In Panel B we use the bid-ask spread residual obtained from the regressions in Panel A and regress CDS Spread
on Bid-Ask Residual, proxies for firms’ rollover exposures, as well as other controls from our baseline model specification.
CDS Spread is the natural logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. Firms’ rollover
exposures are proxied by the ratio of debt maturing within one year, scaled by total assets and total debt, respectively. We
separate between issuers that are investment-grade rated and speculative-grade rated firms. Investment-grade (Speculative-
grade) refers to a firm with a S&P credit rating that is equal to ’BBB’ or higher (’BB’ or lower). The regressions exclude
observations for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. The sample period
is 2006-2012, based on monthly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and
* significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 9
Economic significance of underwriter distress
Panel A: Absolute CDS Spread Contribution
Bid-Ask Equity
UW Risk Residual Leverage Volatility Firm Size Profitability
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Investment-grade 0.351 0.040 0.065 0.050 0.366 0.215
Speculative-grade 0.460 0.060 0.336 0.073 0.092 0.236
Panel B: Relative CDS Spread Contribution
Bid-Ask Equity
UW Risk Residual Leverage Volatility Firm Size Profitability
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Investment-grade 7.784% 1.011% 1.611% 1.232% 8.993% 5.142%
Speculative-grade 7.978% 1.105% 6.319% 1.307% 1.576% 4.233%
This table presents estimates of the economic significance of underwriter distress. The estimation is based upon the results
obtained in Table 8, specification (c) and (g). The absolute credit risk contribution is estimated as the difference between
the 50% and 5% percentile in the distribution of the respective component. The relative credit risk contribution is estimated
as the difference between issuer specific components and the 5% percentile, scaled by the size of CDS spread (bps). Column
(a) presents the contribution of UW Risk and is defined as
UW Risk contributionit = βˆ1 ×UW Riskit + βˆ3 × Debt ≤1yritAssetsit ×UW Riskit
The contributions of factors presented in the table are estimated following the same approach. Column (b) shows the
contribution of Bid-Ask Residual and refers to the bond illiquidity effect that is unrelated to the underwriter distress
effect. Columns (c) to (f) show the contributions of Leverage, Equity Volatility, Firm Size and Profitability. We separate
between issuers that are investment-grade rated and speculative-grade rated firms. Investment-grade (Speculative-grade)
refers to a firm with a S&P credit rating that is equal to ’BBB’ or higher (’BB’ or lower). The sample period is 2006-2012,
based on monthly observations.
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Table 10
Key credit events for defaulted underwriters
Panel A: Bear Stearns
Jun-2007 Bear Stearns commits $1.6bn in secured loans to bail out its hedge Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Fund.
Jul-2007 The Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund has lost more than 90% of its value, while
another hedge fund, Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund,
looses all of its value. In the end, both hedge funds filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy.
Dec-2007 The bank reports its first ever quarterly loss, which is nearly four times the analysts’ forecasts.
Mar-2008 Carlyle Capital Corporation (CCC), a hedge fund partly owned by Bear Stearns, collapses due
to large losses in mortgage backed securities arising from the severely weakened housing market.
Consequently, and due to its exposure to the hedge fund and investors grown anxiousness, Bear
Stearns shares fall by 17%. On March 14, 2008, JP Morgan and the New York Federal Reserve
rush to the rescue Bear Stearns, while its’ shares crashes by almost 50%. JP Morgan agrees
to buy Bear Stearns in a deal that values Bear Stearns shares at $2 each, with JP Morgan
exchanging 0.05473 of each of its shares for one Bear share. Due to legal challenges against the
low share price offer claimed by some of Bear Stearns’ shareholders, JP Morgan raises its offer
for Bear Stearns to $10 a share for the takeover.
Panel B: Lehman Brothers
Dec-2007 Lehman Brothers bypasses Bear Stearns as the largest underwriter of mortgage-backed securi-
ties. However, at the same time, it closes one of its subprime-lending units which eliminates
approximately 1,200 jobs.
Mar-2008 Due to the concern that Lehman Brothers would be the next Wall Street financial institution to
collapse after Bear Stearns, the shares fall as much as 48%. However, most of Lehman Brothers’
stock losses recover in the following weeks.
Jun-2008 Lehman Brothers announces its first quarterly loss since going public and sells $6 billion of stock
to bolster capital.
Aug-2008 Shares drop 13% due to the announcement that Lehman Brothers solicited buyers for its
investment-management division.
Sep-2008 Lehman Brothers shares plunged by additionally 45% after a dismissed capital infusion and
reports a $3.9 billion third-quarter loss, the largest in its history. Accordingly, it announces
plans to sell a majority stake in its asset-management unit and to spin off commercial real-
estate holdings. In collaboration with the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve, Bank of America
Corp. emerges as potential buyer. On September 12, 2008, Moody’s announces a potential credit
downgrade and outlines the need for a “stronger financial partner” which lead to an immediate
drop in Lehman Brothers’ shares of 42%. Government agencies react by urging Wall Street chiefs
to find a solution. In an effort to prevent the liquidation of Lehman Brothers, finance leaders
meet at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on September 13, 2008, and Bank of America
and Barclays emerge as bidders. However, due to a fail to secure guarantees against losses, both
bidders withdraws from their offer the following day. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers
petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and listed $639 billion of assets in the largest filing in U.S.
history.
Panel C: Wachovia
Apr-2008 Wachovia announces first quarterly loss in seven years.
Sep-2008 Wachovia experienced large outflows of deposits and drops in the stock price due to the collapse
of Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. savings and loan association. As a reaction to the FDIC’s
declaration that Wachovia was “systemically important” to the health of the economy, and thus
could not be allowed to fail, Citigroup agreed to takeover Wachovia’s banking operations for $1
per share.
Oct-2008 Though the liquidity provision by Citigroup would have allowed Wachovia to continue its op-
erations, Wells Fargo and Wachovia announced on October 3, 2008, their merge in an all-stock
transaction requiring no government involvement. The agreement included a purchase of Wa-
chovia in entirety for $15.1 billion (approximately $7 per share) and Wells Fargo’s purchase of
Wachovia was closed on December 31, 2008. In the meanwhile, Citigroup filed a $60 billion law-
suit against Wachovia and Wells Fargo for interfering with Citigroup’s takeover of Wachovia’s
banking operations.
The table lists the key events leading up to the default of underwriters that are included in our sample of the 20 most
active lead underwriters, i.e., Bear Stearns (Panel A), Lehman Brothers (Panel B) and Wachovia (Panel C).
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Table 11
Underwriter default and issuer credit risk
Panel A: Bear Stearns
CDS Spread
1 mth. 1-2 mth. 1-3 mth. 1-4 mth. 1-5 mth. 1-6 mth.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Default Dummy 0.182*** 0.153*** 0.125* 0.120 0.125* 0.119
(8.36) (3.74) (1.75) (1.64) (1.69) (1.54)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
N 396 396 396 396 396 396
Panel B: Lehman Brothers
CDS Spread
1 mth. 1-2 mth. 1-3 mth. 1-4 mth. 1-5 mth. 1-6 mth.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Default Dummy 0.049 0.112** 0.159*** 0.123** 0.046 -0.010
(1.40) (1.98) (2.58) (2.15) (0.72) (-0.11)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.651 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.651 0.651
N 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813
Panel C: Wachovia
CDS Spread
1 mth. 1-2 mth. 1-3 mth. 1-4 mth. 1-5 mth. 1-6 mth.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Default Dummy 0.217*** 0.248*** 0.227*** 0.138 0.047 -0.108
(2.99) (3.35) (3.00) (1.34) (0.34) (-0.65)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-square 0.581 0.582 0.582 0.581 0.580 0.580
N 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208
This table presents estimates of the effect of underwriter default on issuer credit risk. CDS Spread is the natural logarithm
of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. Default Dummy is a dummy variable that is equal to
one for the months after the underwriter defaults, and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the results where we analyse the
impact of the default of Bear Stearns (March 14, 2008). Panel B shows the results where we analyse the impact of the
default of Lehman Brothers (September 15, 2008). Likewise, Panel C shows the results where we analyse the impact of
the default of Wachovia (September 29, 2008). In specification (a), the dummy is only equal to one in the month following
the underwriter default. In specification (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), the dummy is equal to one in the month following the
underwriter default, as well as respectively two, three, four, five, and six month after. In all model specifications, we use
the sub-sample of firms that have a relationship to the underwriter and perform the regression on firms’ CDS spread using
the baseline model specification. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance
at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 12
Bond underwriter versus bank loan provider
.. ...CDS Spread...
Bond Debt
Total Debt .. -0.939*
.. (-1.74)
UW Risk × Bond DebtTotal Debt .. 0.210***
.. (3.17)
Bank Risk × Bank DebtTotal Debt .. 0.201**
.. (2.52)
Leverage .. 1.641***
.. (6.17)
Equity Volatility .. 2.233***
.. (5.24)
Firm Size .. -0.15***
.. (-3.36)
Profitability .. -2.59***
.. (-4.90)
Cash .. 0.501
.. (0.97)
1yr Swap .. -0.05***
.. (-2.61)
CDS Index .. 0.152*
.. (1.69)
Adj. R-square .. 0.614
N .. 5183
This table presents estimates of the effect of bond underwriter distress versus bank loan provider distress. CDS Spread is
the natural logarithm of the CDS spread on the five-year contract of the issuing firm. UW Risk is the natural logaritm of
related underwriters’ average CDS spreads, weighted by the number of underwritten bonds outstanding. Bank Risk is the
natural logarithm of the average related bank syndicate members’ CDS spreads weigthed by loan size. Bond Debt to Total
Debt is the outstanding corporate bond debt, scaled by the sum of bond and bank loan debt. Likewise, Bank Debt to Total
Debt is the outstanding bank debt, scaled by the sum of bond and bank loan debt. The regressions exclude observations
for firms where one of the related underwriters has defaulted within the last six months. Further, only firms for which we
have lender information from SDC Dealscan are included. The sample period is 2006-2012, based on monthly observations.
(*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) on firm-level debt financing using
credit registry data and unique and comprehensive data on CDS positions. While CDSs help to
reduce frictions in credit markets, this paper documents that the variation in credit extensions
to firms caused by the availability of CDS contracts can be explained by the creditors’ net
CDS positions. Firms where the creditors are net protection buyers have relatively less credit
available and are more constrained in terms of debt refinancing. This effect is strongest when
CDS liquidity is low. Overall, I find that the CDS positions of creditors may imply an indirect
cost to firms in the form of credit rationing.
1. Introduction
Since its introduction in the early 2000s the role of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) for credit
markets and corporate financing has been highly debated. CDSs are financial derivatives
that protect the buyer against default of a given reference firm and the availability of
CDS contracts has been outlined to be accommodative in reducing financial frictions on
the supply side of credit. However, after the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
concluded that banks’ use of over-the-counter derivatives like CDSs had contributed sig-
nificantly to the 2007-08 financial crisis it has been highly discussed that CDSs can harm
not only their buyers and sellers, but the whole economic system. Specifically, the concern
has been raised that buyers and sellers of CDSs may upset the value of the insurance-like
contracts by affecting the financing and credit risk of CDS reference firms. Banks that
trade CDS contracts may, depending on their credit relationship with the CDS reference
firm, exploit their CDS position by offering or withholding finance, and/or by changing
the type of financing given to the firm. Accordingly, the existence of CDSs is not trivial
to the firm and can become decisive to the firm’s debt financing. While the literature so
far has focused on the impact of either the availability of CDS contracts or banks’ use
of CDS contracts to manage their lending, there is still a lack of understanding of the
role of creditors’ use of CDS contracts from the firm’s perspective. In the paper I fill this
gap by examining firm-level credit exposures and variations in creditors’ CDS holdings,
conditional on the availability of the CDS contracts. For the empirical investigation I
make use of unique and comprehensive CDS position and regulatory credit registry data
from the Deutsche Bundesbank which allows me for a given firm to have a clear identi-
fication of the significance of creditors’ CDS positions relative to their credit supply. By
explicitly identifying the role of creditors’ use of CDSs for firms’ total debt financing the
paper shows that the magnitude of relaxed debt financing conditions arising from the
availability of CDS contracts significantly depends on creditors’ net CDS positions and
may imply an indirect cost to firms in the form of credit rationing.
At large, the discussion of how CDSs may impact firms’ debt financing has been argu-
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ing that CDS contracts, as a financial tool, can help to reduce frictions on the supply side
of corporate debt financing. Following the theoretical literature, buyers of CDS contracts,
that have a credit relationships with the reference firm, may strategically change their
lending behavior to the underlying firm (e.g., Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Parlour and
Winton (2013), Darst and Rafayet (2016), and Danis and Gamba (2018)). As outlined
in these papers, when creditors hedge their credit exposures it provides an opportunity
for them to e.g. change the type of debt securities it invests in, reduce their regulatory
capital requirement, and/ or reduce the limited commitment problem of the borrower
which may affect the value of a respective CDS contract. As the existence of CDS mar-
kets, thus, reduces financial frictions on the supply side of credit, the availability of CDS
contracts can lead to more liquid lending markets (see e.g., Bank for International Settle-
ments (2006), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010)) and,
accordingly, affect firms’ debt financing. Using CDS quote data Saretto and Tookes
(2013) investigate the availability of CDSs and provide empirical evidence that firms, in
general, are able to maintain higher leverage and longer debt maturities after their debt
is traded on the CDS market. Using bank-firm specific CDS position data, Gu¨ndu¨z, On-
gena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu (2017) show that banks that properly hedge themselves using
CDS contracts extend relatively more credit to risky corporations. However, while CDSs
may increase lending after CDS contracts become available and individual creditors may
extend their credit to firms in accordance to their hedged credit positions, it is unclear to
what extent this affects the debt financing of the individual firm. CDSs are typically only
available for larger firms with multiple creditors. Hence, it is not obvious that the use
of a CDS contract by an individual creditor affects the firm’s total debt financing. Fur-
thermore, creditors may change their CDS positions over time and, in fact, often also sell
CDS contracts written on their own borrowers’ debt. While the related literature almost
exclusively has been studying the effect of creditors’ use of CDS contracts as a hedging
device, it is important for the discussion of the impact of CDSs on firms’ debt financing
to consider creditors’ net CDS holdings and the variation across firms and time.1
In order to provide a detailed empirical investigation of the role of creditors’ use of
CDSs for firms’ total debt financing I collect comprehensive CDS position and credit
registry data from the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 The CDS position data cover informa-
tion on outstanding CDS contracts on German reference entities and contain specific
information on the buyer/seller of each CDS contract, including their respective position
1To the best of my knowledge, only Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2017) provide an investigation of the
impact of CDS contracts that are sold by bank holding companies.
2Examples of empirical studies that use similar data are Gu¨ndu¨z, Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu
(2017), who make use of the Small Bang in the European CDS market in order to investigate the impact
of CDS hedging positions on the amount of credit offered by individual creditors, as well as Caglio, Darst,
and Parolin (2017), who investigate the use of CDS contracts by U.S. based bank holding companies.
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in (net) notional terms. The German credit registry data contain information on the
creditor-borrower relationships and the credit outstanding between these counterparts.
In contrast to the data used in the related literature, the combination of the CDS posi-
tion and credit registry data ensures clear identification of the credit relation between the
holder of a CDS contract and the underlying reference firm which is essential for the link
between CDSs and firms’ debt financing. Moreover, the data allows me to investigate
creditors’ net CDS position and the significance of these relative to their credit exposures.
This is of particular interest in terms of determining the effect of variations in creditors’
CDS holdings and the impact of credit protection buyers versus sellers. For the empirical
specification I merge these data with firm fundamental and detailed debt holding data
from Compustat Global, Capital IQ, and SDC Dealscan.
Making use of this unique data sample, I first analyze the impact of the presence of
creditors that hold CDS contracts. I find that firms with available CDS contracts are
able to maintain higher credit levels, and specifically show that the higher credit supply
stems not only from those creditors that hold the CDS contract, but also from the firm’s
remaining creditors. In line with Saretto and Tookes (2013), these results suggest that
CDS contracts improve credit markets, more generally. However, when investigating
the variation in creditors’ CDS holdings I also find that the magnitude of the effect
depends on the creditors’ actual use of CDS contracts. Firms have significantly lower
credit available when their creditors are net buyers of credit protection relative to when
the firm’s creditors are net sellers of credit protection, or during periods where none of
their creditors hold a CDS contract written on their debt. In order to provide more
granular insight about these differences in creditors’ supply of credit I study the ratio of
creditors’ CDS holdings relative to the firm-level, i.e., aggregated credit exposures. First,
and based upon a sample defined on the firm-bank level, I find in line with Gu¨ndu¨z,
Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu (2017) that individual creditors that hold CDS contracts
as a baseline provide more credit to CDS reference firms. However, I also find that the
credit extension is decreasing in the bank-specific CDS to credit exposure ratios and
even may become negative. These results suggest that firms, towards which creditors to
a larger extent hedge their credit exposures, obtain relatively less additional credit. I
next confirm this finding on the firm level by showing that firms have significantly less
credit available when their creditors in sum have hedged a high share of the total credit
exposures to a firm. In contrast, firms whose creditors’ hold significant sell positions in
CDS contracts written on the firm’s debt have significantly more credit available. In order
to address concerns of the results being purely driven by differences in firms’ credit risk
I study the firm level determinants of creditors’ use of CDS contracts in my sample and
confirm that the effect of creditors’ CDS holdings is robust. Furthermore, I investigate
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the significance of the presence of CDS creditors and find an amplified effect on the firm-
level credit exposures when more of the firm’s creditors hold CDS contracts on the firm’s
debt.
For the debate about the net impact of creditors’ CDS holdings on firms’ debt fi-
nancing, it is not only important to investigate the level of credit provided to the firm,
but also the implications it may have on firms’ debt financing conditions, more gener-
ally. To do so, I follow the discussion in, e.g., Saretto and Tookes (2013), Brunnermeier
(2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010), and analyze firms’ debt maturity and changes in spe-
cific debt maturity tranches of firms’ outstanding debt. Independent of the actual net
CDS holdings of a firm’s creditors, I find that firms have longer debt maturities when
their creditors hold CDS contracts. Furthermore, I show that the increase stems from
the replacement of short-term debt with more long-term debt. This suggests that re-
financing with longer-term debt is more likely for firms where the creditors hold CDS
contracts. However, the results also outline that the refinancing of debt for firms with
net CDS-buying creditors does not occur before maturity and is replaced with relatively
short-term debt. Meanwhile, I find that firms are able to refinance early and have a
significant extension of medium-term debt when their creditors are net CDS sellers im-
plying that the debt maturity extension is more significant for these firms. As I further
document that the impact on debt maturity is pronounced for firms with relatively low
additional debt capacity I argue that firms with low probability of a credit extension and,
potentially, high credit risk, still may benefit from their creditors’ CDS holdings in terms
of debt refinancing. Related to the investigation of CDSs’ impact on firms’ refinancing
conditions, I also briefly analyze the impact on other measures for firms’ costs of debt.
While I do not find evidence that firms pay higher interest payments, the results indicate
that firms to a higher extend rely on bonds than bank debt when their creditors are
credit protection buyers. Thus, the debt financing of the individual firm may become
limited in its refinancing options when they have creditors that hold CDS contracts on
their credit. Overall, the results of relatively lower debt maturity and more contracted
refinancing options in the case of net protection-buying creditors highlight banks use of
CDS contracts for monitoring purposes as suggested in, e.g., Parlour and Winton (2013)
and Streitz (2015).
Finally, I provide an analysis of the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings that is supple-
mentary to the more general impact of CDS contracts. From the firm’s perspective CDS
holdings by its creditors is endogenous. Hence, it is not enough to address implications
of the availability of CDS contracts but also whether and how the creditors’ specific CDS
holdings affect the financing of firms after their creditors start to trade CDS contracts
on the firm’s debt. While I do find a significant role of the liquidity of CDS contracts
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written on a firm’s debt, I show that the variation in CDS holdings by a firm’s creditors
helps explain differences in firm-level credit exposures, especially when their creditors
only occasionally hold CDS contracts on the firm’s debt.
2. Related Literature
As of now, this paper is among the few papers investigating the role of CDS for corporate
lending using granular CDS position and credit data on the bank-firm level. Using a
similar data sample on German banks, Gu¨ndu¨z, Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu (2017)
investigate banks’ motives for CDS trading and the impact of CDS contracts on credit
availability around the European Small Bang (2008 to 2010). The authors find that
individual banks hedge credit exposures to risky firms with CDS contracts and reallocate
credit to safer firms. Only when banks properly hedge themselves, they extend relatively
more credit to risky firms. Using U.S.-based CDS position and credit registry data,
Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2017) investigate the impact of banks’ usage of CDS contracts
and the respective impact on firms’ credit risk. The authors document that banks hold
large CDS positions to credit exposure ratios and show that rather than leading to an
increase in credit risk of the reference entity, creditors’ holding of CDS positively affects
credit risk. While these papers provide insights on banks’ usage of CDS trading and its
impact on credit provision on the bank-firm level, this study supplements these findings
by using similar data but then providing an understanding of the net impact of creditors’
CDS holdings from the firm’s perspective. Specifically, this paper adds insight on the
role of creditors’ CDS holdings for firms’ total credit, i.e., both the credit provided by
CDS and non-CDS creditors, as well as the magnitude of these results compared to the
effect of the existence of CDS markets more generally. In particular from an economic
perspective it is important to consider the overall implications of CDS contracts for firms’
debt financing.
Turning to the impact of CDS contracts on the firm level, there is a fairly rich liter-
ature. However, to a large extent these studies are based CDS quote data and without
granular information on the firm-bank relation, i.e., whether the holder of the CDS is a
lender of the firm or not. In regards to the impact of CDS on firm fundamentals, Saretto
and Tookes (2013) provide an empirical investigation on non-financial firms in the S&P
index and show that firms with existing CDS quote data are able to maintain higher
leverage ratios and on average are characterized by longer debt maturities. Using similar
data, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) investigate the cost of debt financing in the onset of
CDS trading and do not find that CDS affect the borrowing cost for the average borrower.
Moreover, the authors find a small positive impact of CDS trading on spreads issued to
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safe firms and outline that the benefit increases when market becomes sufficiently liquid.
Overall, these papers exemplify that firms may not necessarily be worse off due to the
availability of CDS contracts. Supplementary to these studies, this paper investigates
differences in firms’ debt financing due to creditors’ CDS holdings and highlights the role
of a credit relationship between the holder of the CDS and the underlying firm, as well
as creditors’ specific CDS positions.
As known from the existing literature, one of the main determinants of credit risk
is the firm’s leverage ratio. Accordingly, when firms obtain higher leverage ratios due
to creditors’ CDS holding, then this may increase the credit risk for these firms (at
least relative to other similar firms or before having debt traded in the CDS market).
In an empirical study using corporate-level CDS trading data and a sample of U.S. non-
financial firms, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) support this spillover mechanism
by documenting that the inception of CDS trading increases the probability of a credit
downgrade and bankruptcy of firms. In addition, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang
(2017) find that firms hold more cash after becoming traded on the CDS market, which
partly is financed by new debt issuances. In particular, the authors show that the effect
is amplified for firms with a lot of long-term debt maturing within the next year reflecting
firms’ precautionary cash holding motives (Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013), Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2014)). Henceforth, when firms become traded on the CDS market, they may
follow more conservative liquidity policies and have higher marginal values of improved
lending conditions. Altogether, these studies also highlight a potential impact of CDS
contracts on firms’ refinancing risk. As proposed in the theoretical paper by Leland and
Toft (1996) and empirically confirmed by Brunnermeier (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010)
firms with shorter average debt maturity or more short-term debt face greater default risk
due to the higher rollover frequency. While firms, accordingly, care about the maturity
of their outstanding debt (e.g., Choi, Hackbart, and Zechner (2016), Harford, Klasa, and
Maxwell (2014), Serveas and Tufano (2006), and Lins, Serveas, and Tufano (2010)), the
ability to refinancing their debt depends on general credit market conditions (e.g., Xu
(2017)) and creditors’ supply of more long-term debt (e.g., Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2013)).3 Further, Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011) exemplify the
economic importance of firms’ refinancing ability for the real economy by documenting
that firms with a high ratio of long-term debt maturing around the peak of the 2007-08
crisis invested less than otherwise similar firms. Hence, to the extent that the presence of
CDS contracts may affect the type of credit by providing more long-term debt then this
3Xu (2017) finds that especially firms of low-quality refinance early and during times with favorable
conditions. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) theoretically show that firms reliance on short-term fi-
nancing is the outcome of a maturity rat race in which the borrowers choice of a short-term financing
structure is the response to other creditors’ simultaneous opt for shorter maturity contracts.
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will also be beneficial for firms. As firms’ refinancing risk in particular is lowered when
short-term debt is replaced with more long-term debt this paper not only investigates
firms’ debt maturity, but in particular firm’s reliance on short-term versus long-term
debt.
While the empirical literature has provided some evidence of the role of CDSs for
corporate policies and credit risk, the discussion of specific channels through which CDSs
affect corporate financing measures has mainly been based on theoretical studies.4 Black
and Hu (2008) were the first to discuss the so-called “empty” creditors, i.e., creditors,
that due to the holding of debt and CDS contracts of the same reference entity at the
same time, no longer are exposed to the credit risk of the debtor. As argued in Bolton
and Oehmke (2011) the “empty creditor problem” the describes the situation where the
creditor, due to the insurance against the default of the debtor, no longer may have
an interest in the efficient continuation of the debtor, and even may push the debtor
into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation. As a baseline, this reduces the ex-post limited
commitment problem of the borrower to repay its debt and, hence, allows for an ex-
ante extension of credit to the borrower.5 Similar, Parlour and Winton (2013) outline
in a theoretical paper that CDSs help creditors to lay-off credit risk because private
information advantages combined with CDS holdings make the creditors able to better
monitor their borrowers. Accordingly, creditors’ may extend credit to safe loans in order
to increase their profits. Further, Darst and Rafayet (2016) show in a theoretical model
that CDS can alter the type of debt securities and also increase credit supply to include
more risky securities for a higher price. Danis and Gamba (2018) show using a theoretical
model that CDSs may increase firms’ default probabilities but also reduce the occurrence
of strategic defaults. Specifically, the authors find that the latter effect dominates and,
in particular, allows firms to gain from less costly financing, which then leads to higher
investment and corporate value. As one of the few and more recent empirical papers,
Streitz (2015) documents that banks, whose borrower’s debt is actively traded in CDS
markets, are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction. In line with
this, and also using syndicated loan data, Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016) find that firms
become more likely to switch to new lenders after the inception of CDS trading on their
debt and suggest a rather negative impact of creditors use of CDS contracts. As proposed
by these papers, the key mechanism for the impact of CDSs is that the holder of the CDS
contract is a creditor of the firm and because of the lending relationships can extend
4The exemptions are Gu¨ndu¨z, Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu (2017) and Caglio, Darst, and Parolin
(2017) who investigate specific bank-firm effects of CDS holdings.
5The authors argue that CDS contracts increase creditors’ debt renegotiation power and make them
less willing to give credit to distressed borrowers, while good firms will be able to obtain higher leverage
ratios.
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or withdraw financing to the firm. Contrary to the related empirical literature that has
been investigating firms’ aggregated financing using information on the availability of
CDS contracts, this paper will, due to the use of regulatory data, focus on the impact of
creditors’ CDS activity, conditional on the availability of CDS contracts.
3. Data and Empirical Specification
The aim of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive and explicit understanding
of the role of creditors’ use of CDSs for firms’ debt financing. Specifically, this paper
focuses on identifying implications of creditors’ net CDS holdings, i.e., the amount of
credit protection bought and sold by the firm’s own creditors, which are supplementary
to the role of CDS contracts for credit markets more generally. In order to address these
issues I combine CDS position, credit registry and other firm fundamental data from
several data sources and then provide an empirical investigation using these data.
3.1 Data
The data sample in this paper is based on confidential data from the German Credit
Registry (MiMik) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The credit registry data con-
tains quarterly information on bank-firm credit exposures held by German banks for the
period 1993-Q2 to 2016-Q2.6 The advantage of this data is that it not only allows me
to obtain information on firms’ credit relationships, but also information on the credit
amount held by individual creditors. The credit measure in the credit registry data is
defined fairly broadly and covers both loans and corporate bonds on the firm-bank level.7
In order to obtain information on outstanding CDS contracts on the firms covered in the
credit registry data I collect comprehensive CDS position data from the Trade Informa-
tion Warehouse (TIW) of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC).8 The
data has been collected since 2008 and contains weekly data on German banks’ positions
in CDS contracts where the reference entity is a German firm. The data covers more
than 95 % of global standard single-name CDS contracts and includes, in contrast to
publicly available DTCC data, information on both the buyer and the seller of the CDS
contract, as well as the reference firm. Most importantly, the data also contains bank-
6The credit data is only available for firms with outstanding credit of at least 1.5 million euro at
the end of each quarter. For details, please see Section 14 of the Banking Act (Deutsche Bundesbank
(2001)).
7Items that are not included in the credit measure are bank exposures, e.g., shares in other enterprises
and securities in the trading portfolio. For detailed definitions, please see, e.g., Section 19 of the Banking
Act (Deutsche Bundesbank (2001)), Schmieder (2006), Ongena, Tu¨nmer-Alkan, and von Westernhagen
(2012).
8I thank Yalin Gu¨ndu¨z for kindly sharing the CDS position data.
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specific CDS position information such as the number of contracts outstanding and the
notional amount bought and/or sold by the individual bank.9
Next, I match the credit registry and CDS position data on the firm-bank level. The
sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2 and is limited by the availability of the CDS position
data. Based upon the credit registry and CDS position data I first identify all firms on
which there are, respectively, are no, traded CDS contracts, as well as the credit exposure
of each firm-bank pair. Secondly, I use the combined data sample to reveal whether the
individual creditor holds a CDS contract that is written on the respective firm’s debt. The
unique data allows me for each firm (borrower) to distinguish between the creditors that
hold CDS contracts (CDS creditors), and the creditors that do not hold CDS contracts
(non-CDS creditors). As this paper focuses on the role of creditors’ use of CDSs, the
identification of CDS creditors is key for the empirical investigation. Thirdly, I exploit
the comprehensive CDS position data by determining whether the individual creditors
are net protection buyers or sellers, and the magnitude of their CDS holdings. This is of
particular interest in order to differentiate between the general impact on credit markets
due to the prevalence of CDS contracts and the firm-specific impact on debt financing
due to creditors’ holdings of CDSs.
- Figure 1 -
Figure 1 shows the time series of aggregated CDS holdings by German banks on German
non-financial firms. While the banks during most of that sample period have been buyers
of credit protection (indicated by a positive CDS net notional value), the figure outlines
most interestingly that the same banks in recent years have been net sellers of credit
protection.10 In gross terms, the German CDS market reached its peak in late 2010
accounting for about 11% of the total credit amount outstanding and since then, come
down to a value of about 4% of firm-level credit exposures. Accordingly, the figure
highlights the necessity for studying the impact of both buy and sell CDS positions of
banks, as well as the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings supplementary to the general
effect of the existence of these markets.
- Table 1 -
In addition, Table 1 summarizes credit and CDS statistics for firms with available CDS
and credit registry. As outlined in the table, the CDS reference firms in my baseline
sample have on average 15 different credit relationships of which 3 relate to banks that
9The data contains end-of-week holdings after all new trades, assignments, terminations and amend-
ments.
10As shown by Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2017) hedge and mutual funds have in recent years been the
typical counterparts and holders of CDSs and the trend has been similar in the U.S.-based CDS market.
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also trade CDS contracts on the firm’s debt. The average firm-level credit exposure is
approximately 1,025 million euro of which about one-third is held by CDS creditors.11
The aggregated firm-level credit exposures have been fairly stable over time while the
share of credit held by CDS creditors, similar to the size of the CDS market, has been
decreasing over time. Further, the table outlines that not only the amount of credit
protection bought relative to credit protection sold has been decreasing, but also that
the number of contracts that were bought compared to the number of contracts that were
sold has been decreasing. This confirms that the liquidity of the German CDS market
has been decreasing, but also that creditors in recent years to a larger extent have become
net sellers of CDS contracts.
In addition to the detailed CDS position and credit registry data, I collect other firm
fundamental data from the Compustat Global database.12 From this source, I collect
all yearly and quarterly corporate financial and stock price data for the period 2008-Q1
to 2016-Q2. Further, I supplement the data from Compustat with firm-level data from
the Capital IQ and the Mergent FISD databases. In contrast to Compustat, Capital
IQ compiles, inter alia, detailed information on corporate debt structure, using footnotes
contained in the firm’s financial reports. Specifically, I obtain data on firms’ debt maturity
structure from this source. In addition, I collect bond-related information on the firm
level from Mergent FISD. To mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize data from these
sources at the 1st and 99th percentiles. As this study investigates the impact of creditors’
CDS holdings on firm-level debt financing measures which are very different for financial
and utility firms, I follow the literature and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000
to 6999), utility firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) and firms for which no SIC code is
available. Further, as firms that act as CDS reference entities are relatively large firms
compared to the average firm covered in the credit registry data and in order to provide a
more unbiased sample, I exclude all small and medium-size firms from the CDS position
and credit registry sample by restricting the sample to firms with an aggregated credit
exposure that on average is within the 1st and 99th percentiles of that of the identified
CDS firms. Finally, I restrict the sample to only include firms for which credit registry
data from the MiMik database as well as firm fundamental data from Compustat and
Capital IQ is available.13 My final sample consists of 78 non-financial German firms, of
11For comparison, the average non-CDS reference firm in the credit registry data has 14 credit relations
and the total firm-level credit exposure is approximately 570 million euro. These values refer to quarterly
observations of 2,267 non-financial firms operating in the same industry as the identified CDS reference
firms.
12The advantage of using data from Compustat rather than, for instance, Amadeus or USTAN, is that
I have quarterly rather than only annual data, which allows for greater granularity in my analysis.
13I follow the conventional approach in related empirical research (e.g., Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009))
and assume that a firm has no merger and acquisition activities in a given quarter if it is reported as
“missing” by Compustat. I use the same argument for observations of capital expenditures.
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which 31 act as reference entities in CDS contracts. In the latter, I will refer to CDS
reference entities as CDS Firms, and to the remaining firms as Non-CDS Firms.
3.2 Empirical Specification
In order to investigate the role of creditors’ CDS holdings for firms’ debt financing I first
analyze the implications for firms’ debt financing. Specifically, I use the firm-specific
credit exposures which I obtain using the quarterly bank-firm credit registry data from
MiMik and by aggregating individual banks’ credit exposures to the firm level. As the
credit measure in MiMik covers firms’ total credit amounts, i.e., both loans and corporate
bonds, a change in this measure will reflect the extension or withdrawal of debt financing
to the firm. Based upon these data I use Total Credit Ratio and Total Credit Amount
as my key measures. Total Credit Amount is the natural logarithm of the firm-specific
credit exposure at the end of a quarter, while Total Credit Ratio is the firm-specific
credit exposure at the end of a quarter, scaled by total assets. In the empirical analyses
I use various versions of both measures. Second, I investigate the role of creditors’ CDS
holdings for firms’ debt refinancing by analyzing the type of credit provided to the firms.
As a proxy for firms’ exposure to debt refinancing I mainly use the variable Debt Maturity
which is the principal-weighted maturity of all debt as reported in Capital IQ and given
in years. To proxy the direct cost of debt I use information on the firm’s total interest
and related payments and define the variable Interests To Credit as the total amount of
interests, scaled by total credit outstanding. To further test for the changes in the type
of debt I use Bonds To Debt which I define as the ratio of the principal of the firm’s
outstanding bonds to total bank debt.
For the choice of potential determinants of the outlined firm-level debt financing
measures and the empirical design I largely follow Saretto and Tookes (2013), Ashcraft
and Santos (2009), and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2017) and relate the measures
to a set of explanatory variables obtained from Compustat.
- Table 2 -
Table 2, Panel A, presents base firm characteristics for the CDS and non-CDS firm sample.
As seen from the table, the average CDS firm has slightly more credit outstanding and
a higher leverage ratio than non-CDS firms. In particular, the average leverage ratio is
27.7% and 25.0% for CDS and non-CDS firms, respectively, implying that CDS firms,
compared to non-CDS firms, to a higher extent rely on debt financing. Accordingly, I
also find that CDS firms have a higher ratio of interest payments, while the debt maturity
of CDS and non-CDS firms is actually very similar. However, and in line with Saretto
and Tookes (2013) and Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2017), I also find wide variation in
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the debt financing across both CDS and non-CDS firms. With respect to other base
firm characteristics Table 2, Panel A, outlines that the average CDS firm in my sample
is larger, uses more commercial papers and has a slightly lower Z-score, but else wise is
similar to the average non-CDS firm.
In order to analyze the implications of creditor’ use of CDS contracts I relate various
proxies to the outlined firm-level debt financing measures. To control for fundamental
differences between CDS and non-CDS firms I use CDS Firm which is a dummy variable
equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample period act as a reference firm
in a CDS contract. To capture the impact of the presence and magnitude of creditors’
actual CDS holdings I first create quarterly firm-bank-specific CDS measures based on
the weekly CDS position data. To this end, I follow the approach in Caglio, Darst, and
Parolin (2017) and use the average of the weekly CDS positions of the last three weeks
before the final week in a given quarter.14 Then, similar to banks’ credit exposures I
calculate firm-specific CDS measures in a given quarter by aggregating creditors’ CDS
position on the firm level. Following this methodology I obtain quarterly data on the
number of CDS contracts bought and sold, the net notional values of these contracts, as
well as how many of a firms’ creditors hold a CDS contract in a given month. Based upon
this quarterly information I then define several variables to measure the extent to which
the firm’s creditors hold CDS contracts on the firm. As a proxy for the presence of CDS
creditors in a given quarter I use CDS Outstanding which is a firm-quarter-level dummy
that is equal to one in quarters where at least one of the firm’s creditors holds a CDS
contract on the firm, and is zero otherwise.15 As a proxy for the significance of creditors’
CDS positions I use the comprehensive firm-level information on the outstanding CDS
contracts. Specifically, I make use of various versions of the variable CDS Coverage, which
is defined as the total net notional amount of all creditors’ outstanding CDS contracts,
scaled by the aggregated credit exposure to the firm. That is,
CDS Coverageit =
Total CDS Net Notionalit
Total Credit Exposureit
(1)
where t indicates the year-quarter and i refers to the firm, and the CDS net notional
value is the CDS notional amount bought net of the CDS notional amount sold.16 While
the size of CDS Coverage measures the fraction of the firm-specific credit exposure that
is covered by outstanding CDS held by their creditors, the sign of the ratio outlines
whether the creditors are net buyers or net sellers of credit protection. Specifically, the
14In robustness tests I use end of quarter observations and obtain similar results.
15In contrast to the measures used in the related literature, CDS Outstanding reflects both the CDS
trading and outstanding CDS positions of the reference firm’s creditors and on a quarterly basis.
16In robustness tests I use the weighted average of each individual CDS net notional to credit exposure
ratios and find that the main results are robust to this alternative specification.
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ratio will be positive when the creditors in sum are net protection buyers and, thus,
hedge their credit exposures. In contrast, the ratio will be negative when the creditors
in sum are net protection sellers and, in fact, implicitly increase their credit exposures.
Further, the ratio will be equal to zero when there are (in net terms) no outstanding CDS
contracts in the respective quarter. As outlined in Table 2, Panel B, about 9 percent of a
CDS firm’s creditors hold CDS contracts on the firm in a given quarter. Accounting for
the credit supply of these creditors, the average CDS firm has a CDS coverage ratio of
approximately 7 percent implying that the creditors on average are net protection buyers.
As I find that the number of CDS contracts bought is slightly lower than the number
of CDS contracts sold, the notional value of credit protection bought by creditors is in
fact larger than the notional value of credit protection sold by creditors. However, the
coverage of creditors’ CDS contracts shows a substantial variation both in terms of sign
and size and will, in line with the measures’ definition, vary both across firms and across
time. For the more formal study of the firm and quarter-specific effect of creditors’ CDS
holdings on firms’ debt financing I mainly use firm-level panel regressions where I regress
the measures for firms’ debt financing on proxies for the CDS activity of the respective
firms’ creditors, as well as a set of control variables. In order to allow for a general lagged
effect of the time-varying measures of creditors’ CDS holdings, as well as to address
concerns of reversed causality I use the one-quarter lagged versions of the CDS-related
in all empirical specifications. Specifically, I use various versions of the following panel
regression model specification, i.e.,
Debt Financing Proxy it = α + βCDS Activity Proxy it−1 + θX it +  it (2)
where t indicates the year-quarter and i refers to the firm. In terms of the controls in
the model, X it, I follow the literature and include firm fundamentals, as well as industry,
firm, time and rating fixed effects. The set of controls used in the specific model depends
on the choice of the debt financing proxy used as dependent variable. Definitions of all
variables included in the regression models are presented in Appendix Table A1.
4. Creditors’ CDS Holdings and Firm Credit
In this section, I study the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings for the firm-level credit
exposure. Within this, I focus not only on the effect on the total credit supplied to
reference firms, but investigate in particular whether creditors’ CDS holdings affect both
the credit supplied by CDS and non-CDS creditors. As creditors typically hold multiple
CDS contracts and can be (net) buyers or sellers of CDS contracts I further study the
impact on the aggregate credit amount provided to a firm conditional on creditors’ net
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CDS holdings and discuss the determinants of creditors’ CDS positions.
4.1 CDS Creditors and Credit Supply
Following Saretto and Tookes (2013), firms with traded CDS contracts are able to main-
tain higher leverage ratios. This is because the availability of CDS contracts implies
that capital suppliers have the ability to hedge their credit risk and, thus, can overcome
credit supply frictions. However, from the individual firm’s point of view it is not obvious
whether, and to what extent, the pure availability of CDS contracts will affect the total
credit supplied to the firm. First, CDS contracts are not necessarily traded by one of
the reference firms’ own creditors. In fact, CDS contracts can be traded by any bank
or financial institution that may, or may not, have a lending relationship with the firm.
This not only implies that the presence of a CDS contract does not necessarily reflects an
actual hedging strategy of a bank towards its credit exposure to the firm, but also that
the holder of the CDS contract has, or has not, the ability to directly affect the credit
supply to the firm. Second, firms typically have multiple creditors where each lender may,
or may not, hold a CDS contract. Moreover, each of the creditors that do hold a CDS
contract may be either a buyer or a seller of a CDS contract and, furthermore, change
its CDS holdings over time. Consequently, each of the lenders does, or does not, have
an incentive to change its credit supply. Taking this to the firm’s perspective, the ques-
tion is then whether the potential change in individual creditors’ credit supply implies a
significant impact on the total credit supplied. Hence, while there may be fundamental
differences between firms that have, or do not have, CDS contracts traded on their debt,
it is important to investigate the granularity of the impact of CDSs conditional on the
CDS holdings of all of a firms’ respective creditors and the variations in these across CDS
firms and time.
As a baseline study, I first investigate the effect of the pure presence of outstanding
CDS contracts held by the firm’s own creditors. The analysis is conducted based upon
the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms, and the results are presented in Table 3.
- Table 3 -
In Model (1) and (2), I investigate the impact of the presence of CDS creditors on
firms’ Total Credit Ratio, which is the firm-specific credit exposure, scaled by total assets.
In line with Saretto and Tookes (2013), the results in Model (1) suggest that CDS firms,
i.e., firms for which a CDS in general is available, have higher credit ratios than non-
CDS firms.17 In addition, I find the signs of the control variables to be in line with
17In robustness test I find similar results when using firms’ (book value based) leverage ratios which I
calculate as the sum of current and long-term debt as defined in Compustat, scaled by total assets.
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the general predictions, e.g., larger firms are less financially constrained and, thus, rely
more on equity markets than on credit markets, higher volatility increases firms’ default
probabilities leading to lower credit ratios, debt capacity is higher for firms with fixed
assets, the availability of commercial paper programs expands access to debt markets.
The results in Model (2) further suggest that firms whose creditors actively trade CDS
contracts have higher credit ratios and thus, that the effect of CDS contracts is not solely
due to fundamental differences between CDS and non-CDS firms.18 In order to investigate
whether the difference in the credit ratio is due to a difference in the credit amount
supplied to the firm Model (3) presents the results where I use the natural logarithm
of the total credit supplied by the firm’s creditors as dependent variable. As seen, I
again find a positive coefficient for CDS Outstanding indicating that firms experience
an extension of credit when the firm’s own creditors use CDS contracts.19 However, as
CDS-trading banks typically are larger and, thus, in general are expected to provide
more credit to firms compared to non-CDS creditors, the findings for CDS Outstanding
may simply reflect differences in lender characteristics rather than implications of the
outstanding CDS contracts. If this is the case, then one would expect only the fraction
of credit that is held by CDS creditors to be larger, while the credit of other creditors
should not be affected (or even be lower). Models (4) and (5) of Table 3 present the results
where I analyze the impact of the presence of CDS creditors on the credit amount that
is supplied by CDS and non-CDS creditors, respectively.20 I find positive and significant
coefficients for CDS Outstanding for the credit exposures of both CDS and non-CDS
creditors. Hence, the results suggest that the effect of the presence of CDS creditors
is not driven by differences in lender characteristics. Moreover, the presence of CDS
creditors may also lead to a credit extension by non-CDS creditors.21
4.2 The Impact of Creditors’ Net CDS Positions
Although the typical view is that creditors are credit protection buyers, the descriptive
analysis in Section 3 revealed that creditors often also are net sellers of CDS contracts.
In terms of the impact of CDSs on the credit amount provided to firms one would expect
that the impact depends on whether the creditors have bought, respectively sold, credit
18Appendix Figure A1 graphically confirms these findings by outlining that the CDS firms covered in
the data sample during the whole sample period have higher credit ratios than their non-CDS counter-
parts, but also that the difference in the credit ratio has been varying over time.
19I find that firms’ Total Credit amount is increased by 0.673 which corresponds to that the total credit
amount of the average firm is approximately 11.1 percent higher due to the presence of CDS creditors.
20For the sample of non-CDS firms, I infer a quasi CDS Creditor Credit Amount by aggregating the
credit exposure of banks that in general trade CDS contracts in my sample.
21Appendix Figure A2, Panel A and Panel B, shows that the share of credit held by CDS-trading
banks for both CDS and non-CDS firms has been steadily decreasing in recent years.
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protection on their own borrowers. To that extent, it is first of all interesting to investigate
whether the credit extension found in the previous section is due to the presence of CDS
creditors that are protection buyers or protection sellers, or both. Furthermore, a finding
that reveals a differential effect on firm-level credit exposures due to the creditors’ CDS
position would support the evidence of a creditor-related effect that is supplementary
to the implications of CDS contracts for credit markets, more generally. While the
literature has outlined that individual creditors that hedge their credit exposure using
CDS contracts have an incentive to extend their credit supply (e.g., Bolton and Oehmke
(2011)), it is likely that firms with creditors that on average are protection buyers will
experience lower credit supply. CDSs are insurance-like contracts that hedge against the
credit risk of reference firms and, thus, most likely held by creditors that want to decrease
their credit risk. In contrast, one would expect no, or even a, positive impact on the
credit supplied to the firm when their creditors are net protection sellers. However, given
a constant demand for credit by the firm and its typical reliance on multiple creditors,
any change in the credit exposure of one CDS holding creditor may be offset by the firm’s
other CDS creditors and/or non-CDS creditors. Contrary to other CDS creditors’ credit
supply, non-CDS creditors’ credit supply is more directly linked to the credit risk of the
firm as these by definition do not hedge their credit exposures.22
In order to investigate the role of creditors’ position in CDS contracts, I next present
the results of an analysis where I regress the firm’s total credit amount, respectively the
credit held by CDS creditors and non-CDS creditors, on proxies for creditors’ net CDS
positions and the standard set of controls. As a measures for creditors’ net CDS positions,
I use the net value of all creditors’ outstanding CDS position, i.e., the notional amount
of CDS bought minus the notional amount of CDS sold. Specifically, I define Net Buyer
(Net Seller) as a dummy variable that is equal to one if the net CDS position of the firm’s
creditors is positive (negative), and is equal to zero otherwise. The results are shown in
Table 4.
- Table 4 -
I find positive and significant coefficients for CDS Outstanding in all model specifi-
cations indicating that firms have more credit available when their creditors hold CDS
contracts that are written on the firm’s debt. However, I also find that the magnitude of
this effect depends on the creditors’ net CDS positions. As shown in Models (1), (3), and
(5) I find negative coefficients for CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers that are significant
at the 5% level. Hence, the total credit amount available to firms is lower when their
22The credit exposure of non-CDS creditors may indirectly be affected by the CDS creditors’ usage of
CDS contracts, if related changes in the credit supply by these creditors affects the overall credit risk of
the firm.
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creditors are net buyers of CDS and the lower credit supply stems from both CDS and
non-CDS creditors. In contrast, and as shown in Models (2), (4), and (6), I find positive
coefficients for CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers in all model specifications. Although the
statistical significance is weak, the results suggest that the total credit amount available
is higher when the firm’s creditors are net sellers of CDS contracts and that the increase
in credit is driven by non-CDS creditors. Thus, in relative terms the results indicate
that the effect of having net CDS-buying creditors is rather negative for the individual
CDS firms, while CDS firms may be able to obtain additional credit when they have net
CDS-selling creditors. However, when also accounting for the effect on firm-specific credit
exposures stemming from the availability of CDS contracts, I find that CDS firms inde-
pendent of their creditors’ CDS positions have more credit available than their non-CDS
counterparts (or during period where the creditors hold no CDS written on the firm’
debt).23 Overall, the analysis reveals that the impact of CDS contracts on firm-level
credit exposures depends upon the CDS position of creditors and supports the result
that the effect on firm-specific credit exposures is caused by the creditors’ actual CDS
holdings.
4.3 The Variation in Creditors’ CDS Coverage
In the previous analysis I find evidence of lower credit supply from both CDS and non-
CDS creditors when their creditors are net protection buyers and relaxed credit supply
when their creditors are net protection sellers. This finding stands in contrast to some
related studies that investigate how individual creditors may change their debt financing
to a firm after having bought a CDS contract on that firm. Based upon a theoretical
model, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) argue that the holding of a CDS contract by a lender
changes the credit relation between the lender and the borrower. Specifically, the creditor
may be willing to extend its credit exposure as the CDS strengthens the creditor’s position
in ex post debt renegotiation. In line with this Gu¨ndu¨z, Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu
(2017) find that creditors hedging their credit exposure by 50 to 200 percent, compared to
other creditors, increase credit to riskier firms in the onset of the Small Bang in Europe.
However, regarding the discussion of the role of CDS contracts for firms’ aggregate lending
the outlined bank-firm level effect may be impeded. Credit extensions by individual
creditors that are due to their purchase of credit protection may be minor in terms of a
firm’s total lending and/or, potentially, offset by the lending of the firm’s other creditors.
Further, banks may adjust their credit supply in accordance to their net CDS position
that can be both net buy and net sell positions. In order to address this discussion in
23The aggregated credit exposures related to CDS firms’ whose creditors are net protection buyers
(sellers) is approximately 6.8 percent (13.8 percent) higher than that of the average non-CDS firm.
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more detail, the next section first provides a brief investigation of the implications of
creditors’ CDS holdings for the credit supply on the bank-firm level before turning to a
more thorough analysis of the variation in creditors’ net CDS positions and its impact
on the credit supply on the firm level.
4.3.1 Creditors’ Hedging and Firm-bank-level Credit
To enhance the understanding of the effect of creditors’ CDS holdings for firm-level credit
this section briefly investigates the impact of individual creditors’ CDS holdings for bank-
firm-level credit. Specifically, I test the effect of a creditors CDS holding for the credit
provided to that firm by conducting an analysis on the bank-firm level and in the sample
that is obtained before aggregating creditors’ credit exposures and CDS positions on the
firm level.24
In Appendix Table A2, Panel A, I first investigate the role of outstanding CDS con-
tracts for individual by separating between creditors which in a given quarter respectively
are net protection buyers and net protection sellers. Specifically, I use bank-firm specific
dummy variables that are equal to one in a given quarter, if the creditor has bought more,
respectively less, credit protection on the firm’s debt than it has sold. As dependent vari-
able I use the natural logarithm of the respective banks’ credit exposures to the firm. As
outlined in the table, Models (1) and (2) show positive and significant coefficients both
when the creditor is a net protection buyer and net protection seller indicating a gen-
eral increase in the credit supplied to firms on which the creditor holds a CDS contract.
However, in contrast to the findings on the firm level I find that the increase in bank-firm
level credit is larger when the creditor is a net protection buyer.
In Panel B of Appendix Table A2, I further exploit whether the impact depends on
the ratio of creditors’ total credit exposure that is covered by the creditors’ outstanding
CDS contracts. In order to be able to differentiate between a baseline CDS effect and
actual coverage effect I also include a firm-bank specific dummy variable that is equal
to one, if the creditor in the given quarter holds a CDS position on the firm’s debt
(Bank CDS Position). In Model (1), I capture the bank-specific CDS coverage effect by
also adding the firm-bank-specific ratio of the creditor’s CDS net notional, scaled by the
credit exposure of the respective bank. In Model (2), I then analyze the bank-specific
CDS coverage in more detail by using dummy variable for specific ranges of this ratio.
As seen from both models, I in general find positive and significant coefficients for Bank
CDS Position suggesting that creditors that hold CDS contracts, in general, provide
24The analysis is supplementary to Gu¨ndu¨z, Ongena, Tu¨mer-Alkan, and Yu (2017) as it also provides
insight on to what extent lower or higher hedge ratios, including negative hedge ratios of a creditor
affects the firm-level credit exposure.
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more credit to reference firms. However, I also find a negative and significant coefficient
for the bank-specific CDS coverage ratio suggesting that the impact is lower for higher
hedge ratios. The findings in Model (2) outline that credit in fact is withdrawn for CDS
hedge ratios above one or below minus one, i.e., when the CDS net notional outstanding
is larger than the creditor’s credit exposure. In contrast, creditors on average provide
more credit in case of relatively low CDS coverage ratios. The results exemplifies that
while individual creditors may extend credit to firms due to their use of CDS contracts
the magnitude varies a lot depending on the extent to which they hedge their credit
protection and may, potentially, also lead to a lower credit supply to the firm. Overall,
these results provide evidence that it is likely that different levels of credit hedging by
creditors of the same firm partly, or totally, may offset each other.
4.3.2 Creditors’ CDS Coverage and Firm-level Credit
In this section I study the variation in creditors’ net CDS positions and its impact on
firms’ total credit exposures by investigating the ratio of firms’ total credit amount that
is covered by outstanding CDS contracts held by its creditors. In order to help the inter-
pretation of the results and to avoid concerns about selection bias, I conduct the analysis
based on the firm level sample including CDS firms only. The results are presented in
Table 5.
- Table 5 -
Similar to the study on the firm-bank level, I include the measure CDS Outstanding
to capture the baseline effect of the presence of CDS creditors. Then, in Panel A, I
use the measure CDS Coverage which is calculated as the net value of all creditors’
outstanding net CDS positions, scaled by the firm-level credit exposure. The measure
not only captures whether the creditors are net buyers or sellers of CDSs, but also the
significance of their holdings. The results in Models (1) and (2) provide evidence that
the finding that CDS firms are able to maintain higher credit ratios when their creditors
hold CDS contracts is robust also in the sample of CDS firms only. However, I further
find (like in the analysis on the firm-bank level) that firms’ credit ratios are decreasing in
the firm-specific CDS coverage ratio, i.e., the more the creditors hedge, the less credit is
available to the firm. Furthermore, the negative correlation between the credit amount
available and creditors’ CDS coverage ratio is confirmed when I in Models (3) to (8)
analyze the impact on firms’ total credit amount, as well as the credit amount held by
CDS creditors and non-CDS creditors, respectively.
In order to differentiate between the size and position effect, I next rerun the analysis
using dummies for certain levels of the total CDS coverage ratio. In particular, I use
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dummies for observations where the total CDS coverage ratio is positive, respectively
negative, and the CDS notional value covers a high, medium or low fraction of the
aggregated credit exposure.25 The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5. In Models
(1) and (2) I again investigate the impact on firms’ total credit ratios. Overall, the
results suggest that the impact on firms’ credit ratios is negative in case of positive CDS
coverage ratios and positive in case of negative CDS coverage ratios. However, I only find
a significant effect when the firm-specific CDS coverage ratio is high and creditors are
net protection buyers. Meanwhile, the coefficient for CDS Outstanding is positive and
significant at the 5% level suggesting that CDS firms are able to maintain higher credit
ratios, except for the case of very high levels of CDS hedging by their creditors. The
results in Models (3) through (8) further show that both CDS and non-CDS creditors
significantly reduce their credit supply when the degree of CDS hedging is high. However,
the impact is larger, and also statistically significant for medium levels of credit protection
for the credit exposures by non-CDS firms. Although the statistical significance is weak,
the results in this specification furthermore suggest that non-CDS creditors, in contrast
to CDS creditors, may be willing to extend their credit exposure during periods where
the notional value of CDSs sold by the firm’s creditors is large relative to the firm-level
credit exposure.
4.4 The Role of Firms’ Credit Risk
Overall, the results outline that the credit extension that as due to the availability of
CDS contracts is less pronounced (and potentially countered) for CDS firms when their
creditors on average use CDS contracts for hedging purposes relative to when their CDS
creditors are net sellers of CDS contracts. However, as the findings furthermore suggest
a clear separation between the credit amount provided by CDS and non-CDS creditors,
the results may also raise concern about that the results are driven by firm characteristics
rather than creditors’ CDS trading. On the one hand, creditors may to a larger extent
become net CDS buyers when the credit risk of the firm is high and therefore provide less
credit to these firms. At the same time, non-CDS creditors of the same firm may provide
even less credit due to their lack of hedging towards firms with, potentially, higher credit
risk. Similar, creditors’ may only sell credit protection on borrowers that are relatively
safe firms. On the other hand, if the variation in the aggregated credit exposures of a
firm is not driven by firm characteristics then the CDS holdings by a firm’s creditors may
imply unanticipated financial constraints to the firm. In particular, this may explain
why firms may choose to switch to new lenders after the inception of CDS trading as
25In particular, I separate the positive observations of the CDS coverage ratio based upon the Q25
and the Q75-quartiles, while I only separate the negative observations based upon the median values.
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suggested in Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016). To provide more insights about the issue of
unobserved firm heterogeneity, I next investigate the role of firm characteristics for the
effect on firm-specific credit exposures.
As CDSs hedge the buyer against the credit risk of the reference firm, I start by
examining to what extent lagged values of measures that reflect a firm’s financial health
explain creditors’ CDS holdings. In particular, I use proxies for the firm’s credit risk
(Z-score and Rating), income (Profitability), debt financing (Leverage and Short-term
Debt), as well as financial constraints (Firm Size). The analysis is conducted in the
sample of CDS firms only and the results are presented in Table 6, Panel A.
- Table 6 -
In Models (1) to (3), I focus on the role of credit risk measures in explaining the
presence of CDS creditors by regressing the dummy variable CDS Outstanding, as well as
the dummy variables where I condition on creditors’ net CDS positions (CDS Outstanding
× Net Buyers and CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers), on the set of measures of firms’
financial health and industry-fixed effects. The results show that the presence of CDS
creditors is positively correlated with firms’ leverage ratios and that firms with lower
(higher) ratings, i.e., lower (higher) repayment probabilities, are more likely to have CDS
creditors that are net protection buyers (sellers). Although the statistical significance
is weak, the results furthermore suggest that firms are more (less) likely to have net
selling (buying) CDS creditors when they are more (less) profitable and/or have less
(more) short-term debt. In Models (4) to (5) I likewise report the determinants of CDS
Coverage, conditional on creditors’ net CDS positions, in order to test whether the credit
risk measures also explain the variation in the firm-specific CDS coverage ratios. Although
the statistical significance is not as strong as before, the results show that higher levels of
credit risk of the firm leads to higher positive CDS coverage ratios and, thus, reveal that
firms’ credit risk and financial constraints positively relate to creditors’ CDS holdings.
Next, I utilize the results obtained from the investigation of the determinants of
firms’ CDS coverage in a robustness test. Specifically, I use the CDS coverage residual
to capture the CDS coverage impact and isolate the effects due to firm’s credit risk.
In order to distinguish between the effect of net protection-buying creditors and net
protection-selling creditors I define CDS Coverage × Net Buyers Residual, respectively
CDS Coverage × Net Sellers Residual, to be equal to the average firm-specific CDS
coverage residual value obtained from the determinants of the CDS coverage model given
by Model (4), respectively Model (5), of Panel A in Table 6. Then I investigate the impact
of the CDS coverage residual on firms’ total credit ratios, as well as the credit ratios held
by CDS and non-CDS creditors to test whether creditors’ CDS holdings has a affect on
firms’ overall debt financing. As the residual measure should only capture the effect of
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creditors’ CDS holdings that is not driven by the credit risk of the firm, I only expect to
find a significant effect for CDS creditors’ credit ratios to the extent that they strategically
change the credit exposures to their borrowers. In the regression on non-CDS creditors’
credit ratio I expect only a significant CDS coverage residual coefficient to the extent
that non-CDS creditors off-set the changes in the credit supply by CDS creditors. The
analysis is again conducted in the sample of CDS firms only and the results are presented
in Table 6, Panel B. Models (1), (3) and (5) show the results in case of net protection-
buying creditors and outline that the result of lower credit supply by CDS creditors is
robust when controlling for the firm’s financial health while the effect on firms’ total credit
ratio or the credit supply by non-CDS creditors is insignificant. As the coefficient in the
model for firms’ total credit ratio is also negative, the results indicate that CDS firms
have less credit available when their creditors are protection buyers. However, the effect
may be minor in terms of their aggregate credit exposure, probably because non-CDS
creditors partly off-set the reduction in credit supply. In contrast, Models (2), (4) and
(6) outline robust results regarding an increase in firms’ total credit ratio and the credit
supplied by CDS creditors in case of net protection selling creditors while the effect on the
credit ratio of non-CDS creditors is insignificant. Overall, the robustness test provides
evidence that CDS firms may benefit in terms of a credit extension from having creditors
that are net protection sellers, but also may experience that credit is withdrawn when
the creditors are net protection buyers.
In terms of the economic significance of these findings, it is clear that the individual
firm will be more exposed to changes in the credit supply caused by creditors’ CDS
holdings the more creditors of the firm hold (or are able to hold) CDS contracts on the
firm’s debt. Furthermore, one would expect that the effect on the firm-specific credit
exposures is only pronounced for firms with a high share of CDS creditors if the effect
indeed stems from creditors’ CDS holdings. In other words, if the effect is purely driven
by firm characteristics, then there should be no difference between the credit amount
provided by CDS creditors and non-CDS creditors, respectively. I test this hypothesis
by utilizing differences in the presence of CDS creditors across CDS firms. Specifically, I
separate CDS firms into the samples of High CDS Creditor Ratio and Low CDS Creditor
Ratio, where High CDS Creditor Ratio (Low CDS Creditor Ratio) refers to firms where
the ratio of CDS creditors to total creditors is above (below) the median value. The
results are presented in Appendix Table A3 and provide evidence that both the results
of lower credit supply in the case of net CDS-buying creditors and the results of higher
credit supply in the case of net CDS-selling creditors are driven by the sample of firms
that have a relative high share of CDS creditors. Hence, the results suggest that the
effect is indeed driven by the CDS trading of a firm’s creditors and moreover that the
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economic significance is largest for firms with a high share of CDS creditors.
Before turning to the discussion of the significance of these results relative to the
liquidity in CDS markets, the next section studies whether creditors’ CDS holdings also
affect firms’ debt financing more generally.
5. Creditors’ CDS Holdings and Debt Refinancing
The previous section showed that the availability of CDS contracts increases the credit
amount available to firms, but also that the level of credit exposures across CDS firms
depends on creditors’ actual CDS holdings. Accordingly, it is likely that creditors’ CDS
holdings also affect firms’ debt refinancing. Changes in firms’ refinancing conditions are
not only determined by the level of credit provided, but may, particularly, be reflected in
the type of debt provided. The credit extension or withdrawal may come at cost or be
beneficial in terms of maturity, interest payments and/or the type of debt. As outlining
potential costs or benefits of creditors’ CDS holdings is key for the determination of
the overall implications of CDS contracts for firms’ refinancing this section investigates
whether the availability of CDS contracts and creditors’ CDS holdings affect also other
measures of a firm’s debt financing.
5.1 The Effect on Debt Maturity
In order to test the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings on reference firms’ debt refinancing,
I first investigate the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings on firms’ overall debt maturity.
Following, e.g., Diamond (1991b) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), firms with
longer debt maturities are better able to mitigate the potential refinancing risk associated
with short-term debt. Longer debt maturities naturally imply that the firm will have to
refinance its debt less often and an increase in firms’ debt maturity may imply a lower
default probability as it increases the probability of debt repayment (e.g., Leland and
Toft (1996), Brunnermeier (2009), and Krishnamurthy (2010)). In contrast, creditors
may have an incentive to lower the maturity of newly issued debt as a more frequent
debt rollover of the firm will lower the creditors’ monitoring costs. This is in line with
Parlour and Winton (2013) who show that creditors may buy CDS contracts to reduce
their monitoring costs by laying-off credit risk. Accordingly, it is likely that creditors,
who have bought credit protection on a firm, also provide more short-term debt to firms.
Conversely, if the creditor successfully reduces all its monitoring costs by holding a CDS
contract on the firm, then the creditor may even be willing to extend the maturity of the
firm’s debt.
For the empirical analysis on the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings on firms’ refi-
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nancing risk, I first determine firms’ overall debt maturity, Debt Maturity, by calculating
the principal weighted average debt maturity of the firm’s outstanding debt. If creditors’
CDS holdings positively affects firms’ refinancing risk then I first of all expect a positive
correlation between creditors’ CDS holdings and Debt Maturity, as well as that the effect
is independent of creditors’ net CDS positions. To test this hypothesis, I regress Debt
Maturity on the specified firm-level measures of creditors’ CDS holdings, as well as a set
of controls, including time, industry, firm and rating fixed effects following Saretto and
Tookes (2013). The results are presented in Table 7.
- Table 7 -
In Models (1) to (4) I first provide an analysis conducted in the sample of both CDS
and non-CDS firms. Although, I find a positive coefficient for CDS Firm in Model (1), the
results outline no significant difference between CDS and non-CDS firms’ debt maturity
for my sample. Instead, the results in Model (2) show that firms have significantly longer
debt maturity in quarters where at least one of the firm’s creditors holds a CDS contract
on the firm.26 The finding is in line with Saretto and Tookes (2013), but specifically
suggests that the effect on firms’ debt maturity is linked to time-variations in creditors’
CDS holdings. In Models (3) and (4) I further explore potential difference due to creditors’
net CDS positions. While I do find a negative, respectively a positive, coefficient in the
case of creditors that are net protection buyers, respectively sellers, the effects are not
statistical significant compared to the debt maturity of non-CDS firms. Henceforth,
relative to non-CDS firms, the results suggest that CDS firms’ refinancing risk is lower
due to the presence of CDS creditors. In order to explore this positive impact on firms’
debt refinancing in more detail, Model (5) and (6) present the results where I investigate
the effect of creditors’ net CDS positions sample of only CDS firms. As outlined in the
table, I actually find significant differences in the debt maturity across CDS firms; firms
with creditors that are net protection buyers have shorter debt maturities than firms with
creditors that are net protection sellers. Relative to non-CDS firms, the debt maturity
is only increased by 0.26 years for firms whose creditors’ are net buyers of CDSs while
the debt maturity is increased by 1.59 years for firms whose creditors’ are net seller of
CDSs.27
In order to help the understanding of the variation in the impact on CDS firms’ debt
maturity it is of interest to study the source of the change in debt maturity. Theoretically
26Assuming that all variables are at the mean level, the results suggest that debt maturity is increased
by 0.92, i.e., about one year, when their creditors’ hold a CDS contract on the firm.
27Compared to Saretto and Tookes (2013) who find that the debt maturity is increased by 1.09 to 1.79
years after the introduction of CDSs my findings show how the differences in creditors’ net CDS position
helps explaining the variation in the effect on debt maturity.
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may an increase in firms’ debt maturity arise not only due to the issuance of new, long(er)-
term debt, but also due to the lack of refinancing of maturing debt. That is, the relative
shorter debt maturity of firms whose creditors’ are net buyers of CDSs may simply be
caused by the lower supply of credit that was documented in Section 4. In particular,
this could arise if the firm’s creditors choose to refinance only a fraction of the firm’s
maturing debt. However, the relative shorter debt maturity may also be caused by
a shorter maturity of newly issued debt and, thus, imply a change in the type of debt.
Likewise, may the relative longer debt maturity of firms whose creditors’ are net sellers of
CDSs be due to a significant lower amount of short-term debt, larger amount of long-term
debt, and/ or replacement of short-term debt with more long-term debt. Accordingly, the
change in these firms’ debt maturity could either arise due to foregone debt refinancing
or a change in the type of debt. In order to outline the source for the change in debt
maturity I next study changes in specific debt tranches that arise due to creditors’ CDS
holdings. In particular, I analyze the amount of the firm’s debt that is due in one year
(Debt Due: 0-1 Yr), two to five years (Debt Due: 2-5 Yrs), five to ten years (Debt Due:
5-10 Yrs), as well as ten to thirty years (Debt Due: 10-30 Yrs), all scaled by the total
debt outstanding. I conduct the analysis in the sample of only CDS firms and present
the results in Table 8.
- Table 8 -
Although I do not find a significant impact of the pure presence of creditors with CDS
holdings the results outline significant effects when I account for whether the firm’s cred-
itors are net protection buyers or sellers. As shown in Models (1), (3), (5), and (7),
firms with creditors that are net protection buyers have a higher ratio of debt that is
due within one to five years and a lower ratio of debt that is due within the next year.
This suggests, that debt maturity extension is caused by the refinancing of maturing debt
with relative short-term debt. In addition, the results indicate a potential lower share of
debt that matures within five to ten years which, in accordance to the previous finding of
lower credit supply to firms with net protection buyers, may reflect that creditors lower
their provision of medium-term debt (rather than short-term debt) in order to reduce
their monitoring costs. In contrast, Models (2), (4), (6), and (8), show that when firms
have creditors that are net protection sellers then the firm has a significant lower share
of debt that is due within two to five years while fraction of debt due in five to ten years
is higher. This not only suggests a decrease in more risky debt but also, since I do not
find a significant decrease in long-term debt, that the increase in debt due within five to
ten years must stem from issuance of new debt. Overall, the firm’s short-term debt is
refinanced with more long-term debt which, all else equal, will be beneficial for the firms
as it not only implies a less frequent debt refinancing, but also that the firms are able to
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refinance their debt early, i.e., before maturing. As suggested by Xu (2017), the latter
effect in particular helps firms to manage their refinancing risk.
In order to understand the significance of the debt maturity results compared to
changes in the firm-level credit exposure, Appendix Table A4 presents the results of an
analysis where I test the impact on debt maturity conditional on the firm’s debt capacity
using the firm’s leverage ratios.28 Overall, I find that especially firms with low debt
capacity will experience an effect in terms of debt refinancing. This is intuitive as firms
with low debt capacity in general will be financially constrained and only have very limited
options for additional credit supply. Hence, for these firms will a change in debt maturity
still be an option to impose relaxation of financing constraints, without providing more
credit.
5.2 The Effect on Other Costs of Debt
In terms of firms refinancing of debt, the previous analysis revealed that firms’ whose
creditors make use of CDS contracts on average have more credit available, as well as
longer debt maturity. Although, I find that CDS firms in overall may experience relaxed
refinancing conditions there is a significant variation in firms’ debt refinancing options.
Accordingly, it is likely that there also is a association between creditors’ use of CDS
and the more direct costs related to the firm’s debt financing. To the extent that the
relaxed refinancing conditions come at a price and/or the presence of CDS contracts may
affect the probability of debt refinancing (for instance due to the higher level of credit),
then one would expect an increase in the firm’s debt financing costs. To address this
issue, I provide an empirical investigation of direct costs associated with creditors’ CDS
holdings by focusing on firms’ amount of interest payments as proxy for firms’ direct debt
financing costs. Accordingly, I define Interest To Credit as the firm’s interests and related
payments, scaled by total credit outstanding.29 The model specification is similar to the
ones used before and the results are presented in Table 9, Panel A.
- Table 9 -
In Model (1) to (3) I first conduct the analysis in the sample of both CDS and non-CDS
firms. While only being statistical significant on the 1% level, the results in Model (1) on
the one hand indicates that CDS firms compared to non-CDS firms have higher interest
payments but on the other hand also outlines that the magnitude is lower in quarters
28Specifically, I separate firms into the sample of Low Debt Capacity and High Debt Capacity where
Low Debt Capacity (High Debt Capacity) refers to firms with average leverage ratios above (below) the
median.
29In robustness tests I use the ratio of interest payments to total assets, as well as the natural logarithm
of interest payments and find that the results and conclusions are robust to both alternative specifications.
67
where their creditors actually hold CDS contracts. While the findings suggest that CDS
firms pay relatively more in interest, the net effect turns out to be negligible in terms of
magnitude and statistical insignificant. In Models (2) and (3), respectively Models (4) and
(5), I further investigate whether the effect depends on the creditors’ net CDS positions.
Although, the results suggest higher interest payments for firms with creditors that are
net protection buyers relative to those firms that are net protection sellers, I do not
find significant coefficients in these specification. Thus, the results suggest no significant
higher direct costs caused by creditors’ CDS holdings and due to a higher reliance on debt
financing by CDS firm. This is in line with Ashcraft and Santos (2009) who find that
the availability of CDS contracts do not affect bonds spreads for the average borrower,
as well as Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2017) who show that CDS firms on average do not
become more risky when the creditors hold CDS contracts.
While firms interest payment is a direct proxy of the costs of debt, firms may also
face other costs associated with their debt financing. In particular, firms may become
more financially constrained if the CDS holding of its creditors significantly limits the
type of debt they can issue. A limitation on the type of debt reduces the firm’s flexibility
in terms of debt refinancing and will, accordingly, be costly for the firm. As documented
by Becker and Ivashina (2014), firms switch from loans to bonds at times characterized
by tight lending standards. Thus, if I find an increase in firm’s bond to bank debt ratios
due to creditors’ CDS holdings, respectively their CDS net positions, then this would
reflect a contraction in the overall credit provision by the firm’s creditors. In Table 9,
Panel B, I analyze this hypothesis by using the measure Bond To Debt, which is the
firm’s amount of bonds outstanding, scaled by total debt. Models (1) to (3) again show
the results where I conduct the analysis in the sample of both CDS and non-CDS firms.
The result in Model (1) indicates that CDS firms relative to non-CDS firms to a higher
extent rely on bonds than on bank debt (e.g., similar to Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016)),
but that there is no baseline effect of creditors’ CDS holdings. However, Models (2) and
(3) outline a significant variation due to creditors’ net CDS positions. That is, when their
creditors are net protection buyers (sellers) I find that firms to a higher (lower) extent
rely on bonds than on bank debt. Thus, the firm’s refinancing conditions in terms of
the type of debt indeed seem to be tightened when their creditors are net buyers. While
this is intuitive, it also outlines, in the light of the previous findings that the credit,
that potentially will be withdrawn from firms once their creditors become net protection
buyer, is bank debt. While I do not find significant results in the analysis conducted on
only CDS firms (Models (4) and (5)), there seems not to be a large variation in CDS
firms’ bond to debt ratios over time.
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6. Creditors’ CDS Holdings versus CDS Liquidity
The previous sections showed that the presence of CDS creditors on average increases
the credit supply and lengthens the debt maturity, but that the magnitude depends
on the actual CDS positions of the creditors. When creditors are net buyers of CDS
contracts the debt maturity and credit amount available to firms is significantly lower
than when their creditors are net sellers of CDS contracts. Thus, while firms with net
protection-buying creditors relative to firms with net protection-selling creditors are more
financially constrained, the net effect of the availability of CDS contracts is still positive.
However, following the related literature the effect of creditors’ ability to hedge their
credit risk with CDS contracts will to a high extent depend on the liquidity in CDS
markets. If CDS markets are very liquid, then banks are able to manage their credit
exposure on a frequent basis and at relatively low costs. Contrary, if CDS markets are
not very liquid, then it may be hard for banks to find a counterpart and manage their
credit risk on a frequent basis. Hence, in terms of the role of CDS contracts for firms’
debt financing one would expect that the credit extension caused by the availability of
CDS contracts, and relative to non-CDS firms, is more significant when CDS markets
are liquid. Specifically, when only few CDS contracts are traded on a firm’s debt then
the effect of the availability of CDS contracts may only be minor, and may even become
insignificant in terms of magnitude. Meanwhile, the effect of creditors’ CDS holdings in
relative terms may become more important when liquidity is low. In the extreme case,
CDS firms may even experience having a lower amount of credit available than non-CDS
firms. In order to investigate the economic significance of creditors’ net CDS holdings
for firms’ debt financing relative to the liquidity of CDS contracts I next study the effect
of creditors’ CDS holdings on the credit amount available to firms conditional on the
liquidity of CDS contracts written on the firm’s debt. As a proxy for how liquid CDSs
are for a given firm I use the natural logarithm of the average number of contracts traded
by the firm’s creditors within a given quarter and define the variable CDS Liquidity. CDS
Liquidity will be high if the creditors of a firm trade a lot of CDS contracts on the firm.30
The results are presented in Table 10.
- Table 10 -
In Model (1) I first test the effect of firm-specific CDS liquidity by conducting an analysis
in the sample of both CDS and non-CDS firms and interacting the measure for the
presence of creditors with CDS contracts and CDS Liquidity. As seen in the table, I
find a positive and significant coefficient for CDS Outstanding × CDS Liquidity while
30Compared to the CDS coverage ratio, CDS Liquidity does not reflect creditors demand for buying
or selling credit protection.
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that of CDS Outstanding is positive, but insignificant. This suggest that there is a linear
relation between the number of contracts held by the firm’s creditors and the impact on
firm credit. This is intuitive as creditors’ ability to hedge their credit exposure becomes
more likely and/or comes at a lower cost when CDS contracts are more liquid. However,
the results also suggest that the effect of liquid CDS contracts dominates the baseline
impact of having a CDS creditor.
To the extent that the impact on firms’ credit amount found earlier is caused by
differences in the liquidity of CDS contracts only, I expect the effect on firm-specific
credit exposures to be positive for firms with liquid CDS contracts and negative for firms
with rather illiquid CDS contracts. Said in other words, the effect should be independent
of creditors’ net CDS positions, i.e., whether the creditors are net protection buyers or
sellers. In contrast, if there is any supplementary effect of the actual CDS trading of
creditors, then I expect to find a significant effect that depends upon creditors’ CDS
holdings. To test this hypothesis, I use the firm-specific CDS liquidity measure and
separate my sample of CDS firms into the samples of Liquid CDS and Illiquid CDS. Liquid
CDS (Illiquid CDS ) refers to firms and quarters where the number of CDS contracts
written on the firm is above (below) the median value. As shown in Models (2) and (3),
as well as Models (4) and (5), I find negative coefficients for firm-quarters observations
where the creditors are net protection buyers and positive coefficients for firm-quarters
where the creditors are net protection sellers. However, the coefficients are only statistical
significant for the sample of firms with illiquid CDS contracts. Thus, although there is a
non-negligible effect of the availability of CDS contracts that increases with the liquidity
in these markets, the results confirm the presence of a supplementary effect of creditors’
actual CDS holdings, especially for firms and during times where CDS contracts are
illiquid. Since, the liquidity in CDS markets in the onset of the U.S. Financial Crisis in
general has been decreasing this finding is of particular interest in terms of the impact of
CDS contracts for firm’s debt financing going forward.
7. Conclusion
Supplementary to what has been shown in the related literature, this paper provides a
thorough investigation of the role of creditors’ CDS holdings for firms’ total debt financing
based upon comprehensive CDS position and regulatory German credit registry data.
Using this unique data sample, I focus on the impact of creditors’ CDS holdings on firm-
level credit exposures and refinancing abilities, that in contrast to other CDS-trading
banks have the ability to offer or withhold finance and/or change the type of financing
given to the firm.
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In line with the literature, I find that the availability of CDS contracts on average
implies that the reference firms have a higher credit amount available. However, I explic-
itly show that the magnitude is significantly lower for firms where the creditors are net
protection buyers relative to firms where the creditors are net protection sellers. While
this is in line with the fact that creditors typically buy CDS contracts on firms that are
more credit risky, I find that the results of a lower credit amount provided to these firms
is robust to when I control for firms’ credit risk. I also find that firms with CDS-buying
creditors have relatively lower debt maturity and are more constrained with respect to
the type of debt they can issue. In other words, the potential benefits that arise from the
availability of CDS contracts are significantly less pronounced when a firm’s creditors are
net protection buyers. However, as I do not find an increase in the direct costs of debt,
the results moreover suggest that the change in firms’ refinancing conditions are caused
by creditors’ aim for lower monitoring costs that is supplementary to the decrease in
credit risk stemming from their CDS buy position. The findings of relaxed debt financing
conditions for firms with net protection-selling creditors outline that creditors also exploit
their simultaneous CDS positions and credit relationships when they are net CDS sellers.
Although firms with available CDS contracts have lower rollover risk compared to firms
for whom CDS contracts are not available, the results suggest that the CDS positions of
creditors may imply an indirect cost to firms in form of credit rationing. In particular,
I find the effect of variations in creditors’ CDS holdings to be important during periods,
respectively for firms, with illiquid CDS contracts.
71
bnEUR
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Q4-2007 ???2008 ???2009 ???2010 ???2011 ???2012 ???2013 ???2014 ???2015 ???2016
bnEUR
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20 CDS ??? Notional CDS ????? Notional????????????????????? ?? ?
-
?
????
????
Figure 1
Time series of CDS holdings by German banks
This figure shows the time series of the aggregated CDS holdings by German banks on German non-financial firms. The
net (solid line) and gross (stacked line) notional amount of CDS refer to the amount of credit protection bought net of
credit protection sold and the aggregate amount of credit protection bought and sold, respectively. The numbers reflect
the holdings of CDS contracts written on firms with available CDS position data (DTCC TIW) and credit registry data
(Deutsche Bundesbank). The time period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2 and all numbers are end of quarter holdings and given in
billion euro.
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Table 1
Credit of reference firms and creditors’ net CDS holdings
Sample: German CDS reference firms
Period
...Full Sample:... ...Recession:... ...Recovery I:... ...Recovery II:...
2008-Q1 2008-Q1 2011-Q4 2013-Q4
to 2016-Q2 to 2011-Q3 to 2013-Q3 to 2016-Q2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Relations: 15.0 16.0 16.0 15.0
- Creditor with CDS position 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
Credit Exposure (mEUR): 1024.5 1090.4 844.8 1105.0
- Creditor with CDS position 342.0 339.1 336.2 278.5
CDS Net Notional (mEUR): 16.3 68.5 21.4 -16.9
- Gross amount bought 120.9 184.4 128.9 79.9
- Gross amount sold 106.5 101.3 103.0 115.5
- Number of contracts bought 21.3 22.9 27.6 13.0
- Number of contracts sold 29.3 18.9 27.8 45.8
N 1475 646 351 478
This table presents sample statistics of CDS and credit related measures of German non-financial firms for the period
2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2. The numbers reflect median values of firm-level measures for firms with available CDS position and
credit registry data and are based upon end-of-quarter observations. Credit Relations reflects the number of creditors for
the average firm. Credit Exposure is the total credit amount outstanding of the average firm, given in million euro. CDS
Net Notional is the CDS notional amount bought net of the CDS notional amount sold by a firms’ creditors, given in
million euro. Creditor with CDS position refers to the creditors of firm that also trade CDS contracts written on the firm.
The CDS position data is from DTCC (TIW), while the credit information is based upon the credit registry data (MiMik)
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
Panel A: Firm Fundamentals
CDS Firms (N: 31) Non-CDS Firms (N: 47)
N Mean StdD Q25 Median Q75 N Mean StdD Q25 Median Q75
Credit Amount 971 6.45 1.40 5.75 6.53 7.34 1485 5.78 1.26 5.29 5.76 6.36
Leverage 972 0.27 0.21 0.15 0.23 0.35 1490 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.36
Debt Maturity 758 3.32 2.66 2.00 3.25 4.46 854 3.32 3.35 1.80 3.00 4.26
Short-term Debt 972 0.21 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.34 1490 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.34
Interest To Credit 913 0.06 0.33 0.03 0.08 0.09 1365 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.05
Firm Size 972 9.62 1.53 8.58 9.71 10.7 1490 7.76 1.32 6.99 7.60 8.50
Profitability 972 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 1490 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Cash 972 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.11 1490 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.13
Fixed Assets 972 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.25 0.35 1490 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.27
Volatility 972 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 1490 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
CP-Program 972 0.27 0.4 0.00 0.00 1.00 1490 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Z-Score 972 2.08 3.48 -0.33 1.94 3.28 1490 3.99 9.35 -0.87 2.09 3.36
Rating 972 1.35 1.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 1490 1.47 1.48 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: CDS-related Measures
CDS Firms (N: 31)
Obs Mean StdD Q25 Median Q75
CDS Coverage 972 0.07 0.50 -0.01 0.00 0.06
CDS Creditor Ratio 972 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.14
CDS Liquidity 755 1.53 1.45 0.99 1.45 1.71
The table provides firm-level summary statistics for the samples of CDS- and non-CDS firms, respectively. Panel A shows
statistics related to base firm fundamentals. Panel B shows statistics of CDS-related measures for the sample of CDS
firms. Total Credit Amount is the natural logarithm of the firm-specific credit exposure. Leverage is the book value of
long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. Debt Maturity is the average debt maturity of all
outstanding debt, weighted by the principal of the debt, and given in years. Interest To Credit is the sum of interest
and related payments, scaled by the firm-specific credit exposure. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalents, scaled by total
assets. Short-term Debt is the fraction of long-term debt due within one year, scaled by to total long-term debt. Fixed
Assets is net property plant and equity, scaled by total assets. Volatility is the average volatility 2-digit SIC-code. CP
Program is a dummy variable equal to one if the corporation has an outstanding commercial paper program. Z-Score is
the Altman Z-score. Rating is average of firm-bank specific assigned ratings as defined in the German credit registry data.
CDS Coverage is sum of CDS notional bought minus the sum of CDS notional sold by all creditors of a firm, scaled by the
firm-specific credit exposure. CDS Creditor Ratio is the number of creditors that hold a CDS on the firm’s debt, scaled
by the total number of creditors of the firm. CDS Liquidity is the natural logarithm of the average number of outstanding
CDS contracts within a given quarter. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, and the variables are based on quarterly
observations. The firm fundamental data are obtained from Compustat Global and Capital IQ, while the credit registry
data are obtained from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the CDS position data are obtained from DTCC (TIW). For
details, please see Appendix Table A2.
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Table 3
The presence of CDS creditors and firm credit
Total Total Credit Amount: Credit Amount:
Credit Ratio Credit Amount CDS Creditors Non-CDS Creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS Firm 2.534*** 0.824* -0.35*** 1.133*** -0.30**
(7.50) (1.88) (-3.8) (3.67) (-2.0)
CDS Outstanding 2.390*** 0.673*** 1.456*** 0.933***
(6.08) (7.75) (5.25) (6.92)
Industry Leverage -3.41 -4.51* 0.219 -1.89 -2.61***
(-1.3) (-1.8) (0.39) (-1.0) (-3.0)
Firm Size -2.26*** -2.30*** 0.329*** -1.53*** -0.76***
(-23.) (-23.) (17.0) (-22.) (-23.)
Cash -4.07*** -2.83* -2.21*** -2.39** -0.44
(-2.7) (-1.8) (-6.6) (-2.2) (-0.8)
Volatility -11.7*** -10.5*** -14.7* -68.0*** -37.5***
(-3.3) (-3.0) (-1.8) (-2.7) (-3.1)
Profitability -5.35 -5.25 -0.54 -2.29 -2.95**
(-1.2) (-1.1) (-0.5) (-0.7) (-1.9)
Fixed Assets 7.728*** 9.127*** -2.55*** 7.280*** 1.847***
(7.23) (8.41) (-11.) (9.51) (4.95)
Net Working Capital 11.30*** 10.31*** 0.523 7.222*** 3.088***
(5.01) (4.60) (1.03) (4.56) (4.01)
Capital Expenditure -6.76* -5.03 -0.21 -1.78 -3.24**
(-1.6) (-1.2) (-0.2) (-0.6) (-2.3)
Acquisition Activity -1.71 -0.80 0.093 -1.20 0.404
(-0.6) (-0.3) (0.16) (-0.6) (0.46)
Dividends 1.528*** 1.409*** 0.148** 1.069*** 0.340***
(4.97) (4.61) (2.15) (4.96) (3.24)
CP Program 2.512*** 2.336*** 0.163** 1.525*** 0.810***
(8.38) (7.82) (2.45) (7.24) (7.89)
Sovereign Risk 0.854 -1.10 3.213 -2.36 1.260
(0.05) (-0.0) (0.96) (-0.2) (0.24)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full Full Full Full Full
R-square 0.634 0.640 0.634 0.572 0.741
N 2343 2343 2382 2343 2343
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS holdings on firm-specific credit exposures in the sample of
German non-financial firms. In Models (1) and (2) I use Total Credit Ratio which is the firm’s total credit amount, scaled
by total asset. In Models (3) to (5) I use Total Credit Amount which is defined as the natural logarithm of firm-specific
credit exposures, as well as Credit: CDS Creditors (Credit: Non-CDS Creditors) which is the natural logarithm of the
credit amount provided by creditors that hold (do not hold) CDS contracts. The variable CDS Firm is a dummy equal to
one for firms that at some point during the sample period act as a reference firm in a CDS contract. The variable CDS
Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the
firm’s debt. The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche
Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as
well as time, industry and rating fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms.
The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 4
Creditors’ CDS positions and firm credit
Total Credit Amount: Credit Amount:
Credit Amount CDS Creditors Non-CDS Creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CDS Firm -0.36*** -0.36*** 5.145*** 5.143*** -1.44*** -1.44***
(-3.8) (-3.8) (77.6) (77.5) (-13.) (-13.)
CDS Outstanding 0.774*** 0.634*** 0.719*** 0.623*** 0.842*** 0.678***
(7.96) (7.12) (10.4) (9.91) (7.82) (6.88)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers -0.15** -0.11** -0.17**
(-2.3) (-2.4) (-2.3)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers 0.131* 0.063 0.166**
(1.88) (1.28) (2.15)
Industry Leverage 0.118 0.121 1.599*** 1.629*** 0.466 0.456
(0.21) (0.21) (4.05) (4.11) (0.75) (0.73)
Firm Size 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.325*** 0.326***
(16.9) (16.9) (9.33) (9.40) (15.2) (15.3)
Cash -2.18*** -2.19*** -1.30*** -1.32*** -2.00*** -2.01***
(-6.5) (-6.5) (-5.5) (-5.5) (-5.4) (-5.4)
Volatility -14.4* -14.4* -6.11 -6.20 -23.0*** -23.0***
(-1.8) (-1.8) (-1.1) (-1.1) (-2.6) (-2.6)
Profitability -0.46 -0.47 -1.27* -1.30* -1.53 -1.54
(-0.4) (-0.4) (-1.8) (-1.8) (-1.4) (-1.4)
Fixed Assets -2.54*** -2.53*** -1.09*** -1.08*** -2.23*** -2.21***
(-11.) (-11.) (-6.7) (-6.7) (-8.8) (-8.7)
Net Working Capital 0.477 0.487 0.922*** 0.940*** 0.333 0.339
(0.94) (0.96) (2.58) (2.63) (0.59) (0.60)
Capital Expenditure -0.19 -0.19 -1.07* -1.07* -0.92 -0.92
(-0.2) (-0.2) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-0.9) (-0.9)
Dividends 0.144** 0.144** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.163** 0.163**
(2.08) (2.09) (2.68) (2.71) (2.13) (2.13)
Acquisition Activity 0.137 0.131 -0.00 -0.01 0.153 0.151
(0.23) (0.22) (-0.0) (-0.0) (0.24) (0.23)
CP Program 0.163** 0.162** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.234*** 0.232***
(2.45) (2.43) (7.76) (7.74) (3.18) (3.15)
Sovereign Risk 2.866 2.913 2.890 3.010 4.356 4.370
(0.86) (0.87) (1.23) (1.28) (1.18) (1.18)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
R-square 0.635 0.634 0.964 0.964 0.574 0.574
N 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS positions on firm-specific credit exposures in the sample of
German non-financial firms. In Models (1) and (2) I use Total Credit Amount which is defined as the natural logarithm
of firm-specific credit exposures. In Models (3) to (6) I use Credit: CDS Creditors (Credit: Non-CDS Creditors) which
is the natural logarithm of the credit amount provided by creditors that hold (do not hold) CDS contracts. The variable
CDS Firm is a dummy equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample period act as a reference firm in a CDS
contract. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter
holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS Outstanding ×
Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers (sellers). The information for
credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position
data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as well as time, industry and rating
fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to
2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and *
significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 5
Creditors’ CDS coverage and firm credit
Panel A: CDS Coverage Ratio
Total Total Credit Amount: Credit Amount:
Credit Ratio Credit Amount CDS Creditors Non-CDS Creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CDS Outstanding 0.253*** 0.259*** -0.06 -0.04 -0.18** -0.15* 0.126 0.159
(4.68) (4.78) (-0.9) (-0.5) (-1.9) (-1.7) (1.16) (1.51)
CDS Coverage -0.07* -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.53***
(-2.2) (-10.) (-8.0) (-8.5)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.565 0.568 0.851 0.867 0.770 0.786 0.754 0.773
N 923 923 945 945 945 945 945 945
Panel B: Levels of CDS Coverage
Total Total Credit Amount: Credit Amount:
Credit Ratio Credit Amount CDS Creditors Non-CDS Creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CDS Outstanding 0.249*** 0.243*** -0.06 -0.09 -0.19** -0.21** 0.144 0.102
(4.53) (4.41) (-0.8) (-1.1) (-2.0) (-2.2) (1.33) (0.92)
High CDS Coverage+ -0.38** -1.68*** -1.67*** -2.15***
(-2.5) (-8.9) (-7.1) (-7.8)
Med. CDS Coverage+ -0.17 -0.31** -0.29 -0.80***
(-1.4) (-2.0) (-1.5) (-3.5)
Low CDS Coverage+ -0.03 -0.06 -0.10* -0.07
(-0.9) (-1.2) (-1.6) (-0.9)
High CDS Coverage− 0.103 0.202 -0.07 0.879***
(0.61) (0.91) (-0.2) (2.78)
Low CDS Coverage− 0.039 0.066 0.119* 0.059
(0.99) (1.19) (1.74) (0.74)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.569 0.566 0.864 0.852 0.783 0.771 0.772 0.756
N 923 923 945 945 945 945 945 945
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS coverage on firm-specific credit exposures in the sample of
German non-financial firms. In Models (1) and (2) I use Total Credit Ratio which is the firm’s total credit amount, scaled
by total asset. In Models (3) to (5) I use Total Credit Amount which is defined as the natural logarithm of firm-specific
credit exposures, as well as Credit: CDS Creditors (Credit: Non-CDS Creditors) which is the natural logarithm of the
credit amountprovided by creditors that hold (do not hold) CDS contracts. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy
equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. In Panel A, I
use the variable CDS Coverage which is the total CDS net notional held by the firm’s creditors in a given quarter, scaled by
the firm’s total credit amount. In Panel B, I replace CDS Coverage with dummy variables indicating certain CDS coverage
levels. The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche
Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as
well as time, firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS firms. The sample period is
2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5%
level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 6
Determinants of creditors’ CDS holdings and the residual effect on firm credit
Panel A: Determinants of Creditors’ CDS Holdings
CDS Outstanding CDS Outstanding CDS CDS
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers × Net Sellers Coverage+ Coverage−
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leverage t-1 3.709*** 1.007** 2.339*** -0.33*** 0.030*
(0.78) (0.46) (0.71) (-3.2) (1.66)
Rating t-1 0.125 0.203*** -0.13* 0.009 -0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.70) (-0.1)
Z-score t-1 0.023 -0.02 0.090* 0.006 0.001
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (1.07) (0.91)
Profitability t-1 8.229 -0.71 1.913 -0.61 0.119
(5.32) (3.26) (3.79) (-0.8) (0.89)
Short-term Debt t-1 -0.20 0.235 -0.56 0.179* -0.02
(0.56) (0.44) (0.54) (1.77) (-1.2)
Firm Size t-1 -1.32*** -0.14** -0.70*** 0.023* -0.00***
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (1.69) (-2.8)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
Pseudo R2 0.413 0.140 0.179 0.086 0.074
N 941 941 941 940 940
Panel B: CDS Coverage Residual
Total Credit Ratio: Credit Ratio:
Credit Ratio CDS Creditors Non-CDS Creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.................
CDS Coverage+
Residual -0.03* -0.03*** 0.003
(-1.2) (-2.5) (0.17)
CDS Coverage−
Residual 0.370** 0.243*** 0.126
(2.22) (2.82) (1.31)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.726 0.727 0.676 0.676 0.747 0.747
N 894 894 894 894 894 894
This table presents estimates of the effect of measures of firms’ credit risk on creditors’ CDS holdings and the residual
effect on firm-specific credit exposures in the sample of German non-financial firms. In Panel A, I regress measures for
creditors’ CDS holdings on a set of measures of firms’ credit risk, as well as industry FE. The variable CDS Outstanding is
a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt.
Accordingly, the variable CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one
if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers (sellers). The variable CDS Coverage+ (CDS Coverage−) is equal
to the variable CDS Coverage if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers (sellers), and zero otherwise. CDS
Coverage is the total CDS net notional held by the firm’s creditors in a given quarter, scaled by the firm’s total credit
amount. In Panel B, I regress firms’ credit ratios on the CDS coverage residual value obtained from the regression analysis
from Panel A, Models (4) and (5). The variable Total Credit Ratio is the firm’s total credit amount, scaled by total asset.
Credit Ratio: CDS Creditors (Credit Ratio: Non-CDS Creditors) is the credit amount provided by creditors that hold (do
not hold) CDS contracts, scaled by total asset. The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit
registry data from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base
firm-level financial variables, as well as time, firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of
CDS firms. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the
1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 7
Creditors’ CDS positions and debt maturity
Debt Maturity Debt Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CDS Firm 0.097 -0.57* -0.57* -0.58*
(0.39) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-1.8)
CDS Outstanding 0.922*** 1.116*** 0.858*** 0.723 0.104
(3.13) (3.38) (2.85) (1.58) (0.24)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers -0.29 -0.66**
(-1.3) (-2.3)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers 0.244 0.671**
(1.07) (2.34)
Industry Debt Maturity 0.490*** 0.469*** 0.471** 0.469** 0.471** 0.440**
(4.26) (4.09) (2.38 ) ( 2.38) (2.38) (2.23)
Leverage -1.07* -0.93 -0.95* -0.94* -2.62* -2.54*
(-1.8) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.9) (-1.8)
Firm Size 0.029 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.489 0.487
(0.37) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.95) (0.94)
Cash 2.581** 3.335*** 3.450*** 3.403*** 0.354 0.122
(2.02) (2.58) (2.66) (2.63) (0.13) (0.04)
Volatility 7.826 11.10 12.11 11.77 15.91 15.20
(0.29) (0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.33) (0.31)
Profitability -0.24 -0.72 -0.58 -0.60 -0.21 -0.14
(-0.0) (-0.1) (-0.1) (-0.1) (-0.0) (-0.0)
Fixed Assets 0.288 0.797 0.748 0.794 4.192* 4.622*
(0.32) (0.89) (0.83) (0.88) (1.76) (1.94)
Net Working Capital -2.24 -2.96 -3.11 -3.08 -1.89 -1.73
(-1.0) (-1.3) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-0.3) (-0.3)
Capital Expenditure 6.783* 7.900** 7.997** 7.985** 14.76** 14.76**
(1.94) (2.25) (2.28) (2.27) (2.42) (2.42)
Dividends 0.091 0.070 0.061 0.062 0.441 0.432
(0.34) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.98) (0.96)
Acquisition Activity 3.957* 4.370** 4.524** 4.496** -0.16 -0.23
(1.90) (2.11) (2.18) (2.16) (-0.0) (-0.0)
CP Program 0.349 0.302 0.293 0.292 0.709** 0.709**
(1.57) (1.36) (1.32) (1.31) (1.99) (1.99)
Sovereign Risk 0.548 0.481 0.432 0.438 0.576 0.572
(0.75) (0.66) (0.59) (0.60) (0.71) (0.70)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N N Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full Full Full Full CDS CDS
R-square 0.280 0.285 0.286 0.286 0.293 0.293
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 734 734
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS positions on debt maturity in the sample of German non-
financial firms. Debt Maturity is the average debt maturity of all outstanding debt, weighted by the principal of the debt,
and given in years. The variable CDS Firm is a dummy equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample
period act as a reference firm in a CDS contract. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least
one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS
Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit
protection buyers (sellers). The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from
MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial
variables, as well as time, industry/ firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses in Models (1) through (4) are conducted in
the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms, while the analyses in Models (5) and (6) are conducted in the sample of CDS firms.
The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 8
Creditors’ CDS positions and short-term versus long-term debt
Debt Due: Debt Due: Debt Due: Debt Due:
0-1 Yrs 1-5 Yrs 5-10 Yrs 10-30 Yrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CDS Outstanding 0.009 0.000 -0.04 0.032 0.029 0.000 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.47) (-0.1) (-1.4) (1.10) (1.22) (-0.2) (2.72) (2.70)
CDS Outstanding
× Net Buyers -0.02** 0.081*** -0.03* -0.00
(-1.9) (3.91) (-2.2) (-0.4)
CDS Outstanding
× Net Sellers 0.014 -0.09*** 0.040** 0.000
(1.11) (-4.3) (2.50) (0.05)
Industry Debt Maturity -0.00 -0.00 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003
(-1.27) (-1.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.84) (0.84) (1.56) (1.46)
Leverage 0.075 0.066 -0.22 -0.17 0.546 0.522 0.369*** 0.371***
(0.27) (0.24) (-0.5) (-0.3) (1.60) (1.53) (3.93) (3.95)
Firm Size 0.014* 0.014* 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.005 0.005 0.010*** 0.010***
(1.66) (1.64) (4.26) (4.34) (0.52) (0.48) (3.63) (3.63)
Cash 1.049*** 1.046*** -0.60*** -0.58*** 0.436*** 0.427*** -0.04 -0.04
(8.48) (8.48) (-2.9) (-2.8) (2.85) (2.80) (-0.9) (-1.0)
Volatility 2.468 2.478 -4.56 -4.59 -2.26 -2.24 -0.46 -0.48
(1.16) (1.17) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-0.8) (-0.8) (-0.6) (-0.6)
Profitability 0.382 0.383 0.794* 0.786* 0.138 0.141 0.035 0.035
(1.49) (1.50) (1.89) (1.87) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.40)
Fixed Assets 0.170 0.177* -1.03*** -1.07*** 0.457*** 0.477*** -0.07** -0.07**
(1.60) (1.67) (-5.9) (-6.1) (3.49) (3.63) (-2.1) (-2.1)
Net Working Capital -1.06*** -1.06*** 0.867*** 0.858*** 0.004 0.008 -0.00 0
(-5.3) (-5.3) (2.62) (2.60) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.0) (-0.0)
Capital Expenditure 0.764*** 0.767*** -1.66*** -1.68*** 1.533*** 1.540*** -0.00 0
(2.99) (3.00) (-3.9) (-4.0) (4.85) (4.87) (-0.0) (-0.0)
Dividends -0.02 -0.02 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0
(-1.0) (-1.0) (-3.8) (-3.8) (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.8)
Acquisition Activity 0.212 0.215 -0.39 -0.4 0.632*** 0.637*** 0.022 0.02
(1.08) (1.09) (-1.2) (-1.2) (2.59) (2.61) (0.33) (0.30)
CP Program 0.005 0.005 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.35) (0.36) (2.62) (2.63) (3.02) (3.02) (7.49) (7.46)
Sovereign Risk 0.096 0.093 -0.30 -0.29 -0.05 -0.06 0.298 0.299
(0.17) (0.17) (-0.3) (-0.3) (-0.0) (-0.0) (1.61) (1.62)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.572 0.572 0.531 0.533 0.423 0.424 0.626 0.626
N 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS positions on short-term and long-term debt in the sample of
German non-financial firms. Debt Due: 0-1 Yrs is the amount of debt that is due within one year, scaled by the sum of
current and long-term debt (book value). The definitions for Debt Due: 2-5 Yrs, Debt Due: 5-10 Yrs, and Debt Due:
10-30 Yrs follow the same approach. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s
creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS Outstanding × Net
Buyers (CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers
(sellers). The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche
Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as
well as time, firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS firms. The sample period is
2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5%
level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 9
Creditors’ CDS positions and the cost and type of debt
Panel A: Interest Payments
Interest To Credit Interest To Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS Firm 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191***
(6.28) (6.28) (6.29)
CDS Outstanding -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.01 -0.01
(-6.1) (-5.6) (-5.8) (-0.6) (-0.6)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers 0.007 0.002
(0.34) (0.11)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers -0.01 0.000
(-0.4) (-0.4)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
R-square 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.606 0.606
N 2212 2212 2212 912 912
Panel B: Bond to Debt Ratio
Bond to Debt Bond to Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS Firm 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.099***
(3.10) (3.15) (3.21)
CDS Outstanding 0.002 -0.03 0.013 -0.07** -0.10***
(0.07) (-1.1) (0.46) (-2.4) (-3.2)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers 0.055*** -0.02
(2.67) (-1.1)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers -0.04** 0.027
(-2.0) (1.41)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
R-square 0.598 0.600 0.599 0.673 0.673
N 1880 1880 1880 802 802
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS positions on cost and type of debt of German non-financial
firms. In Panel A, I use Interest to Credit which is the sum of interest and related payments, scaled by the sum of current
and long-term debt. In Panel B, I use Bond to Debt which is the total amount of bonds outstanding, scaled by the sum of
current and long-term debt. CDS Firm is a dummy variable equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample
period act as a reference firm in a CDS contract. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least
one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS
Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit
protection buyers (sellers). The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from
MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial
variables, as well as time, industry/firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses in Models (1) through (3) are conducted in
the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms, while the analyses in Models (4) and (5) are conducted in the sample of CDS firms.
The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table 10
The presence of CDS creditors versus CDS liquidity and firm credit
Total Total Credit Amount
Credit Amount Liquid CDS Illiquid CDS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS Firm -0.50***
(-5.8)
CDS Outstanding × CDS Liquidity 0.158***
(4.81)
CDS Outstanding 0.036 0.701*** 0.570*** 0.196* 0.053
(1.64) (4.42) (3.92) (1.76) (0.51)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers -0.15 -0.16**
(-1.4) (-2.3)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers 0.104 0.128*
(0.95) (1.80)
Industry Leverage -0.54 5.149 5.305* -2.18*** -2.20***
(-0.9) (1.62) (1.66) (-3.0) (-3.0)
Firm Size 0.289*** 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.375*** 0.384***
(14.8) (5.73) (5.68) (5.40) (5.52)
Cash -2.07*** -4.72*** -4.77*** -2.34*** -2.42***
(-6.3) (-4.6) (-4.6) (-3.2) (-3.3)
Volatility -21.3*** -25.7 -26.7 -14.1 -14.8
(-2.8) (-1.1) (-1.1) (-1.3) (-1.4)
Profitability 0.266 5.092** 4.947** 5.924*** 6.055***
(0.27) (2.49) (2.42) (2.88) (2.94)
Fixed Assets -2.23*** -4.71*** -4.67*** -0.61 -0.55
(-9.5) (-10.) (-10.) (-1.0) (-0.9)
Net Working Capital 0.214 1.480 1.579 0.594 0.617
(0.43) (0.80) (0.85) (0.51) (0.53)
Capital Expenditure -0.05 -6.84*** -6.91*** 11.19*** 11.07***
(-0.0) (-4.1) (-4.1) (5.11) (5.04)
Dividends 0.139** 0.156 0.165 -0.03 -0.03
(2.05) (1.02) (1.07) (-0.2) (-0.2)
Acquisition Activity 0.512 1.161 1.108 1.805 1.748
(0.90) (0.77) (0.73) (1.36) (1.32)
CP Program -0.04 0.724*** 0.720*** 0.154** 0.149*
(-0.6) (5.90) (5.86) (1.98) (1.91)
Sovereign Risk 2.527 0.289 0.289 3.818* 3.863*
(0.77) (0.41) (0.41) (1.74) (1.75)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N N N N
Firm FE N Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Full CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.647 0.796 0.796 0.821 0.820
N 2382 473 473 471 471
This table presents estimates of the effect of creditors’ CDS holdings and CDS liquidity on firm-specific credit exposures in
the sample of German non-financial firms. Total Credit Amount is defined as the natural logarithm of firm-specific credit
exposures. The variable CDS Firm is a dummy equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample period act as
a reference firm in a CDS contract. The variable CDS Liquidity is the average number of outstanding CDS contracts in
a quarter and held by the firm’s creditors, given in logarithm. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if
at least one of the firm’s creditors in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are
net credit protection buyers (sellers). The analysis in Model (1) is conducted in the sample of CDS and non-CDS firms.
In Models (2) through (5) I use the sample of CDS firms and separate firms into samples of firms with Liquid CDS and
Illiquid CDS based upon the average number of CDS contracts held by the firm’s creditors. The information for credit
and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data
from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as well as time, industry/ firm and rating
fixed effects. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the
1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Figure A1
Development in firm-level credit exposures for CDS and non-CDS firms
This figure shows the developement in the firm-specific credit exposures for German non-financial firms. CDS Firms (solid
filled bars) refers to the sample of firms that at some point during the sample period act as CDS reference firms. Likewise,
Non-CDS Firms (pattern filled bars) refers to the sample of firms that at no point during the sample period act as CDS
reference firms. The variable Total Credit Ratio is the firm’s total credit amount, scaled by total asset, and is based on
end-of-quarter observations. The figure outlines the yearly averages of the respective quarterly total credit ratios. The
time period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2. The credit registry data is obtained from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the CDS
positios data is obtained from DTCC (TIW).
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Figure A2
Development in firm-level credit exposures for CDS and non-CDS firms by type of
creditor
This figure shows the developement in the firm-specific credit exposures for German non-financial firms based upon the
type of creditor. CDS Firms (Panel A) refers to the sample of firms that at some point during the sample period act
as CDS reference firms. Likewise, Non-CDS Firms (Panel B) refers to the sample of firms that at no point during the
sample period act as CDS reference firms. The development in the firm-specific credit exposure is shown separately for
CDS Banks and Non-CDS Banks, where CDS Banks (Non-CDS Banks) refers to the creditors of a firm that at some point
(at no point) during the sample period holds a CDS contract on one of the sample firms. The variable Credit Ratio is
the credit amount held by, respectively, CDS Banks and Non-CDS Banks), scaled by total asset. The figures outline the
yearly averages of the respective quarterly credit ratios. The time period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2. The credit registry data
is obtained from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the CDS positios data is obtained from DTCC (TIW).
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Table A1
Description of variables
Dependent Variables Description
Credit Amount Log(Firm credit) The natural logarithm of the firm-level credit exposure. Quarterly firm-
level measure. Source: German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Credit Ratio Credit Exposure/ ——-
Total Assets
Firm-level credit exposure, scaled by total assets. Quarterly firm-level mea-
sure. Source: German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Compu-
stat Global.
Leverage Total Debt/ Total Assets The sum of current and long-term debt as defined in Compustat (book
value), scaled by total assets. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Com-
pustat Global.
Debt Maturity Principal weighted aver-
age— debt maturity
The average debt maturity of all outstanding debt, weighted by the princi-
pal of the debt, and given in years. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source:
Capital IQ.
Debt Due: ——-
0-1 Yr
Debt due within 1 year/—
Total Debt
Debt that is due within one year, scaled by the sum of current and long-
term debt (book value). The definitions for Debt Due: 2-5 Yrs, Debt Due:
5-10 Yrs, and Debt Due: 10-30 Yrs follow the same approach. Quarterly
firm-level measure. Source: Capital IQ and Compustat Global.
Interest To——–
Credit
Interest Payments/ ———
–Credit Amount
The sum of interest and related payments, scaled by the firm-level credit
exposure. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Bond To Debt Outstanding Bonds/ ——
— Total Debt
Total amount of bonds outstanding, scaled by the sum of current and long-
term debt (book value). Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Mergent
FISD and Compustat Global.
Bank Credit —–
Amount
Log(Firm-bank credit) The natural logarithm of firm-bank-level credit exposure. Quarterly firm-
bank-level measure. Source: German credit registry (Deutsche Bundes-
bank).
Main Explanatory Variables Description
CDS Firm Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for firms that at some point during the sample
period act as a reference firm in a CDS contract. Firm-level measure.
Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
CDS ———
Outstanding
Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors hold a
CDS contract on the firm. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: DTCC
(TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Net Buyers Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s creditors net CDS holding is
positive. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: DTCC (TIW) and German
credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Net Sellers Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s creditors net CDS holding is
positive. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: DTCC (TIW) and German
credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
CDS Coverage Total CDS net notional/—
Credit Exposure
The sum of CDS notional bought minus the sum of CDS notional sold by
all creditors of a firm, scaled by the firm-level credit exposure. Quarterly
firm-level measure. Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry
(Deutsche Bundesbank).
CDS Creditors Creditors that hold CDSs Creditors that within the sample period hold a CDS on the firm’s debt.
Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit
registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
CDS Creditor –
Ratio
# CDS Creditors/ ———-
# Creditors
The number of creditors that hold a CDS on the firm’s debt, scaled by the
total number of creditors of the firm. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source:
DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
CDS Banks Banks that trade CDSs Banks that within the sample period trade CDS contracts. Quarterly firm-
level measure. Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche
Bundesbank).
CDS Liquidity Log(# CDS contracts) The natural logarithm of the average number of outstanding CDS con-
tracts within a given quarter. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: DTCC
(TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Bank CDS——–
Position
Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the respective bank is a creditor and holds
a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Quarterly firm-bank-level measure.
Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Bank CDS——–
Coverage
Bank CDS net notional/–
Bank-firm credit exposure
The amount of CDS bought minus the amount of CDS sold by a creditor,
scaled by the its credit amount outstanding. Firm-bank-level measure.
Source: DTCC (TIW) and German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
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Table A1
Description of variables (cont.)
Other Variables Description
Industry——–
Leverage
Average leverage across—
3-digit SIC-code
The sum of current and long-term debt as defined in Compustat (book
value), scaled by total assets, and across three-digit SIC codes. Quarterly
industry-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Industry ——–
Debt Maturity
Average debt maturity —
across 3-digit SIC-code
The average debt maturity of all outstanding debt, weighted by the princi-
pal of the debt, and across three-digit SIC codes. Quarterly industry-level
measure. Source: Capital IQ.
Firm Size Log(Total Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source:
Compustat Global.
Profitability EBIT/ Total Assets Total earnings before interest and related expenses, income taxes, and div-
idends, scaled by total assets. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Com-
pustat Global.
Cash Cash/ Total Assets Cash holdings including marketable securities, scaled by total assets. Quar-
terly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Volatility Average volatility across—
2-digit SIC-code
Average standard deviation of corporates’ cash flow within the same two-
digit SIC code (minimum three observations). Quarterly industry-level
measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Fixed Assets Net PPE / Total Assets Net property plant and equity, scaled by total assets. Quarterly firm-level
measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Net Working —–
Capital
(Working Capital - Cash)/
Total assets
The amount of working capital minus cash holdings, scaled by total assets.
Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Capital —–
Expenditure
CapEx/Total assets The amount of total capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. Quarterly
firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Acquisition —–
Activity
Acquisition/ Total Assets The amount used for merger and acquisition activities, scaled by total as-
sets. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Dividends Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for firms’ with positive dividends, and zero
otherwise. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
CP Program Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for firms with an outstanding commercial
paper program, and zero otherwise. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source:
Compustat Global.
Rating Internal Credit Rating Average of firm-bank specific assigned ratings as defined in the German
credit registry data. Rating classes are defined between 1 to 8, with lower
values indicating higher likelihood of debt repayment. Quarterly firm-level
measure. Source: German credit registry (Deutsche Bundesbank).
Z-score Altman Z-score The variable is calculated as the Altman Z-score and based upon firm fun-
damentals. Quarterly firm-level measure. Source: Compustat Global.
Sovereign Risk 5-year CDS spread The variable is the end-of-quarter observation of the German 5-year CDS
spreads. Source: Markit.
The table provides descriptions of all the variables used in the analyses. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.
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Table A2
The impact of creditors’ CDS holding on firm-bank level credit
Panel A: Bank-specific CDS positions
Bank Credit Amount
(1) (2)
Bank CDS Position
× Net Buyer 0.349***
(9.25)
Bank CDS Position
× Net Seller 0.239***
(7.9)
Controls Y Y
Intercept Y Y
Time FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Bank FE Y Y
Rating FE Y Y
Sample CDS CDS
R2 0.494 0.494
N 70573 70573
Panel B: Bank-specific CDS coverage ratios
Bank Credit Amount
(1) (2)
Bank CDS Position 0.467*** 0.083
(15.49) (1.14)
Bank CDS Coverage -0.001***
(-15.8)
I{CDS Hedge Ratio > 1} -1.01***
(-11.92)
I{Bank CDS Coverage ∈ ]0.5;1] } 1.035***
(10.9)
I{Bank CDS Coverage ∈ ]0;0.5] } 1.458***
(17.45)
I{Bank CDS Coverage ∈ [-0.5;0[ } 1.574***
(20.15)
I{Bank CDS Coverage ∈ [-1;-0.5[ } 0.722***
(8.63)
I{Bank CDS Coverage < -1} -1.46***
(-18.23)
Controls Y Y
Intercept Y Y
Time FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Bank FE Y Y
Rating FE Y Y
Sample CDS CDS
R-square 0.497 0.531
N 70573 70573
This table presents estimates of the effect of bank-specific creditor CDS holdings on bank-firm credit exposures in the
sample of German non-financial CDS firms. Bank Credit Amount is defined as the natural logarithm of the bank-firm-level
credit exposure. In Panel A, I use the variable Bank CDS Position which is a dummy variable equal to one if the respective
bank is a creditor and holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, Bank CDS Position × Net Buyer (Bank CDS
Position × Net Seller) is a dummy variable equal to one if the respective bank is a creditor and has bought (sold) a CDS
contract on the firm’s debt. In Panel B, I use the variable Bank CDS Coverage which is the total CDS net notional held by
the respective creditor of the firm and in a given quarter, scaled by the bank-firm specific credit exposure. Furthermore, I
use dummy variables indicating certain Bank CDS Coverage levels. The information for credit and CDS-related measures
is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all
models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as well as time, firm, bank and rating fixed effects. The analyses are
conducted in the sample of CDS firms. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (***
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table A3
Robustness: High versus low presence of CDS creditors
Total Credit Ratio Total Credit Ratio
High CDS Low CDS High CDS Low CDS
Creditor Ratio Creditor Ratio Creditor Ratio Creditor Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Outstanding -0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03
(-0.0) (-0.9) (-1.4) (-0.6)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers -0.12** 0.016
(-2.2) (0.48)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers 0.121** -0.02
(2.06) (-0.8)
Industry Leverage 0.935 1.504** 0.851 1.540**
(0.54) (2.25) (0.49) (2.29)
Firm Size -0.12 0.662*** -0.13 0.660***
(-1.4) (5.22) (-1.4) (5.21)
Cash -2.20*** -1.91*** -2.21*** -1.91***
(-3.8) (-5.1) (-3.8) (-5.1)
Volatility -3.43 5.857 -3.78 5.753
(-0.2) (1.10) (-0.3) (1.09)
Profitability 4.334*** 1.880* 4.290*** 1.865*
(4.07) (1.87) (4.03) (1.86)
Fixed Assets 0.654 0.343 0.736 0.329
(1.34) (1.01) (1.50) (0.97)
Net Working Capital -0.44 1.076* -0.41 1.075*
(-0.4) (1.91) (-0.4) (1.91)
Capital Expenditure 4.045*** 1.390 4.075*** 1.379
(4.35) (1.24) (4.36) (1.23)
Dividends 0.016 -0.03 0.017 -0.03
(0.20) (-0.4) (0.21) (-0.4)
Acquisition Activity 1.264 1.393** 1.253 1.372**
(1.64) (2.20) (1.62) (2.16)
CP Program -0.00 0.076* -0.00 0.074*
(-0.0) (1.85) (-0.0) (1.81)
Sovereign Risk 0.201 0.954 0.202 0.968
(0.55) (0.90) (0.56) (0.92)
Intercept Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.741 0.831 0.741 0.831
N 451 471 451 471
This table presents estimates of the effect creditors’ CDS holdings and the relative presence of CDS creditors on firm-level
credit exposures in the sample of German non-financial firms. Total Credit Ratio is the firm’s total credit amount, scaled
by total asset. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors in the
given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers (CDS
Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers (sellers). In
Models (1) and (2), as well as Models (3) and (4), I seperate the sample of CDS firms into the samples of High CDS
Creditor Ratio and Low CDS Creditor Ratio, where High CDS Creditor Ratio (Low CDS Creditor Ratio) refers to firms
where the ratio of CDS creditors to total creditors is above (below) the median value. The information for credit and
CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche Bundesbank) and CDS position data from
DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as well as time, firm and rating fixed effects.
The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS firms. The sample period is 2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly
observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
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Table A4
Robustness: High versus low debt capacity
Debt Maturity Debt Maturity Debt Maturity
Low Debt High Debt Low Debt High Debt Low Debt High Debt
Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CDS Outstanding 2.178** -0.44 2.327*** -0.90** 1.168 -0.60
(2.28) (-1.21) (2.60) (-2.2) (1.36) (-1.5)
CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers -1.28** 0.299
(-2.5) (1.13)
CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers 1.414*** -0.29
(2.70) (-1.1)
Industry Debt Maturity 0.401 0.629*** 0.294 0.431*** 0.324 0.431***
(0.88) (3.99) (0.64) (2.75) (0.71) (2.75)
Leverage -5.47 -5.53** -0.62 -4.92** -0.71 -4.92**
(-1.08) (-2.16) (-0.1) (-2.0) (-0.2) (-2.0)
Size -2.57* 1.216*** -0.06 -0.28 -0.06 -0.28
(-1.8) (3) (-0.1) (-1.0) (-0.0) (-1.0)
Cash 7.422 -6.43** 7.279 -2.40 7.032 -2.40
(1.23) (-2.36) (1.28) (-0.8) (1.23) (-0.8)
Industry Volatility 201.7* -34.1 211.9** -107.*** 220.8** -107.***
(1.85) (-0.85) (2.07) (-2.8) (2.15) (-2.8)
Profitability 6.823 -2.08 15.04 -0.57 15.41 -0.57
(0.58) (-0.41) (1.31) (-0.1) (1.34) (-0.1)
Fixed Assets -2.10 6.525*** -1.64 -2.71* -1.21 -2.71*
(-0.44) (2.8) (-0.4) (-1.7) (-0.3) (-1.7)
Net Working Capital -5.04 -1.06 -10.2 -6.79 -10.2 -6.79
(-0.47) (-0.25) (-1.0) (-1.5) (-1.0) (-1.5)
Capital Expenditure 7.425 12.17 14.35 19.22** 14.03 19.22**
(0.73) (1.54) (1.49) (2.35) (1.46) (2.35)
Dividend Dummy 1.002 0 0.685 0.022 0.660 0.022
(1.17) (-0.02) (0.83) (0.04) (0.80) (0.04)
Acquisition Activity -2.62 -0.3 2.311 2.885 2.304 2.885
(-0.39) (-0.05) (0.35) (0.48) (0.35) (0.48)
CP Program 0.765 0.773*** 0.723 0.275 0.708 0.275
(0.94) (2.64) (0.98) (0.91) (0.96) (0.91)
Sovereign Risk 0.120 0.177 0.159 0.237 0.149 0.237
(0.3) (0.35) (0.41) (0.44) (0.38) (0.44)
Intercept Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS CDS
R-square 0.299 0.564 0.292 0.486 0.294 0.486
N 360 373 359 374 359 374
This table presents estimates of the effect creditors’ CDS holdings and debt capacity on the debt maturity of German
non-financial firms. Debt Maturity is the average debt maturity of all outstanding debt, weighted by the principal of the
debt, and given in years. The variable CDS Outstanding is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the firm’s creditors
in the given quarter holds a CDS contract on the firm’s debt. Accordingly, the variable CDS Outstanding × Net Buyers
(CDS Outstanding × Net Sellers) is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s creditors are net credit protection buyers (sellers).
In Models (1) through (6), I seperate the sample of CDS firms into the samples of Low Debt Capacity and High Debt
Capacity, where Low Debt Capacity (High Debt Capacity) refers to firms with average leverage ratios above (below) the
median. The information for credit and CDS-related measures is based upon credit registry data from MiMik (Deutsche
Bundesbank) and CDS position data from DTCC (TIW). In all models, I include base firm-level financial variables, as
well as time, firm and rating fixed effects. The analyses are conducted in the sample of CDS firms. The sample period is
2008-Q1 to 2016-Q2, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5%
level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
89
90
Chapter 3
Can Central Banks Boost Corporate
Investment: Evidence from ECB’s
Liquidity Injections
with Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Dragon Y. Tang, and Sarah Q. Wang
For helpful comments and discussions, we thank Viral Acharya, Michele Boldrin, Murillo Campello,
David Cook, Xiaodan Gao, Gary Gorton, Regina Hammerschmid, Balint Horvath, Nigel Jones Barradale,
Raj Iyer, Andrew Karolyi, Mico Loretan, Andrew MacKinlay, Simone Manganelli, Martin Oehmke, An-
tonio Paradiso, Davide Tomio, Neeltje Van Horen, Yan Xu, and seminar and conference participants at
the Reserve Bank of Australia, Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance at Shanghai Jiao Tong Univer-
sity, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, University of Macau, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University,
Cass Business School, Copenhagen Business School, NYU Stern, Bocconi University, University of War-
wick, University of Surrey, Goethe University of Frankfurt, the 2017 HKMA/FRB/Atlanta Fed Joint
Research Conference on Unconventional Monetary Policy, 16th International Conference CREDIT, the
CICF 2017, FMA Asia 2017, The 4th International Conference on Sovereign Bond Markets, the confer-
ence on “Asymmetries in Europe: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies” in Pescara, Swiss Society for
Financial Market Research 2017, Bank of Canada Annual Conference 2016, European Banking Center
Network Conference 2016, 15th International Conference Credit, 6th IWH/INFER Workshop on (End-
ing) Unconventional Monetary Policy, EFA 2016, Indian School of Business (ISB) Summer Research
Conference, IF2016 Annual Conference in International Finance at City University of Hong Kong, and
the 2016 FEBS Conference. We also acknowledge the support of Research Center SAFE at Goethe Uni-
versity, Marcel Heinrichs from S&P Capital IQ, and Matteo Crosignani for helping us with data. Daetz
gratefully acknowledges support from the Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC), grant no. DNRF102.
Subrahmanyam thanks the Volkswagen Foundation, the Anneliese Maier Research Award of the Alexan-
der von Humboldt Foundation, and the Center for Global Economy and Business at NYU Stern for their
generous support. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the position of Danmarks Nationalbank.
91
Abstract
Can monetary stimulus boost corporate investment? We answer this question by studying
ECB’s 2011-2012 Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), which provided cheap funding
to Eurozone banks. We find that, relative to their non-Eurozone counterparts, Eurozone firms
invested more after the LTROs. However, riskier banks took more funds from the LTROs,
and their uptake is negatively associated with their clients’ investment. In other words, firms
reduced investment when their banks took cheap LTRO funds from the ECB. Overall, our
results highlight the difficulty of boosting investment by injecting liquidity into the banking
system, especially with impaired bank balance sheets.
1. Introduction
Central banks all over the world have undertaken a series of both conventional and, more
recently, unconventional monetary policy actions, such as injecting liquidity into the
banking system since the 2008 credit crisis. These liquidity injections were of significant
size and scope. Despite the overwhelming press coverage on central bank liquidity injec-
tions, the nascent literature on the topic has primarily focused on the impact of central
banks’ unconventional monetary policy on the banking sector and its related financial
ramifications. However, the important question of whether these liquidity injections have
indeed helped the real economy, as intended, remains unanswered. In this paper, we fill
this gap in the literature by examining the impact of unconventional liquidity interven-
tions on corporate policies, particularly those relating to investment and employment.
Our research is of considerable importance even as many central banks around the world
are actively intervening in markets in order to stimulate economic growth.
The Eurozone provides an ideal laboratory to study the impact of unconventional
monetary policies due to its unique structure of a monetary union catering to diverse
economies from the member states of the Eurosystem. Since 2010, several Eurozone
countries experienced severe fiscal difficulties and financial problems. As a reaction to
heightened sovereign default risk, the EU, the IMF, and the ECB engineered a series
of interventions to improve market liquidity, real output, and employment. The largest
of these interventions was the liquidity injected by the ECB into the commercial banks
of Eurozone countries through two unconventional Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
(LTROs) with a three-year maturity, implemented in December 2011 and February 2012,
respectively.1 However, the efficacy of these measures as prominent examples of uncon-
ventional monetary interventions remains hotly debated.
Theoretically, macro-liquidity injections do not always translate into corporate liquid-
ity and investment (see, e.g., Christiano (1994)). First, bank lending to corporations may
1Figure 1 provides a detailed timeline of the ECB’s recent unconventional monetary policies, while
the details of related ECB interventions are discussed in Appendix Note 1.
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respond weakly to the unconventional liquidity interventions. This may be due to banks’
precautionary motive to deleverage, particularly when banks hold large amounts of risky
sovereign debt (Bocola (2016)), or their incentive to use lender-of-last-resort (LOLR)
funding from central banks to take on even more sovereign risk rather than lending it
to corporations. In addition, not only the size, but also the persistence of the interven-
tion, i.e., banks’ repayment policies with respect to these additional funds, are important
factors for the impact on banks’ lending policies. To that extent, the liquidity transmis-
sion mechanism clearly depends upon bank risk characteristics. Second, unconventional
liquidity interventions can also affect the real economy through corporations’ own liq-
uidity, financing, and investment policies. Unconventional monetary policies that aim
at boosting bank liquidity may make corporations less concerned about future financing
and, thereby, stimulating investment. However, corporations may also read the LTRO
uptake of their banks as a signal of their quality, with more risk attributed to banks
with a higher uptake. Since the corporations’ future financing may be in jeopardy, they
may borrow as much as possible and reduce their investments due to their concern about
the possible lack of continuing financing from their respective banks. Thus, the extent
to which macro-liquidity injections are converted into economic output also depends on
corporate characteristics, such as reliance on debt financing from the banking sector, as
well as economic conditions and fiscal policies, more generally. Overall, it is, thus, unclear
whether we would necessarily observe a positive effect of liquidity injections on the real
economy.2
We explicitly address this lacuna in the literature and investigate whether particular
ECB liquidity injections indeed helped the real economy. Specifically, we examine the
impact of macro-liquidity injections on corporate investment and employment policies in
the context of the ECB’s LTROs I and II as exogenous liquidity shocks in the Eurozone
countries. Although prior studies show that negative credit supply shocks result in a
reduction in corporate investment (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam (2011)), whether or
not a positive credit supply shock can boost investment is a under-studied open question.
Corporations do not base their investment decisions exclusively on their cost of funding;
new investments tend to be driven by long-term plans.
We investigate investment and employment policies in a larger sample of Eurozone
corporations around the LTRO implementation. We build a comprehensive dataset that
combines monetary policy data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, loan informa-
tion on Eurozone lenders from the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)
2There is a substantial degree of disagreement among business economists about the real effects of
such liquidity injections. For example, the Spanish bank BBVA expresses a more optimistic view and
argues that ECB liquidity injections could have boosted Eurozone GDP by between 0.3 percent and 0.5
percent.
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DealScan database, corporate fundamental data from Compustat Global and S&P Capi-
tal IQ, credit ratings on non-financial corporations from CreditPror by S&P Capital IQ,
credit default swaps (CDS) data from Markit, and relevant data from other sources. A
unique feature of our research is that we capture the LTRO impact on corporate-specific
policies, using both country- and bank-level LTRO uptake information.
Making use of these comprehensive data, we find that corporations in countries with
a higher LTRO uptake experienced larger investment cuts, while there is no significant
change in their wage payments (payments to employees). Furthermore, corporations as-
sociated with banks that had a higher LTRO uptake reduced their investment more than
those associated with banks that had a lower LTRO uptake. However, a negative associ-
ation between the LTRO uptake of banks and corporate investment does not necessarily
imply a causal relationship. In order to directly address causality, we analyze the deter-
minants of a bank’s LTRO uptake and find evidence that LTRO uptake positively relates
to bank risk, which is consistent with Drechsler, Drechsel, Marques-Ibanez, and Schnabl
(2016). Consequently, we do find that the causal relationship between the LTRO uptake
and corporate investment is weak when we account for relevant country, bank, and cor-
porate characteristics, suggesting no causal relationship between the LTRO uptake and
the decrease in corporate investment. In fact, we find in counterfactual analyses that
the two three-year LTROs halted the deterioration in corporate investment; moreover, as
evidenced by the fact that non-Eurozone corporations in Europe experienced even larger
investment cuts, post-LTRO.
To better understand the counterintuitive result of lower investment associated with
greater liquidity injection, we further explore whether the decrease in corporations’ in-
vestments following LTRO liquidity injections relates to corporate, bank and/or country
characteristics. First, we explore the exposure and response of corporations to the pos-
itive bank liquidity shocks, conditional on the riskiness of their respective bank lenders
and home country. In this investigation, we find that corporations with a greater depen-
dence on bank debt, and those with risky bank lenders, experienced greater decreases in
their investment when their bank lenders had greater LTRO uptakes. These findings are
consistent with the LTRO’s role in the “revelation of bank quality” and underscore cor-
porations’ uncertainty about the real impact of these monetary policy measures. Second,
we study the role of the persistence of LTRO interventions for their ultimate transmission
to the corporate sector. A noteworthy feature of LTROs is that they allowed banks to
repay the ECB’s LTRO loans early, i.e., after just one year and, thus, well before the end
of the three-year maturity. We find that the banks’ holding period for the LTRO funds
played a significant role in terms of the transmission of the liquidity to the corporate
sector as the average corporation in countries where the banks retained the LTRO funds
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for a longer period did not decrease its investment. Meanwhile, we find the investment
reduction associated with LTROs to be mainly driven by corporations in countries with
intermediate levels of LTRO repayments. These findings reveal the interesting distribu-
tional effects of unconventional monetary policies, and cast doubt on the real beneficiaries
of the liquidity injection, as the countries that were most affected by the Eurozone crisis
did not experience an improvement in their respective investments.
Recent discussions of the impact of macroeconomic interventions in the face of anemic
economic growth, even after many years of monetary easing, have shifted the debate to
the role of fiscal policies. Hence, we also investigate the role of fiscal policies for the
effectiveness of the LTROs to investigate the effect of Eurozone-wide monetary policies,
conditional on national policies. In a monetary union such as the Eurozone, individual
governments can (and often do) undertake different fiscal actions, which are sometimes
unrelated to ECB policies. Related to this discussion, we show that when individual
national governments cut their corporate taxes or increased their public investments, the
LTRO uptake of banks domiciled in those countries is associated with an increase in
corporate investment therein. These findings demonstrate the importance of coordinated
monetary and fiscal policies for corporate investment, as there are limits to the efficacy
of monetary policies taken in isolation.
Existing studies of unconventional monetary policies are mostly in the U.S. setting
(e.g., Berger and Roman (2016)). One related contemporaneous work examining the
European setting is Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2017). They find evidence of
zombie lending by banks, following the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) in the summer of 2012. Our study is distinguished from theirs in that we focus
on corporate policies, following the largest real liquidity injection, i.e., three-year LTRO
liquidity injections, in which banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (the
GIIPS countries) and non-GIIPS countries voluntarily participated. We also explore the
role of banks’ early repayment decisions of their LTRO borrowing on the corporations’ de-
cisions, and find that ECB liquidity injections have been ineffective in boosting corporate
investment. However, we do not argue for a causal relationship between the LTRO uptake
of banks and the corporate investment of their clients. Instead, we find that the LTRO
uptake amount significantly proxies for bank risk, particularly for non-GIIPS banks. We
show in addition, based on a counterfactual analysis, that these liquidity injections may
have halted economic deterioration in the Eurozone. Furthermore, we suggest that it is
important to consider monetary policies in tandem with fiscal policies. Hence, our re-
sults are consistent with the signaling role of banks’ LTRO uptake and their subsequent
early repayment: Corporations may read their bank lenders’ LTRO uptake and early
repayment as a signal of their quality and adjust their investment policies accordingly,
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particularly in non-GIIPS countries. Our results also imply that unless a bank’s balance
sheet becomes healthy, the monetary policy transmission mechanism can be ineffective.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section
2. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics for our data and specifies the empirical setting
for our analysis. In section 4, we investigate the impact of macro-liquidity injections on
corporate investment. In section 5, we examine the asymmetries in the LTRO impact
across corporations and countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
A substantial body of literature has shown that negative credit supply shocks reduce
corporate investment. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that U.S. corporate in-
vestments declined after the banks were negatively affected by the 1998 Russian default.
Amiti and Weinstein (2017) show that supply-side financial shocks had a large impact
on corporate investment. Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that credit market disruptions
in 2008/2009 caused a significant decrease in employment. Similarly, Cingano, Manaresi,
and Sette (2016) show that the liquidity drought in the interbank market during the
2007 crisis caused a large investment decrease for Italian corporations, while Bottero,
Lenzu, and Mezzanotti (2015) show that the investment and employment of small cor-
porations in Italy were negatively affected by the credit crunch that followed the Greek
crisis. De Marco (2017) shows that during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, banks cut
their credit supply to borrowers because of their own funding problems, and corporations
subsequently decreased their investments. The effect of bank credit tightening during
the Sovereign Debt Crisis on corporate investment is confirmed by Buca and Vermeulen
(2017). However, there has been little prior research on whether a positive credit supply
shock can boost corporate investment.3
Central banks play an active and prominent role in the financial markets, and their
actions can profoundly affect corporate policies. Therefore, it is fundamentally important
to understand the impact of monetary policy. Although there is substantial research on
the conventional monetary policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (e.g., Gorton and
Metrick (2013), and Romer and Romer (2013)), there is little research on unconventional
monetary policies, particularly outside the U.S., and their impact on the real economy.
After the global financial crisis and the great recession that ensued, fiscal and monetary
3One exception is Kasahara, Sawada, and Suzuki (2016), who show that bank capital injections made
by the Japanese government in March 1998/1999 had a negligible impact on the average investment
rate of their borrowers. Bergman, Iyer, and Thakor (2017) find a positive effect of cash injection during
the Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s. Foley-Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2016) find that non-financial
corporations with a high reliance on longer-term debt increased their investments during the Maturity
Extension Program (MEP).
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interventions were first initiated by the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve System,
leading to several studies examining U.S. data. In general, these studies find some evi-
dence of increased risk-shifting by banks, relaxed corporate financing constraints, but an
ineffective impact on households following the interventions. For example, Duchin and
Sosyura (2015) and Berger and Roman (2016) focus on the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) and find evidence of regulatory arbitrage by banks and a positive impact
on “Main Street” after the program. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Mahoney, and Stroebel
(2015) find that government interventions aimed at lowering banks’ funding costs are
ineffective in terms of stimulating household borrowing and spending. Furthermore, the
impact of the interventions on the real economy, e.g., corporate financing constraints
and investment, may depend on the characteristics of the intervention. For example,
Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017) find that the mortgage-backed security
purchases (but not Treasury bond purchases) made by the Federal Reserve may crowd
out banks’ commercial lending and decrease corporate investment.
The ECB’s introduction of unconventional monetary policies in Europe led to similar
studies based on European data. Studies on European policies are particularly important,
as Europe has a very different economic governance structure than the U.S., particularly
with regard to economic affairs; this implies that the U.S. analysis may not apply in a
straightforward way to Europe. The crucial difference lies with regard to the common
monetary policy in the Eurozone, even when member countries follow independent fiscal
policies. A number of the European studies focus on the sovereign bond market and
banks’ risk-taking after either the announcement or the actual implementation of uncon-
ventional monetary policies. Eser and Schwaab (2016) find that the SMP helped lower
the yield spreads and yield volatilities of European sovereign bonds. Although Acharya,
Imbierowicz, Steffen, and Teichmann (2017) do find some announcement effects, they note
that it was the actual purchases and not the signaling of the policy that drove the bond
yields lower. De Pooter, Martin, and Pruitt (2018) find consistent results demonstrating
that the Securities Market Program (SMP) helped lower the sovereign bond liquidity
premium. Garcia-de Andoain, Heider, Hoerova, and Manganelli (2016) find that ECB
liquidity injections helped stabilize the overnight unsecured interbank market. Drechsler,
Drechsel, Marques-Ibanez, and Schnabl (2016) find that banks with weaker capitaliza-
tion borrowed from the ECB and posted riskier collateral to access ECB funding. Also,
Acharya and Steffen (2015) document banks’ “carry trade” behavior from 2007 to 2013
and attribute it to risk shifting and regulatory arbitrage motives. Acharya, Pierret,
and Steffen (2017) find differing impacts of the LTROs and OMT on banks’ risk-taking;
whereas banks’ holding of risky sovereign debt was increased by the LTROs, the OMT
reduced sovereign risk and increased banks’ debt holdings.
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De Pooter, DeSimone, Martin, and Pruitt (2015) find SMP announcement effects but
no actual purchase effect on bond yield spreads.4 Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and
Uno (2016) find that a change in sovereign credit risk leads to a change in sovereign bond
market liquidity, and that the ECB intervention weakened this adverse dynamic relation-
ship and improved market liquidity. Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018)
find that the SMP and the OMT on average, decreased yields across Italy, Spain and Por-
tugal, while stock prices increased in both distressed and core countries, suggesting that
these policies also had beneficial macro-spillovers.
In addition to the sovereign bond market and banks’ risk-taking, an increasing num-
ber of papers focus on the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the actual users
of capital, i.e., corporations, which are the focus of this study. Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger,
and Hirsch (2017) show that banks increased their lending to corporations following the
“whatever-it-takes” statement of ECB President, Mario Draghi, and the announcement
of the OMT. Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2018) show that the contraction
in the loan supply from Eurozone periphery banks that arose during the financial crisis
from 2006 to 2012 depressed investment, job creation, and sales among related European
borrowers, concluding that borrowers saved more cash out of their free cash flows. Sim-
ilarly, Chodorow-Reich (2014) documents the negative impact of bank lending frictions
on employment outcomes. Acharya, Imbierowicz, Steffen, and Teichmann (2017) find
that bank risk impairs the transmission of central bank liquidity to loan spreads, which
negatively affects high-risk bank borrowers. In contrast, we emphasize the role of bank
risk in determining banks’ LTRO uptake and corporate investment. In addition, a few
recent country-specific papers have shown that unconventional monetary policies by the
ECB can indeed have a positive, moderately sized effect on the supply of bank credit to
corporations (see, e.g., Carpinelli and Crosignani (2017), Garcia-Posada and Marchetti
(2016), and Andrade, Cahn, Fraisse, and Me´sonnier (2018)).
Another related strand of the literature tackles the general determinants of corporate
investment, including corporate taxation and other factors. Graham, Leary, and Roberts
(2014) study U.S. data and find that government fiscal activities can affect corporate
financial and investment policies. Kydland and Zarazaga (2016) show that concerns
about higher taxes caused by fiscal challenges depressed investments and slowed the
recovery in the U.S. In this paper, we provide additional insights regarding corporations’
adjustment of their investments in response to macro-liquidity injections in terms of both
the announcement and the excess inflow of liquidity to their lenders through an increase
in (cheaper) external funding from central banks. In the following sections, we empirically
4Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2018) investigate the effects of ECB interventions on the Greek govern-
ment bond market in mid-2010, and find that the bonds purchased by the ECB experienced a much
steeper drop in their yields than did other bonds.
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examine the impact of macro-liquidity injections on corporate policies in the context of
the ECB’s LTRO interventions.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We collect data from several databases that contain European data ranging from the
2002 adoption of the euro to 2014, thereby allowing us to look at differences in corporate
policies during both normal and distressed periods, along with periods characterized by
ECB interventions.5 We use data on corporate fundamentals from the Compustat Global
database.6 From this source, we identify a sample of European corporations and collect
all yearly and quarterly corporate financial and stock price data for the period from 2002
to 2014. Since financial and utility corporations often have capital structures that are
quite different from the average corporation, we follow the literature and exclude financial
corporations (SIC codes 6000 to 6999), utility corporations (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) and
corporations for which no SIC code is available. Furthermore, because we are interested
in only active corporations, we follow Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and require corpo-
rations to have both a non-negative asset value and non-negative sales to be included in a
given year (quarter). We supplement the data from Compustat with corporate data from
the Capital IQ database. Capital IQ compiles, inter alia, detailed information on corpo-
rate debt structure using financial footnotes contained in corporations’ financial reports.
Finally, we use CreditPror (S&P Capital IQ) rating data as a proxy for corporate credit
risk so that we can estimate the impact of the ECB’s extraordinary liquidity injection,
after controlling for such risk.7 In addition to the corporate data, we also collect country-
and industry-specific data from several other sources, including five-year sovereign CDS
spreads from Markit, and measures of a country’s overall exposure to other countries’
economic conditions from the World Bank.
To analyze the impact of the liquidity interventions made by the ECB, we restrict
our main sample to corporations located in the Eurozone. This sample includes all
corporations located in countries that belong to the Eurosystem (i.e., the Eurozone), and
which thereby were directly affected by the ECB’s liquidity interventions. To exclude
any potential biases or country-specific reasons for the later adoption of the euro by some
5We restrict ourselves to the period after 2002 to ensure alignment with the establishment of the
Eurozone.
6The advantage of using data from Compustat rather than, for instance, Amadeus, is that we have
quarterly rather than only annual data, which allows for greater granularity in our analysis.
7To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize the observations for our variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Furthermore, we follow the approach in related empirical research and assume that a
corporation has no R&D expenditure (or M&A activities), if it is reported as “missing” by Compustat.
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countries, we include only corporations from those countries that adopted the euro as a
common currency in 1999, and joined the European Monetary System at the time of its
inception in January 2001. However, we collect similar data for both Eurozone and non-
Eurozone corporations, and use the latter as a control group for some of our subsequent
analyses.8
To address the impact of liquidity intervention on corporate policies, we use the
ECB’s implementation of its unconventional three-year LTROs. These operations were
announced in early December 2011, and were implemented on December 21, 2011 (LTRO
I) and February 29, 2012 (LTRO II).9 In general, as indicated by the steep increase in
the amount of outstanding LTRO as presented in Appendix Figure A1, the interventions
overall turned out to be of significant size. Since we are particularly interested in whether
and how much of the ECB’s liquidity injections flowed to individual banks, we make use
of both country-specific aggregate information on the Eurozone banks’ uptake of LTRO I
and LTRO II, and bank-level uptake information that is hand-collected from Bloomberg.10
Table 1 outlines these LTRO uptake numbers within the Eurozone, sorted by coun-
try.11 As shown in the table, banks from the periphery countries were highly active
because of their actual capital needs, as the LTRO was their only option for accessing
medium-term funding. However, for many banks, participation in the unconventional
LTROs also provided them with an opportunity to replace their shorter-term borrow-
ing with low-cost three-year borrowing (Fitch Ratings (2012)). Therefore, banks in even
highly rated and safe Eurozone countries such as Germany and France participated in the
three-year LTRO. In addition, as Table 1 indicates, the participation in, and the uptake
from, the two LTROs were quite similar (both at the aggregate and country levels). The
aggregate uptake was approximately 918 billion Euro, with Italian and Spanish banks
being, by far, the most active in their participation in terms of both the number of par-
ticipating banks and the amounts borrowed. Together, banks in these two countries had
an uptake of approximately 68 percent of the aggregate uptake. In terms of the signif-
icance of the ECB liquidity intervention, we can see from the ratio of the total LTRO
uptake to central government debt in the country that the liquidity injection was great-
8Eurozone countries that are excluded from the analysis are Slovenia (joined in 2007), Cyprus and
Malta (joined in 2008), Slovakia (joined in 2009), Estonia (joined in 2011), Latvia and Lithuania (joined
in 2015), Poland and the Czech Republic (current applicants), and Luxembourg (missing data). The
Non-Eurozone sample includes EU corporations located outside the Eurozone. For details, see Appendix
Table A1.
9For details of various unconventional programs of ECB, please see Appendix Note 1.
10We thank Matteo Crosignani for kindly sharing the bank-level LTRO data that he obtained from
Bloomberg.
11Appendix Figure A2 provides a graphical presentation of these numbers. It should be noted that
although the ECB liquidity injection was available only to Eurozone banks, approximately 5 percent of
the total uptake involved non-Eurozone banks that participated through their subsidiaries situated in
the Eurozone.
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est for countries in the Eurozone periphery, i.e., GIIPS countries. Furthermore, we also
see that banks in the GIIPS countries had the highest LTRO borrowings (scaled by the
banks’ total assets), and that the bank-specific uptake was very similar across the periph-
ery countries. We supplement these intervention-specific data with other Eurozone-wide
data that are obtained from National Central Bank (NCB) reports from members of the
Eurosystem and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, where all published reports and
historical data are stored on a monthly or weekly basis, depending on the source.12
3.2 Empirical Design
With regard to our investigation of the impact of unconventional LTROs on the real
economy, we focus on corporate investment and wage policies. As a proxy for corpo-
rations’ investments, Investments, we follow the literature and use the ratio of capital
expenditure to total assets. As shown in Table 2, Panel A, the average corporation in
our main sample uses 3.12 percent of its total assets on investment in each quarter. As a
proxy for employment compensation, we use Wages, which represents the corporations’
total salaries and wages, expressed in logarithms. We relate corporate investment and
wages to a set of explanatory variables and other controls, including both firm- and time-
fixed effects. Our main controls in the investment and employment compensation model
specifications are Cash Flow, Market to Book, Firm Size, Leverage and Rated. Cash Flow
is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after
interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by
the book value of assets. Firm Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is measured
as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total
assets. Finally, Rated is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the corporation is rated,
and zero otherwise. Since investment and employment may also be determined by the
lagged ratios of alternative investment measures, e.g., R&D and acquisitions, along with
profitability and the degree of competition in the respective industry, we also use these
controls in extended specifications.
To capture the liquidity injection impact of the three-year LTROs, we use the measures
Country LTRO Uptake and Lender LTRO Uptake. Country LTRO Uptake measures
the differences between countries in terms of participation in the three-year LTROs by
reflecting the country-specific uptake of liquidity. In particular, Country LTRO Uptake
is equal to zero until the first unconventional LTRO, Q4-2011, and equals the amount of
12Source: https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/home.do and http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/
monetary/res/html/index.en.html. Note that the ECB does not provide data regarding its
intervention programs.
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each country’s total uptake through LTRO I and II, i.e., the sum of banks’ LTRO uptake
in the respective country, scaled by each country’s central government debt holdings in
the year 2011. Thus,
Country LTRO Uptake t, c =
Total Country LTRO Uptake t, c
Central Government Debt 2011, c
(1)
where t indicates the year-quarter and c refers to the country. Hence, this variable
measures the country-specific significance of how the unconventional monetary policy
implemented by the ECB differentiates between countries that had a high or low uptake.
Accordingly, we expect corporations located in countries that received relatively high
liquidity injections to have been more heavily affected and to show a stronger reaction in
their investment policies.13
To provide a deeper investigation of the corporate-level impact of the LTRO uptake by
Eurozone banks, we also investigate the lending relationships to banks that participated
in the LTROs, LTRO-bank, of our corporations in the main sample. To obtain information
on each corporation’s LTRO-bank relation, we collect syndicated loan information from
the LPC Dealscan database and create a subsample of corporations from our main sample
with lender and loan information. In particular, we match the information on LTRO-
banks with the lender-share and loan-facility data in LPC DealScan.14 By using the loan-
facility data, we specifically also match the LTRO-banks (as lenders) with a subsample of
the Eurozone corporations (as borrowers) and, thus, identify whether those corporations
have a relationship with a LTRO-bank. Using this procedure, we match 953 corporations,
476 of which have an LTRO-bank relationship. Table 2, Panel B, shows the summary
statistics and confirms that there is no major sample bias induced by our procedure for
identifying loan relationships.15
To explicitly study the impact of corporations’ access to LTRO funds, we define
a corporate-specific LTRO exposure measure, Lender LTRO Uptake, based upon the
hand-collected bank-level uptake from Bloomberg. Similar to the Country LTRO Uptake
measure, Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero, until the first round of the unconventional
LTROs, Q4-2011. However, thereafter, it equals the average LTRO borrowing amount of
related banks (LTRO I and LTRO II), scaled by the size of each related bank, i.e., total
assets, as of 2011. The measure is determined as
13In robustness tests, we use the ratio of the country-specific LTRO uptake to the country’s GDP as a
proxy for the size of each country’s economy. Our main results are robust to this alternative specification.
14Based upon our sample of LTRO-banks, we identify 89 banks as lenders with syndicated loans
covered in LPC Dealscan. We match Dealscan borrowers with Compustat corporations by using the link
provided by Chava and Roberts (2008), and by hand-matching corporations by name and country of
origin.
15There is a minor sample bias in terms of corporate size because LPC Dealscan provides loan pricing
information on syndicated loans, which are typically made to larger corporations.
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Lender LTRO Uptake t, i = Σ
Ni
j=1
(
Bank LTRO Borrowing t, j
Bank Size 2011, j
)
/Ni (2)
where t indicates the year-quarter, i refers to the corporation, j refers to a related bank
and Ni refers to the total number of LTRO-bank relationships the corporation has. A
high value of Lender LTRO Uptake implies that the LTRO borrowing of banks with which
the corporation has an existing lending relationship, compared to the size of the related
banks on average, was significant which, all else being equal, makes it more likely that
the corporation had access to (and obtained) additional funds stemming from the LTRO
liquidity injections. Thus, compared to Country LTRO Uptake, Lender LTRO Uptake
proxies for the corporate-level access to the unconventional LTRO funds, but is only
available for the subsample of corporations for which we also have loan-level information.
Since this paper is based upon Eurozone corporations and provides a cross-country
study, we also include the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads, Sovereign Risk,
and the countries’ ratios of exports to GDP, Sovereign Export, in our model specifications,
to control for sovereign credit risk and the diversification of the economy across markets.
As outlined in Table 2, Panel C, the median CDS spread over the sample period within
the Eurozone is approximately 17.62 bps. The sovereign CDS spread variable shows
a large degree of cross-country and time-series variation, which implies that this is an
suitable proxy for our study of unconventional monetary policies within the Eurozone.
Likewise, we find a large variation in the countries’ dependence on exports.16
In section 4, we analyze the impact of the Country LTRO Uptake and Lender LTRO
Uptake measure on corporate investment and employment compensation. As the trans-
mission of the LTRO liquidity injection by the ECB occurred through the banking sector,
and banks’ incentives for participating in the LTRO programs are important to under-
stand the transmission efficiency, we also analyze the determinants of banks’ usage of
LTRO funds. To this end, we also collect bank-level data from Bankscope and Markit
and investigate the role of bank, country and borrower characteristics prior to the LTRO
implementation for banks’ borrowings through LTRO I and LTRO II. In section 5, we
further investigate the impact of the granularity of the LTROs on corporations’ invest-
ments. We start from the corporations’ reliance on bank debt, and investigate the role
of this reliance in determining the impact of the country, as well as lender-specific LTRO
uptake measures. Next, we investigate the effect of lender and country characteristics,
such as the average risk and size of the corporations’ lenders, as well as the role of the
banks’ overall policies on the repayments of the LTRO and (local) fiscal policies.17
16Appendix Table A3 provides summary statistics for the non-Eurozone sample, and shows no general
differences between Eurozone and non-Eurozone corporations, except for lower sovereign CDS spreads.
17Descriptions of all variables presented in this section can be found in Appendix Table A2.
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4. Central Bank Liquidity Injections and Corporate Policies
In this section, we investigate the impact of the unconventional liquidity intervention
on the real economy. We focus on the effect of the three-year LTROs implemented by
the ECB on corporate investment and employment compensation. We first use the non-
Eurozone corporations as the counterfactual, and compare corporate policies of Eurozone
and non-Eurozon firms following the liquidity injections. We then restrict our analysis in
the sample of firms within Eurozone and among LTRO qualified banks/firms. We further
investigate the determinants of bank LTRO uptakes and discuss their implications for
the real economy.
4.1 Counterfactual Analysis: Eurozone versus Non-Eurozone Countries
We use non-Eurozone corporations as the benchmark to compare corporate investment
and employment with and without the influence of the LTRO liquidity injections. Al-
though using non-Eurozone corporations as the benchmark may be challenged based on
other fundamental differences between Eurozone and non-Eurozone economies in Europe,
the comparison can be considered as a rough “counterfactual analysis” investigating the
impact of the ECB’s three-year LTROs.
In Figure 2, we first plot the change in corporate investment around the LTRO inter-
ventions for Eurozone and non-Eurozone corporations. Before the LTRO implementation,
Eurozone and non-Eurozone corporations generally showed similar trends in their invest-
ments, with a slightly greater decrease in investment for Eurozone corporations. However,
after the LTRO implementation, Eurozone corporations sustain their investments better
than non-Eurozone corporations, particularly during the first year after the LTRO liq-
uidity injections. This finding provides some preliminary evidence that the three-year
LTROs may have halted the deterioration in Eurozone corporations’ investments.
We then investigate corporate investment and employment policies after the LTRO
intervention occurred in a sample of corporations located in the EU, with non-Eurozone
corporations used as the control group for the LTRO effects. Whereas banks in the Euro-
zone countries may have had access to LTRO liquidity injections during the two rounds of
unconventional LTROs, non-Eurozone countries did not have such access.18 To account
for major differences in economic conditions across countries and the corresponding de-
ferred impact, we also match the EU sample countries based upon their sovereign risk
when investigating the impact of the LTROs. In particular, we measure country risk
18This is valid with the exception of non-Eurozone banks with bank subsidiaries located in the Euro-
zone. Additionally, we do not account for other stimulus measures that may have been implemented in
the non-Eurozone countries during the same period, which would be biased against our finding a positive
impact of the LTROs in the Eurozone countries relative to the non-Eurozone countries.
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using the countries’ CDS spreads two years before the LTRO intervention. Risky (Safe)
Sovereign is defined as a CDS spread above (below) the median in the pre-intervention
and crisis periods (2009 and 2010).
The results are presented in Table 3. In Model (1) of Panels A and B, we use the full
sample of corporations. The variable Post-LTRO is a time dummy variable equal to one,
for year-quarter observations occurring after the ECB had implemented the first three-
year LTRO intervention (Q4-2011), and indicates the timing of the LTRO intervention.
The variable Non-Eurozone is a dummy equal to one, for corporations located in coun-
tries that do not belong to the Eurozone. The variable of interest in this counterfactual
analysis is Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone, which is the interaction term between the LTRO
intervention and non-Eurozone dummies. The variable equals one, for non-Eurozone cor-
porations in year-quarters following the first LTRO intervention, which captures the effect
of the liquidity intervention on corporate policies in non-LTRO countries (the “counter-
factual” effect). We find a negative and significant coefficient of the term Post-LTRO
× Non-Eurozone for both the investment and wage analyses. This finding suggests that
non-Eurozone corporations may not only have had less access to a substantial financ-
ing source, but may also have experienced an even greater decrease in investment than
corporations in the Eurozone.
In Models (2) and (3) of Table 3, we further separate our sample of corporations in the
EU into high and low sovereign-risk subsamples, based on the risk of the country in which
a corporation is located. We then compare corporate policies during the post-LTRO in-
tervention period for the high and low sovereign-risk groups. We find that non-Eurozone
corporations in both the high- and low-risk groups experienced a greater decrease in their
investments and wages following the unconventional LTROs than did Eurozone corpora-
tions. If one takes non-Eurozone corporations (or sovereign risk-matched non-Eurozone
corporations) as the “counterfactual” of Eurozone corporations exposed to LTRO liq-
uidity injections, the results in this section suggest that the LTROs helped Eurozone
corporations sustain their investments better than corporations elsewhere in Europe at
the onset of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
4.2 Investment and Employment Compensation of Eurozone Firms
Corporate access to debt markets has an impact on corporations’ investments (Harford
and Uysal (2014)), and financing frictions do affect investment decisions (Almeida and
Campello (2007)). Thus, the availability of debt financing after the LTRO intervention,
and the resulting credit supply shock, may have affected corporations’ investment poli-
cies, such as capital expenditures. Likewise, we expect that the increased availability
of debt financing may have increased employment compensation. Both a positive effect
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on investment and increased employment compensation would suggest that the LTRO
intervention had an ameliorating impact on the real economy. However, corporations
may have had a precautionary demand for liquidity because of their own concern about
future access to financing. They may have borrowed as much as possible and many even
decrease their investments due to concerns about the lack of continued future funding
from their banks. If LTRO uptakes were viewed as a signal of bank risk/future liquidity
risk, corporations may have even decreased their investments, even when their current
access to financing was good.
4.2.1 Country LTRO Uptake and Corporate Investment
To investigate whether the LTRO intervention had an impact on corporate investment
and employment decisions, we next present the results of our investigation of proxies for
corporate investment and employment compensation. The analysis is conducted based
on the sample of all corporations in the Eurozone, and the results are presented in Table
4. We first discuss the results in the models when using Country LTRO Uptake as the
variable of interest. In Model (1), we use the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets
as our proxy for corporate investment. We add only controls that affect the corporate
capital expenditure decision. Since investments and employment may also be determined
by the lagged ratios of alternative investment measures, e.g., R&D and acquisitions,
along with profitability and the degree of competition in the considered industry (see,
e.g., Almeida and Campello (2007) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)), we use
these controls for robustness checks and present the results in Appendix Table A4. As
both tables show, after controlling for corporate fundamentals, we find a negative and
significant coefficient of the country-specific LTRO uptake measure, which indicates that
corporations located in countries with a high uptake of additional liquidity in the banking
sector reduced investments following the LTRO intervention; on average, they decreased
their investments by 0.32 percent following the LTRO intervention.19
In Model (3) of Table 4, we provide the same analysis for corporate employment com-
pensation. Recall that, as a proxy for employment compensation, we use corporations’
total expenses related to wages (on a logarithmic scale). In this case, we do not find a
significant effect for the LTRO uptake measure. Therefore, similar to the case of cor-
porate investment, corporate spending on employees was not positively (or negatively)
affected by the introduction of the unconventional LTROs. Our tentative conclusion is
that although corporations may have had access to more debt financing, they did not use
the proceeds from the additional borrowing to invest in their businesses.
19The country-specific LTRO uptake typically differs by 25 percent, implying that for such a difference,
the investment difference is 25%*1.276%=0.32%.
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4.2.2 Lender LTRO Uptake and Corporate Investment
To further understand the transmission channel, we utilize detailed bank-firm relationship
data (from LPC Dealscan) and bank-level LTRO uptake data (from the ECB) to measure
the liquidity injection effects at the corporate level. The effectiveness of the liquidity
transmission to the corporate sector largely depends on the response of, and the changes
in, the lending behavior of banks that participated in the three-year LTROs. Corporations
with a relationship to a LTRO-bank should, all else being equal, be more affected by the
ECB’s LTRO intervention, if it indeed had a significant impact. On the one hand, a
corporation’s relationship to an LTRO bank establishes a direct link to the injected
macro-liquidity. On the other hand, these corporations would also be more exposed to
additional risk-taking by the LTRO banks and, thus, more concerned about their future
financing.
In Table 4, Models (2) and (4), we provide an analysis of the impact of LTRO liquid-
ity injections on corporate investment and employment compensation in the sample of
corporations for which we have lender information from Dealscan. Lender LTRO Uptake
provides a corporate-specific measure of their bank lenders’ LTRO uptake. If LTROs
are sufficiently effective, we expect that corporations that had an existing borrowing
relationship with banks that obtained a significant amount of the LTRO funds are, in
general, more likely to be positively affected by the LTRO credit supply shock. However,
as shown in Table 4, rather than a positive impact, we find a negative and statistically
significant coefficient of Lender LTRO Uptake for investment, whereas the coefficient of
Lender LTRO Uptake is positive but statistically insignificant for wages. The results also
suggest that the average corporation did not increase its investment, although, in relative
terms it may have had direct access to the additional credit supply provided by the ECB.
4.2.3 Robustness with a Shorter Window
Our baseline analyses are conducted in the sample period from 2002, the date of adoption
of the Euro, to 2014. However, there are a number of interventions during the pre-LTRO
period. In this section, we use a shorter pre-LTRO window and a more balanced sample
period from 2009 to 2014 to conduct the same analysis. The results are presented in
Appendix Table A5. Models (1) and (2) show the results for corporate investment using
the Country LTRO Uptake and Lender LTRO Uptake measures, respectively. Similar
to the findings in the baseline sample, we find a significant negative coefficient of our
LTRO measures. The results confirm that corporations decreased their investments after
the LTRO liquidity injections, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are lower than
the baseline results. In Models (3) and (4), we further conduct the analysis for wage
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payments. While we find some evidence of higher corporate wage payments after the
LTROs, when using Country LTRO Uptake, the results are not significant when using
Lender LTRO Uptake to capture the liquidity injection impact. Overall, the evidence in
the restricted sample is consistent with the baseline case.
4.3 Determinants of LTRO Uptake
In this section, we analyze the determinants of banks’ LTRO uptake to understand the
negative investment results. The analysis is conducted on a sample of banks with borrow-
ers located in the Eurozone. Specifically, we make use of loan data from SDC Dealscan
and investigate all banks with lending relationships to the Eurozone corporations in our
sample. Then, based upon hand-collected information on banks’ participation in the
LTRO interventions, we capture bank borrowing from the ECB’s three-year LTROs us-
ing two measures: (1) an indicator variable that is equal to one if the bank participated in
one of the LTROs, and (2) the natural logarithm of one plus the bank’s total borrowing
in billion Euros from LTRO I (Dec-2011) and II (Feb-2012).
Drechsler et al. (2016) find that weakly capitalized banks took out more lender-of-
last-resort loans. Thus, we add measures for bank risk as determinants of the LTRO
uptake. The variable High Risk Bank is equal to one, if at the end of 2010, a bank had
a CDS spread above the median CDS spread and zero otherwise. In addition, we add
Bank Size, which is the bank’s total assets at the end of 2010, to capture the potential
difference in accessing the liquidity injection because of the size effect. Larger banks
may have had sufficient collateral to access the LTRO funds. Also, they may had have
better access to liquidity injections because they were “too big to fail.” Besides bank
characteristics, we also add proxies for borrower risk and country risk, which may affect
banks’ access to, and usage of, LTRO funds. Borrower Size refers to the average size
(measured by total assets as a natural logarithm) of the banks’ borrowers at the end of
2010. Likewise, Borrower Leverage, Borrower Short-term Debt, and Borrower Cash Flow
are the average leverage, short-term debt and cash flow of the banks’ borrowers at the
end of 2010. Sovereign Risk is the countries’ CDS spread at end-2010, expressed as a
natural logarithm.20
We implement our test in a regression framework and the results are presented in
Table 5. Panel A focuses on the probability of a bank participating in LTRO liquidity
interventions. Panel B reports the determinants of the amounts of the LTRO uptakes.
The results indicate that risky banks (High Risk Bank) are more likely to borrow, and
20We collect the bank-level measures from Bankscope as well as Markit, while the borrower-related
data are based upon the information in our main sample (for details, see Section 3). After combining
all the bank-specific data, we end up with 185 banks with all available information to provide us with a
balanced dataset.
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borrow a greater amount from the LTRO liquidity injections, relative to low risk banks.
We also find that large banks access the LTRO injections that much more, which is
consistent with our prediction. In addition, banks in riskier countries borrowed more
from the LTROs. Compared to bank and country risk measures, the characteristics of the
borrowing corporations are less significant in determining the banks’ LTRO borrowing
probability and the uptake amount. In Table 5, when we further separate banks into
GIIPS and non-GIIPS banks, the implications are generally similar. Interestingly, we find
that for non-GIIPS banks, bank risk significantly increases the probability of participating
in LTRO liquidity injections as well as the amount of LTRO uptake. Overall, we find
evidence that banks’ participation in LTRO and their LTRO uptake amounts positively
relate to bank risk and country risk. This is consistent with the explanation for the
decrease in investment following an LTRO, i.e., that corporations took the LTRO uptake
as a signal of risk and, consequently, decreased their investments. We further explore
the role of bank and country risk in explaining the decrease in corporate investment in
Section 5.
4.4 LTRO Residual Effect on Investment
A negative relationship between a banks’ LTRO uptake and the corporate investment of
its corporate borrowers does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. There might
be observed and unobserved omitted variables that affect both a bank’s LTRO uptake
decision and its corporate investment. For example, from previous analyses, we do find
evidence that bank risk and country risk positively relate to bank LTRO uptake. In this
subsection, we conduct additional analyses to better understand this causal relationship
between a bank’s LTRO uptake and the corporate investment of its borrowers.
In an ideal setting, to establish a causal relationship, we would need to identify a
shock or an instrument that affects a bank’s LTRO uptake decision, but not its corporate
borrowers’ investment or employment policies. While this is challenging, we alternatively
utilize the determinants of the LTRO uptake results, and use the Lender LTRO Residual
to capture the LTRO impact and isolate the effects due to of bank, country, and corporate
characteristics. Specifically, Lender LTRO Residual is zero until Q4-2011, and equal
to the average bank-specific LTRO residual value obtained from the determinants of
the LTRO uptake model of the corporation’s related banks, Model (3) of Panel B in
Table 5, thereafter. Then, we investigate the impact of Lender LTRO Residual on the
investment and wage payment decisions. These results are presented in Table 6. We find
some evidence that Lender LTRO Residual decreased investment, but this is which is
only marginally significant at the 10% level, while the impact on wage payments is not
significant. Therefore, the results suggest that the causal relationship between the LTRO
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liquidity injections and corporate investment is weak. Instead, other factors such as bank
risk and country risk may explain both the LTRO uptake decision and the decrease in
corporate investment, which we explore further in Section 5.
5. The Granularity of the LTRO Impact on Investment
Our previous evidence suggests that the unconventional ECB liquidity injections were not
sufficient to boost corporate investment, but, as a lower bound, these injections may have
halted the decline in investment. In this section, we further understand the decrease in
investment and investigate the asymmetries in the impact of the LTRO, particularly the
setting in which the two LTROs may have stimulated corporate investment. Corporations
may have different reactions to the liquidity injection because of corporation-specific,
bank-specific, or local country characteristics. In particular, we explore corporations’
exposure to the LTRO liquidity shocks to understand the potential of the LTROs for
boosting corporate investment. Then, conditional on corporations’ access to the LTRO
funding, we study the role of bank risk and country risk, which are significant determi-
nants of the bank LTRO uptake as discussed earlier, in shaping corporate investment
following the LTROs. Finally, to understand the role of the persistence and strength of
liquidity interventions, we also investigate whether the effect of the LTRO intervention
varies across banks’ LTRO repayment choices and local fiscal policies.21
5.1 The Impact of Bank Debt Reliance
The LTRO liquidity injections are conducted through the banking sector, since the ex-
pected transmission channel to the real economy is through bank lending. Corporations
with greater dependence on bank debt financing are exposed more to, and may benefit
more from, these liquidity injections, which may further stimulate corporate investment.
However, corporations may view their lenders’ LTRO uptake as a signal of bank risk and
future financing uncertainty. Corporations may, therefore, borrow as much as possible
and even decrease investment because of their own precautionary demand for liquidity,
particularly for those with a greater dependence on bank debt.22
To test this prediction, we construct a proxy for bank debt dependence based on
Capital IQ data. Specifically, we separate corporations into the subsamples High Bank
21In this section, we mainly focus on corporate investment. In general, similar to the baseline results,
there is no significant change in wage payments following LTROs, conditional on various characteristics.
22In Appendix Table A6 and A7, we find evidence that Eurozone corporations, on average, increased
leverage and cash holdings after the LTRO liquidity injections. In Appendix Note 2 we provide a
detailed discussion of these related results and document that the macro-liquidity injections translate
into corporate liquidity.
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Debt and Low Bank Debt, based upon their bank debt obligations (Bank Debt), one
year before the first three-year LTRO intervention, i.e., Q4-2010. Next, we run the
same subsample analysis for corporate investment. The results are presented in Table
7. In Models (1) and (2), we use the country-specific LTRO uptake measure, Country
LTRO Uptake. We find negative and significant coefficients for the LTRO uptake measure
in both specifications, and the coefficients are quite similar in magnitude for high and
low bank-reliant corporations suggesting that the country-based uptake did not have a
differential impact for high versus low bank-reliant corporations. In Models (3) and (4),
we use the corporate-specific LTRO uptake measure, Lender LTRO Uptake. We find
a negative coefficient of Lender LTRO Uptake for the subsample of corporations with
High Bank Debt, whereas the coefficient for corporations in the Low Bank Debt sample
is insignificant. Thus, we find some evidence that corporations with a relatively high
reliance on bank debt invest less if their lenders had a high LTRO uptake. This is in line
with our previous analysis and conclusions.
Overall, the investment results, conditional on bank debt dependence, presented in
this section provide additional evidence that the LTRO intervention did not boost the
investment for the average corporate borrower. Instead, corporations with a greater
dependence on bank debt and, thus, more exposed to the positive bank liquidity shock,
exhibited greater decreases in their investment when their bank lenders had higher LTRO
uptakes. In the next section, we explore the roles of bank risk and country risk in
explaining the decrease in investment, following the LTRO liquidity injections and, given
the corporations’ access to the LTRO interventions.
5.2 Bank Risk, Country Risk, and LTRO Impact
The analysis of the determinants of a bank’s LTRO uptake in section 4.2 suggests that
bank and country risks are significantly and positively related to banks’ usage of the
ECB’s liquidity injections. If bank and country risks are also negatively related to corpo-
rate investment, this may explain the decrease in corporate investment after the LTRO
liquidity injections. Therefore, we may expect the decrease in investment to be more sig-
nificant for corporations with risky lenders, and also those in risky countries. In addition,
corporations may take the LTRO uptakes as signals of lenders’ risks and future financing
constraints and may, accordingly, respond by decreasing investment. The signaling role
of LTRO uptakes may be more important for corporations with hitherto safe lenders and
those in safe countries.
To investigate the roles of bank risk and country risk, we separate corporations into
subsamples of Risky Lender and Safe Lender, based upon the average CDS Spread of their
lenders, Bank Risk, one year before the first three-year LTRO intervention, i.e., Q4-2010.
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Then we conduct analyses of corporate investment in both subsamples. These results are
presented in Models (1) and (2) of Table 8. In Panel A, we employ the country-specific
Country LTRO Uptake measure, while Panel B focuses on the corporate-specific Lender
LTRO Uptake. As outlined in the table, we find significant decreases in investment after
the LTRO uptakes for both the Risky Lender and Safe Lender subsamples, with a greater
decrease for corporations with risky lenders.
To further explore the interaction of bank risk, country risk, and the LTRO impact,
we first separate corporations into subsamples based on country risk, i.e., GIIPS and
non-GIIPS. GIIPS countries are most affected by the Sovereign Debt Crisis and have a
higher country risk, ex ante. The corporations in each subsample are further separated
into groups based on their bank lenders’ risk. The results are presented in Models (3) to
(6) of Table 8. For corporations in GIIPS countries, we find evidence that corporations
with risky lenders experienced a greater decrease in investment after the LTRO uptakes,
while the change in investment is not significant for those with safe lenders. However, for
corporations in non-GIIPS countries, we find a significant decrease in investment after
LTRO for both the Risky Lender and Safe Lender subsamples. We also find that the
decrease is greater for corporations with risky bank lenders, which outlines bank risk as
the important measure explaining the decrease in investment after the LTRO uptake.
Moreover, the LTRO uptake is not only related to previously known bank risk, but may
also signal an incremental risk of those that were regarded hitherto as safe lenders. The
significant decrease in investment for safe lenders in safe countries is consistent with
the signaling role of the LTRO uptake, particularly, for non-GIIPS countries. Overall,
the findings in this section confirm the role of bank risk in explaining the decrease in
investment following the LTRO uptake, especially given corporations’ access to the LTRO
funding through their lending relationships.23
5.3 The Effect of Early Repayment of LTRO Funds
In terms of the transmission of LTRO liquidity to the corporate sector, the impact may
vary across countries due to differences in the persistence of the LTRO liquidity shocks.
While the LTROs provided a three-year funding opportunity for Eurozone banks, par-
ticipating banks were given the option to repay, either in part or in full, the amount
of their borrowings after one year, without any penalty in order to increase the attrac-
tiveness of the unconventional LTROs. Since banks are closely monitored by financial
market participants, it is likely that LTRO-participating banks would have chosen to
repay the three-year LTRO funds at the early opportunity, either to signal improvements
23In Appendix Table A8, we investigate the role of lender size. We find evidence of a decrease in
investment following the bank lenders’ LTRO uptake for corporations with small lenders.
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in their individual funding conditions or because of their decreased funding needs during
the process of balance sheet adjustment.24
To investigate the role of early repayment, we rely on the end-of-year country-level
LTRO data reported by the NCBs to proxy for country-specific LTRO early repayments
by banks. Specifically, we use the percentage changes in the country-level LTRO holdings
between 2012 and 2013 as a proxy for early repayments of the three-year LTROs across
countries (for details, see Appendix Table A9).25 One interesting observation from this
measure is that the bank repayments differ for non-GIIPS (core) and GIIPS (periph-
ery) countries. In general, non-GIIPS countries had high LTRO repayment rates. At
one extreme, German banks exhibited a 80 percent decrease in their reliance on LTRO
funds from 2012 to 2013. Other non-GIIPS countries in our sample (i.e., Austria, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and France) also showed a sharp decrease of approximately 64
percent in their balances of LTRO funding during this period. Among GIIPS countries,
there are mixed patterns in the LTRO early repayment, with more modest amounts for
banks in Portugal (13 percent), Italy (20 percent), and Greece (29 percent), and larger
repayments of approximately 45 percent in Spain and Ireland. Based on our proxy for
early LTRO repayments, we separate our sample of corporations into three groups: Low
Early LTRO Repayment (Portugal and Italy)26, Medium Early LTRO Repayment (Spain,
Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France), and High Early LTRO Repay-
ment (Germany). Next, we examine the impact of the LTRO intervention on corporate
investment for the three different groups.
The results are presented in Table 9. As seen from the table, the impact of the LTRO
intervention on corporate policies differs significantly across the early LTRO repayment
groups. The decrease in investment is concentrated in corporations in countries with
medium early repayment (Spain, Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France in
Panel B). For those in the low early repayment group (Portugal and Italy in Panel A), the
change in investment is not significant. However, the German corporations in the high
early repayment group (Panel C) increased their investments after their banks’ LTRO
uptake.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 9, we further investigate whether the impact of the
bank-level LTRO uptake and early repayments differ for large and small corporations,
i.e., corporations that are relatively less versus more financially constrained. In general,
small corporations rely more on bank debt financing, and have fewer capital market
24See ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2013.
25The NCBs’ country-level LTRO data may contain LTROs with other maturities, i.e., three-month
and one-year. However, most of the LTROs were of three-year maturity. As discussed in the 2013 annual
report of the Bank of Spain, “Most of the decrease in this balance took place in January when institutions
availed themselves of the early redemption option offered by three-year refinancing operations.”
26Greece had low early repayment, but is not covered by the analysis due to missing bank LTRO data.
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alternatives when their bank lenders are financially constrained. On the one hand, when
the LTRO uptake improves the funding condition of banks and relaxes corporate financing
constraints, small corporations may respond more positively to the LTRO intervention.
On the other hand, when the LTRO uptake signals bank risk, small corporations may
respond more negatively to their lenders’ LTRO uptake. As seen from the table, we again
find more negative results for investment for corporations in countries with medium early
repayment. For the low early repayment group in Panel A, while large corporations
decreased investment with the Lender LTRO Uptake, we observe a significant increase in
investment for small corporations following the lenders’ LTRO uptake. For the high early
repayment group in Panel C, the increase in investment after the lenders’ LTRO uptake
mainly comes from small corporations.
To obtain a complete picture of the corporate policies following LTRO uptake and
early repayment, we report the corresponding results for cash, leverage and wage payment
policies in Appendix Table A10. For corporations in countries with relatively low early
repayments (i.e., Portugal and Italy (Panel A)), we find that corporations increase their
leverage and cash holdings with their lenders’ LTRO uptake, which is consistent with
the transmission of the LTRO funding to the corporate level, as well as precautionary
demand for cash. However, there is no increase in leverage and cash for corporations in
countries with medium and high early repayment (Panels B and C). These findings are
also intuitive, since we expect a lower transmission of funds for high early repayers of
LTRO funds. Overall, the results in this section suggests the role of transmission of LTRO
funds to the corporate level for low early repayment banks. Apart from Germany, where
corporations increased investment despite having experienced no significant increase in
leverage, small corporations in Portugal and Italy did benefit from LTRO funding.
5.4 The Role of Fiscal Policy
Fiscal and monetary policies interact closely in reality, and these interactions can lead to
very different outcomes than those predicted by the analysis of each policy in isolation
(Dixit and Lambertini (2003)). Whereas the ECB has launched a plethora of expan-
sionary monetary interventions since the onset of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis,
many Eurozone member states implemented austerity plans to cut government spending,
intending to reduce their fiscal deficits and sovereign debt. One feature of the Eurozone
economies is that although the ECB determines the common monetary policy for all
member countries, each member state’s government decides its own fiscal policy. This
feature limits the flexibility of economic policymaking and introduces greater complex-
ity to overall economic policies, with attendant spillover effects on product supply and
consumer demand in the Eurozone. In particular, fiscal policies that do not support the
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Eurosystem-wide monetary policy may offset the positive liquidity shock created by the
ECB, because they may weaken the signaling effect by the banks, and potentially hurt
the corporations even more. Therefore, we expect the decrease in investment to be more
pronounced when there is a lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies,
i.e., expansionary monetary policy through the LTROs, accompanied by a contractionary
fiscal policy in a particular country. However, when there is closer coordination between
monetary and fiscal policies, we expect to observe increased corporate investment follow-
ing the implementation of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy.
To investigate the role of fiscal policy, we analyze the impact of the country-level
changes in corporate tax rates and government investment expenditures, as proxies for
the country-specific fiscal policies. Accordingly, contractionary fiscal policies involve in-
creasing corporate taxation, decreasing government spending (investment expenditures),
or both. Specifically, we measure the changes in tax policy as the country-specific change
in the corporate tax rate from one year before to one year after the first LTRO inter-
vention, i.e., the change from Q4-2010 to Q4-2012. Next, we classify corporations into
subsamples based on whether their local national government increased, maintained or
decreased its corporate tax rate, and conduct our investment analysis within the subsam-
ples of corporations located in Increased Corporate Tax, Unchanged Corporate Tax and
Decreased Corporate Tax countries, respectively.27
To account for governments’ spending policies, we again use the country-specific
change in the government investment expenditures from one year before, to one year,
after the first LTRO intervention, i.e., the change from Q4-2010 to Q4-2012. Specifically,
we use the median of the ratio of the quarterly government investment expenditures to
GDP for each year to classify corporations into subsamples based on whether their na-
tional government increased or decreased the amount of investment expenditures between
Q4-2010 to Q4-2012. Next, we conduct our investment analysis within the subsamples
of corporations located in Increased Government Investment, and Decreased Government
Investment countries, respectively.
The results of our analysis of fiscal policies are presented in Table 10. In Panel A, the
analysis is conducted in the baseline Eurozone sample, with Country LTRO Uptake as a
proxy for monetary policy. As we can see from Models (1) and (5), we find significant neg-
ative coefficients for Country LTRO Uptake for corporations in countries that increased
their corporate taxes or decreased government investments. These results indicate that
in countries with relatively contractionary fiscal policies, corporations decreased their
investments following the LTRO liquidity injection. Furthermore, for Models (3) and
27During the period Q4-2010 to Q4-2012, France and Portugal increased, and Finland, the Netherlands
and Greece decreased their nominal corporate tax rates. The remaining countries did not change their
corporate tax rates.
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(4), we find some evidence that when governments adopted accommodative fiscal poli-
cies in the face of substantial monetary stimulus, corporations actually increased their
investment along with their local banks’ uptake of the LTRO liquidity injections.
In Panel B, we further investigate the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in
the bank-firm-linked sample, with Lender LTRO Uptake as a proxy for monetary policy.
We again find some evidence that corporations in countries with accommodative fiscal
policies increased or had a smaller decrease in investment following the LTRO liquidity
injections. However, the results are not as robust as those for the full sample with the
Country LTRO Uptake used as a proxy for monetary policy, which may indicate the
differential impact of the signaling versus the transmission channels of monetary policy:
ECB monetary policy can be transmitted as a positive signal to the corporate level only
if the local government sends an accommodative signal at the same time. In contrast,
the actual transmission effect may still be present, but to a much smaller degree, despite
accommodative fiscal policies, so long as it is ensured that the corporations actually
have access to the additional funds stemming from the ECB operations. Overall, the
results in this section provide additional evidence of the potential for increased corporate
investment in countries with coordinated monetary and fiscal policies.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate whether, and how, corporate investment is affected by uncon-
ventional monetary interventions by analyzing the largest liquidity injections in history.
Focusing on the ECB’s three-year LTROs, we find that non-Eurozone firms which are
not directly affected by LTROs reduced investments more than Eurozone firms. Such a
counterfactual analysis suggests that LTROs helped Eurozone corporations to decelerate
their investment decline. However, non-financial corporations in the Eurozone did not in-
crease their investments after these massive liquidity injections. The investment of these
corporations are negatively associated with the amount of funds their banks obtained
from the ECB. Banks’ LTRO uptake amounts are positively related to their own credit
risk.
We further investigate the role of bank risk in explaining the decrease in corporate
investment following the LTROs. We find that corporations with a greater exposure to
bank debt and those with risky lenders exhibit greater decrease in investment following
their lenders’ LTRO uptakes. The results suggest that bank risk and the signaling role
of the banks’ LTRO uptake might have impeded the transformation of liquidity injection
into real economic outputs. In addition, we find that the negative investment effect
of the unconventional LTROs varies across LTRO repayment choices that relate to the
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persistence of the LTRO interventions. Smaller corporations whose lenders’ held the
LTRO funds for a longer period did increase investment following their lenders’ LTRO
uptake. Furthermore, we find that when governments adopted more accommodative fiscal
policies at the same time, corporate investment increased in response to their lenders’
LTRO uptakes.
While our results suggest that liquidity injections can decelerate economic decline, our
study outlines the significance of bank and country characteristics that impede the effec-
tiveness of unconventional monetary policies in improving real economic output. When
bank balance sheets are stressed, it would be difficult to stimulate corporate investment
by just injecting liquidity into poorly capitalized banks. Fiscal policies and other un-
conventional monetary policies, including the more aggressive Targeted LTRO, may have
resulted in different outcomes, but they too should be carefully discussed and analyzed.
We leave these issues for future study once additional data become available.
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Figure 1
ECB’s unconventional monetary policies
This figure outlines the timeline of recent unconventional monetary policies implemented by the European Central Bank
(ECB). MRO labels the standard Marginal Refinancing Operations that are conducted on a weekly basis. LTROs refers to
Longer-Term Refinancing Operations, while TLTROs refers to the recently introduced Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations. SMP, the Securities Markets Program, was more recently replaced by the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT ) program. APP represents the most recently introduced Asset Purchase Program, that is still under way. The
“whatever-it-takes” event refers to a speech made by Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, at the Global Investment
Conference, London, 26 July 2012.
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Figure 2
Time series of corporate investment before and after the LTRO intervention in Europe
This figure plots the changes in the investment ratios for Eurozone and non-Eurozone corporations, from before the financial
crisis (Q2-2008) before the three-year LTRO interventions (Q2-2011), respectively from before (Q2-2011) to one (Q4-2012),
two (Q4-2013) and three (Q4-2014) years after the three-year LTRO interventions. Specifically, the figure outlines the
average of corporations’ investment ratios. Our measure for corporate investment is Investments, which is the corporate
capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. The overall sample of corporations is taken from Compustat Global and is
restricted to EU countries. For details, please see Appendix Table A1.
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Table 1
Liquidity injection from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
LTRO I: LTRO II: Total LTRO Country Bank
Dec-2011 Feb-2012 Borrowing LTRO Uptake LTRO Uptake
EUR bn EUR bn EUR bn % of Gov. Debt % of Bank Size
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Austria 03.66 07.83 11.49 04.82 007.10
Belgium 45.28 43.71 88.99 25.02 012.30
France 05.59 06.52 12.12 00.61 003.40
Germany 12.25 13.13 25.38 01.67 006.70
Greece 0060.94 § 0in.a. 60.94 25.54 00in.a.
Ireland 21.91 17.62 39.52 22.33 011.50
Italy 172.080 128.110 300.200 15.92 013.40
Netherlands 08.86 01.96 10.81 02.58 009.80
Portugal 24.54 24.76 49.30 29.37 011.80
Spain 153.210 165.530 318.740 51.44 015.70
Total 508.320 409.170 917.490
This table presents data on the liquidity injections that Eurozone countries obtained from the three-year Longer-Term
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) initiated by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 21, 2011 (LTRO I) and
February 29, 2012 (LTRO II), respectively. Totel LTRO Borrowing refers to the total amount that banks in the respective
country obtained through LTRO I and II, with the numbers given in billion EUR. In column 4, we scale the Total LTRO
Borrowing for each country by the country’s central government debt obligations, as of December 2011. In column 5, we
report the average LTRO borrowing by banks, scaled by the banks’ total assets in 2010, in the respective country. The
information about the bank and country-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-collected data from Bloomberg, as well
as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The data on banks’ total assets are obtained from Bankscope
and available public financial reports, while the information for government debt by country is obtained from the World
Bank Database.
§In the case of Greece, we only have information about the total LTRO amount which, besides the three-year LTROs, also
includes the standard one-month and three-month LTROs. As we cannot separate the latter, the number is not directly
comparable to the uptake numbers for the other countries.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
Panel A: Main sample
Country DEU FRA ITA GRC NLD FIN ESP BEL AUT IRL PRT Total
Investments 3.31 3.05 2.47 2.48 3.11 3.39 3.29 3.85 5.41 2.56 3.16 3.12
Wages 1.85 1.86 2.30 1.19 2.88 2.16 3.30 2.10 3.15 1.30 2.77 2.07
Cash 10.07 10.23 6.96 4.15 6.82 8.06 7.08 8.01 8.85 11.37 4.00 8.29
Leverage 16.40 19.06 27.63 33.97 22.80 23.86 28.33 22.42 22.35 21.28 40.2 22.07
Net Debt 55.58 59.01 64.26 60.54 58.65 57.39 63.95 56.70 55.96 55.04 73.59 59.01
Short-term Debt 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.07
Bank Debt 11.36 9.97 20.99 21.78 13.38 15.49 22.47 11.43 14.23 12.56 22.58 14.54
Firm Size 4.53 4.59 5.70 4.84 6.32 4.99 6.42 5.15 5.44 5.69 5.92 5.02
Market to Book 120.0 121.6 114.4 95.2 128.9 125.9 123.4 114.7 114.7 128.9 106.9 117.9
Cash Flow 4.84 3.57 3.07 1.62 5.80 7.21 5.89 4.81 5.36 2.90 2.96 4.10
Industry Sigma 7.61 5.69 3.20 3.07 5.53 4.43 2.59 4.48 3.30 4.55 2.97 4.85
Net Working Capital 6.17 1.90 0.85 5.11 2.13 3.75 -2.08 -0.58 3.38 0.55 -7.76 2.75
R&D/Sales 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Acquisition Activity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
# N 31333 30712 10825 9810 6594 6000 5443 4939 3376 2519 2392 113943
# Firms 837 837 285 233 190 143 136 124 92 75 57 3009
Panel B: Sample with existing loan information from LPC Dealscan
Country DEU FRA ITA GRC NLD FIN ESP BEL AUT IRL PRT Total
Investments 3.92 3.34 2.97 3.45 3.25 3.76 3.26 4.06 5.82 2.98 5.61 3.55
Wages 3.10 3.62 3.34 2.35 3.83 3.93 3.96 2.90 3.76 2.01 4.12 3.43
Cash 8.49 8.97 7.36 4.44 6.84 5.41 6.71 6.73 8.20 9.49 4.17 7.65
Leverage 22.0 24.3 30.3 42.6 25.1 27.8 32.6 26.8 26.4 30.2 39.0 26.5
Net Debt 60.7 63.4 69.2 66.4 62.0 60.1 66.9 61.4 55.4 62.5 72.5 62.9
Short-term Debt 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.06
Bank Debt 10.3 9.62 21.0 23.0 12.7 13.0 25.3 11.6 17.3 13.6 11.8 13.4
Firm Size 6.32 6.82 6.60 5.90 7.21 6.83 7.09 6.52 6.53 7.18 7.82 6.72
Market to Book 119 120 115 98.5 130 121 118 115 122 143 121 119
Cash Flow 4.93 4.07 3.71 2.12 5.74 6.77 6.08 5.17 5.71 3.12 5.94 4.72
Industry Sigma 6.43 5.04 3.01 2.75 4.50 4.07 2.53 4.76 3.30 2.80 2.78 4.44
Net Working Capital 5.93 -2.3 -0.4 0.43 1.72 3.64 -1.6 -2.6 8.06 0.36 -8.4 1.11
R&D/Sales 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
Acquisition Activity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
# N 1076 1000 3700 2015 3816 2473 2993 2039 1084 1232 475 4059
# Firms 245 238 93 43 101 54 70 43 24 32 10 953
# LTRO-Bank Rel. 122 111 57 9 52 18 48 25 11 16 7 476
Panel C: Country-specific measures
Country DEU FRA ITA GRC NLD FIN ESP BEL AUT IRL PRT Total
Sovereign Risk 10.55 11.71 52.00 56.40 29.95 13.09 50.74 24.96 10.35 27.89 36.86 17.62
Sovereign Export 42.25 27.12 26.21 22.10 69.27 39.08 25.51 76.44 51.00 90.48 29.91 31.12
Corporate Tax 30.17 35.42 31.40 29.00 25.50 26.00 30.00 33.99 25.00 12.50 29.00 34.43
Gov. Investments 8.68 15.81 11.69 19.42 15.69 15.13 16.45 8.65 11.73 13.72 14.80 14.26
Gov. Debt 67.06 67.01 105.9 126.6 50.27 41.69 50.08 101.8 73.17 32.54 69.23 69.88
This table provides sample averages (medians) of corporate characteristics for each country in our samples of Eurozone
corporations. Panel A outlines the summary statistics for the main data sample, while Panel B shows the summary
statistics for the sample Eurozone corporations, for which we also have loan information from LPC Dealscan. In Panel
C, we show summary statistics for country-specific measures used in our analysis. The sample period for each country is
2002-2014, and the variables are based on quarterly observations. For the specific definition of each variable we refer to
Appendix Table A3. The corporate fundamental data are obtained from Compustat Global, while country-specific data
are obtained from Markit, the World Bank, as well as the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. For any data unavailable for
a specific quarter, we replace the missing values with yearly observations. Ratios are given in percentages.
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Table 3
Counterfactual analysis of the LTRO effect: Eurozone versus Non-Eurozone
Panel A: Investments
Investments Investments
Full sample Risky Sovereign Safe Sovereign
(1) (2) (3)
Post-LTRO -0.491*** -0.345* -0.634***
(0.09) (0.19) (0.10)
Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone -0.606*** -0.870*** -0.422***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.06)
Cash Flow 0.002 0.012*** -0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.086*** 0.149*** 0.065**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Leverage -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.070 0.203 0.042
(0.11) (0.26) (0.12)
Country Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.586 0.525 0.617
N 149798 37088 107834
Panel B: Employment
Wages Wages
Full sample Risky Sovereign Safe Sovereign
(1) (2) (3)
Post-LTRO -0.096** -0.083 -0.063
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone -0.070*** -0.099*** -0.116***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Cash Flow -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.703*** 0.736*** 0.684***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Leverage -0.001** -0.002** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.157** 0.312*** 0.100
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Country Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.772 0.832 0.769
N 91049 19222 69184
This table presents estimates of the “counterfactual” effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on corporate policies, in a sample of corporations located in the European Union
(EU), both either inside or outside the Eurozone. Our measure for investment is Investments, which is the corporation’s
capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. The variable Post-LTRO is a dummy variable equal to one, for year-quarter
observations after the ECB had implemented the first three-year LTRO intervention (Q4-2011). The variable Post-LTRO
× Non-Eurozone is the interaction variable between the non-Eurozone dummies and LTRO intervention and captures the
effect of the liquidity intervention on corporate policies in non-LTRO countries (“counterfactual” effect) accordingly, which
equals one for non-Eurozone corporations after the first LTRO intervention (for details see Appendix A1). In Model (1),
we use the full sample of corporations. In Models (2) and (3), corporations are separated into high and low-risk sovereigns,
based on their location and the respective country’s CDS spreads. Risky (Safe) Sovereign is defined as a CDS spread
above (below) the median in the pre-intervention and crisis period (2009 and 2010). In Panel A and Panel B, we present
the estimates from our analysis of corporate investment and wages, respectively. The sample period is 2002-2014, based
on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at
the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 4
LTRO uptake effect on investment and employment: Eurozone firms
Investments Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country LTRO Uptake -1.276*** -0.140
(0.24) (0.08)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.514*** 0.019
(0.11) (0.05)
Cash Flow 0.009*** 0.018*** -0.004*** -0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.124*** -0.037 0.677*** 0.717***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Leverage -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.313*** 0.507*** 0.101* -0.175**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08)
Sovereign Risk -0.301*** -0.298*** 0.011 0.066**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Sovereign Export -0.014*** -0.028*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.568 0.602 0.787 0.713
N 86392 32725 51997 19667
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) on corporate investment and employment compensation in a sample of corporations located in the
Eurozone. Our measure for investment is Investments, which is the corporations’ capital expenditure, scaled by total
assets. Our measure for employment compensation is Wages, which is the corporations’ total salaries and wages, given
in logarithms. The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and is equal to the countries’ total
LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the countries’ central government debt, afterwards. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake
is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of
each bank, thereafter. We classify Eurozone banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO
intervention had a loan relation to the bank. The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-
collected data from Bloomberg, as well as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The loan information
data is obtained from LPC Dealscan. In all models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to
macro-economic variables. The sample period is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at
the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard
errors.)
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Table 5
Determinants of banks’ LTRO borrowing
Panel A: Bank-specific LTRO borrowing indicator
LTRO Borrowing Indicatorj,11/12 LTRO Borrowing Indicatorj,11/12
All Banks All Banks All Banks GIIPS Banks Non-GIIPS Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Risk Bankj,10 1.237*** 1.584*** 1.414*** 1.053 3.032***
(0.358) (0.424) (0.446) (0.833) (1.076)
Bank Sizej,10 0.174** 0.388*** 0.538*** 1.266*** 0.551**
(0.080) (0.111) (0.134) (0.345) (0.264)
Borrower Sizej,10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.62 -0.21
(0.264) (0.281) (0.511) (0.704)
Borrower Leveragej,10 0.034 0.016 0.038 -0.01
(0.023) (0.026) (0.050) (0.066)
Borrower Short-term Debtj,10 -7.66 -9.08* -15.3* -49.3*
(4.689) (5.284) (9.235) (26.50)
Borrower Cash Flowj,10 -0.26** -0.21* -0.52** 0.060
(0.117) (0.114) (0.231) (0.200)
Sovereign Risk10 1.269*** 1.986 0.174
(0.405) (2.787) (0.898)
Pseudo R-square 0.085 0.222 0.280 0.501 0.417
N 185 155 155 80 75
Panel B: Bank-specific LTRO borrowing amount
Log(1 + Total Bank LTRO Borrowing) Log(1 + Total Bank LTRO Borrowing)
All Banks All Banks All Banks GIIPS Banks Non-GIIPS Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Risk Bankj,10 0.782*** 0.789*** 0.621*** 0.450* 0.502**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.26) (0.21)
Bank Sizej,10 0.061*** 0.174*** 0.248*** 0.484*** 0.099**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03)
Borrower Sizej,10 -0.138** 0.033 -0.028 -0.107
(0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07)
Borrower Leveragej,10 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Borrower Short-term Debtj,10 -2.969** -1.818 -2.797 -3.485*
(1.42) (1.38) (1.98) (1.99)
Borrower Cash Flowj,10 -0.045 -0.028 -0.067** 0.005
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Sovereign Risk10 0.486*** 0.728** -0.023
(0.12) (0.28) (0.11)
R-square 0.418 0.447 0.500 0.750 0.293
N 185 155 155 80 75
This table presents estimates of the effect of bank, country and borrower measures on banks’ borrowings from the ECB’s
three-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in a sample of banks with borrowers located in the Eurozone. In
Panel A, our measure for banks’ LTRO borrowings is LTRO Borrowing Indicator, which is an indicator that is equal to
one, if the bank participated in one of the LTROs. In Panel B, our measure for banks’ LTRO borrowings is Log(1 + Total
Bank LTRO Borrowing), which is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the banks’ total borrowing from LTRO I (Dec-2011) and
II (Feb-2012). We regress the bank LTRO borrowing measures on a set of control variables. High Risk Bank is a dummy
variable equal to one, if the bank at the end of 2010 had a CDS spread above the median CDS spread, and zero otherwise.
Bank Size is the banks’ total assets at the end of 2010, given in natural logarithm. Borrower Size refers to the average
size (measured by total assets given in natural logarithm) of the banks’ borrowers at the end of 2010. Likewise, Borrower
Leverage, Borrower Cash Flow and Borrower Short-term Debt is the average leverage, cash flow and short-term debt of
the banks’ borrowers at the end of 2010. Sovereign Risk is the countries’ CDS spread at the end of 2010, given in natural
logarithm. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 6
Lender LTRO residual effect on investment and employment
000 Investments 000 Wages
(1) (2)
Lender LTRO Residual -0.146* 0.021
(0.07) (0.04)
Cash Flow 0.027*** -0.004
(0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.004*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size -0.148** 0.647***
(0.06) (0.04)
Leverage -0.022*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.456*** -0.155*
(0.12) (0.09)
Sovereign Risk -0.299*** 0.095**
(0.05) (0.04)
Sovereign Export -0.050*** -0.009*
(0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
R-square 0.621 0.680
N 20097 12247
This table presents estimates of the residual effect of lenders’ liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) on corporate investment and employment compensation in a sample of corporations
located in the Eurozone. Our measure for investment is Investments, which is the corporations’ capital expenditure, scaled
by total assets. Our measure for employment compensation is Wages, which is the corporations’ total salaries and wages,
given in logarithms. The variable Lender LTRO Residual is zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the bank specific LTRO
residual value obtained from the regression analysis from Table 5, Panel B, Model (3), of the corporate-related banks,
thereafter. We classify Eurozone banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO intervention
had a loan relation to the bank. The loan information data are obtained from LPC Dealscan. We also include base
corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period is 2002-2014, based on
quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the
10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 7
LTRO effect on Investment: The role of corporations’ bank debt reliance
Investments Investments
High Bank Debt Low Bank Debt High Bank Debt Low Bank Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country LTRO Uptake -0.812** -0.832**
(0.37) (0.33)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.891*** 0.279
(0.16) (0.17)
Cash Flow 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.015***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.175*** 0.086** -0.011 -0.037
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Leverage -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.618** 0.136 0.710** 0.316**
(0.30) (0.12) (0.27) (0.12)
Sovereign Risk -0.353*** -0.227*** -0.467*** -0.145***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Sovereign Export -0.012 -0.019*** -0.029** -0.024***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.525 0.563 0.601 0.594
N 31262 45556 12710 17797
This table presents estimates of the effect of the corporate reliance on bank debt and the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s
three-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on corporate investment, in a sample of corporations located
in the Eurozone. Our measure for investment is Investments, which is the corporation’s capital expenditure, scaled by
total assets. Bank Debt is the debt from bank loans, divided by total assets. In Models (1) and (2), and Models (3)
and (4), corporations are separated into those with High and Low Bank Debt ratios, based upon their bank debt ratios
one year before the first three-year LTRO intervention (Q4-2010). The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to zero,
until Q4-2011, and equal to the country-specific total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the central government debt of the
country, thereafter. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake
amount of the corporate’s related banks, scaled by the size of each bank, thereafter. We classify Eurozone banks as related
if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO intervention had a loan relation to the bank. The sample period
is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level,
and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 8
LTRO effect on investment: The role of lender characteristics
Panel A: Country LTRO uptake and lenders’ credit risk
Investments Investments
GIIPS Non-GIIPS
Risky Lender Safe Lender Risky Lender Safe Lender Risky Lender Safe Lender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country LTRO Uptake -2.699*** -2.313** -1.721** 0.993 -9.994*** -4.540***
(0.47) (0.93) (0.77) (0.77) (1.67) (1.37)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.617 0.633 0.589 0.619 0.650 0.636
N 9819 10494 3905 965 5914 9529
Panel B: Lender LTRO uptake and lenders’ credit risk
Investments Investments
GIIPS Non-GIIPS
Risky Lender Safe Lender Risky Lender Safe Lender Risky Lender Safe Lender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.707*** -0.418*** -0.496* -0.995 -0.874*** -0.433***
(0.18) (0.14) (0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.14)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.616 0.633 0.588 0.619 0.649 0.636
N 9819 10494 3905 965 5914 9529
This table presents estimates of the effect of bank characteristics and the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on corporate investment, in a sample of corporations located in the Eurozone. Our
measure for investment is Investments, which is the corporations’ capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. We separate
corporations into Risky and Safe Lender. Risky (Safe) Lender is a dummy variable equal to one if the corporations’
lenders one year before the first three-year LTRO intervention, i.e., Q4-2010, on average had a CDS spread above (below)
the median, and zero otherwise. The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the
country-specific total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the central government debt of the country, thereafter. The variable
Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related
banks, scaled by the size of each bank, thereafter. The sample period is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (***
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 9
LTRO effect on investment: The role of banks’ early repayment of LTRO
Panel A: Low early LTRO repayment
Investments Investments
Full Sample Large Corporations Small Corporations
(1) (2) (3)
Lender LTRO Uptake -1.006 -2.852*** 11.687***
(1.05) (0.93) (3.98)
Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.556 0.611 0.535
N 4876 2343 2533
Panel B: Medium early LTRO repayment
Investments Investments
Full Sample Large Corporations Small Corporations
(1) (2) (3)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.537*** -0.405*** -0.626**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.25)
Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.644 0.687 0.582
N 16900 10006 6894
Panel C: High early LTRO repayment
Investments Investments
Full Sample Large Firms Small Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Lender LTRO Uptake 10.809** 5.338 21.035***
(4.40) (5.67) (7.24)
Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.558 0.582 0.548
N 8812 4251 4561
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) by loan-related banks, and LTRO repayment policies on corporate polices, in a subsample of Eurozone
corporations with existing loan information in LPC Dealscan. Our measure for corporate investment is Investments, which
is the corporation’s capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until
Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each bank, thereafter.
In Panels A through Panels C corporations are separated based on their location and the respective country’s LTRO
repayment policy, compared to the initial Country LTRO Uptake. Low (Medium, High) Early LTRO Repayment is defined
as a LTRO repayment ratio from 2012 to 2013, i.e., at the first possible LTRO repayment date, that is below 30% (between
30% and 70%, above 70%). The sample period is 2002-2014, and based on quarterly observations. In all models, we include
base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level,
** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table 10
LTRO effect on investment: The role of fiscal policy
Panel A: Eurozone sample
Investments Investments
Increased Unchanged Decreased Increased Decreased
Corp. Tax Corp. Tax Corp. Tax Gov. Investment Gov. Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country LTRO Uptake -9.899*** -1.343*** 14.115* 1.404* -1.797***
(1.46) (0.30) (9.59) (0.72) (0.29)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.626 0.554 0.531 0.576 0.562
N 25926 44138 16328 39965 46427
Panel B: Eurozone sample with existing loan information
Investments Investments
Increased Unchanged Decreased Increased Decreased
Corp. Tax Corp. Tax Corp. Tax Gov. Investment Gov. Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lender LTRO Uptake 0.182 -1.034*** 7.920* -0.409*** -0.569**
(0.16) (0.16) (4.43) (0.14) (0.24)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.665 0.577 0.604 0.607 0.601
N 9041 17602 6082 13942 18783
This table presents estimates of the effect of fiscal policy and the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) on corporate investment. Our measure for corporate investment is Investments, which is
the corporate capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. Panel A shows the results based upon a sample of corporations
located in the Eurozone and using the country-specific LTRO uptake. The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to
zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the country-specific total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the central government debt
of the country, thereafter. Panel B shows the results based upon a subsample of Eurozone corporations with existing loan
information in LPC Dealscan, and using the lender-specific LTRO uptake. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal
to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each
bank, thereafter. In Models (1) to (3), corporations are separated into those with increased, unchanged and decreased
corporate tax rates (Increased (Unchanged, Decreased) Corporate Tax), based on the home countries’ (absolut) change
of the corporate tax rate between Q4-2010 and Q4-2012, i.e., around the first LTRO. The corporate tax rate data are
given on a quarterly basis. In Models (4) and (5), corporations are separated into those with increased and decreased
government investments (Increased (Decreased) Government Investment), based on the home countries’ (relative) change
in the government investment expenditures to GDP ratio between Q4-2010 and Q4-2012, i.e., around the first LTRO. In
all models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period
is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level,
and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Appendices
Appendix Note 1: Background on ECB’s open market operations
The ECB open market operations are aimed “to steer short-term interest rates, to manage
the liquidity situation and to signal the monetary policy stance in the euro area” and can be
classified into regular open market operations and non-standard monetary policies.28 Regular
open market operations consist of main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-
term refinancing operations (three-month LTROs). MROs are the ECB’s primary, regular
open market operations and refer to regular one-week liquidity-providing reverse transactions.
In October 2008, the ECB switched to a fixed-rate full allotment mode such that Eurozone
banks were then able to obtain unlimited short-term liquidity at a fixed rate, provided they
pledged sufficient eligible collateral. To provide additional, longer-term refinancing, the ECB
also offers three-month LTROs which in 2003 amounted to 45 billion EUR (about 20 percent of
the overall liquidity provided by the ECB). In recent years, the regular open market operations
have been complemented by a set of non-standard monetary policies. On 28 March 2008, the
ECB announced two six-month LTROs (allotted on 2 April and 9 July 2008), which were both
present for the amount of 25 billion EUR. The three- and six-month LTROs were carried out
through a variable-rate standard tender procedure. In June 2010, the ECB Governing Council
decided to adopt a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment in the regular three-month
LTROs (allotted on 28 July, 25 August, and 29 September 2010). On 6 October 2011, the ECB
further announced two twelve-month LTROs as fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment.
These were conducted in addition to the regular and special term refinancing operations in
October and December 2011, respectively.
On 8 December 2011, to increase the ECB’s support for the Eurozone banking sector and
to improve the real economy, two three-year LTROs were announced. The LTROs were allotted
on 21 December 2011 (LTRO I) and 29 February 2012 (LTRO II) and settled with maturities
on 29 January 2015 and 26 February 2015, respectively. The interest rate on the two long-term
loans was the average MRO rate over the life of the operation and approximately 1 percent.
The three-year LTROs eased credit conditions, not only by allowing banks to borrow unlimited
funds for three years (given the provision of eligible collateral) but also by assisting banks with
the management of their “gap risk”, i.e., increasing banks’ ability to match the tenor of their
assets and liabilities. Prior to the LTROs, many banks were only able to secure overnight
funding. To increase the attractiveness of the unconventional LTROs, participating banks were
given the option to repay part or the full amount of their borrowings after one year without any
penalty, i.e., as of 25 January (LTRO I) and 22 February (LTRO II) 2013, respectively. While
banks used the LTROs loans to rollover previous and to obtain new central bank borrowing, it
was stated, that “there is no limit on what the banks can do with the money”.29
In total, 523 credit institutions participated in LTRO I and were provided with 489.2 billion
EUR amounting to a net injection of 210 billion EUR. As outlined by Fitch Ratings (2012),
the participants in LTRO I can roughly be divided into two groups. On the one hand, banks
from the periphery countries were highly active due to their actual capital needs, as the LTROs
provided them with their only option for accessing medium-term funding. On the other hand,
the unconventional LTROs simply provided an opportunity to replace shorter-term funds with
28For details about the financial instruments that are used to achieve open market transactions, see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/html/index.en.html.
29Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/a-central-bank-doing-what-central-banks-do.html?
_r=0.
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1 percent three-year borrowing for the banks. Following the ECB, 45.72 billion EUR of the total
uptake was used to replace the twelve-month allotment that had taken place in October 2011,
and many of the 123 counter-parties were located in highly rated, safe countries such as France
and Germany.30 In particular, the banks that placed the highest bids were those that had 1)
the highest upcoming rollover needs and 2) the lowest maturity structures. However, it was also
claimed that certain banks avoided the LTROs due to concerns that participating banks would
be stigmatized as troubled institutions.31 Since a considerable portion of the banks’ collateral
was already pledged at the ECB at the time of the first allotment, the central banks relaxed
the collateral requirements to encourage uptake in LTRO II.32 In the end, LTRO II provided a
liquidity injection of 529.5 billion EUR (310 billion EUR in net terms) to 800 credit institutions.
Table 1 provides the LTRO amounts by country.
In June 2014, to “further ease private sector credit conditions and stimulate bank lending
to the real economy”, the ECB announced targeted LTROs (TLTROs) that provide financing
to credit institutions with maturity of up to four years. Under the TLTRO, counter-parties are
only allowed to borrow an amount that is capped in accordance with their corporate lending. In
September and December 2014, the ECB initially introduced two successive TLTROs, in which
counterparties were able to borrow in accordance with their initial allowance, at a rate equal to
a 10 basis point spread over the MRO rate. In the series of four rounds of TLTRO conducted
between March 2015 and June 2016, the ECB eliminated this excess MRO spread. The TLTROs
will all mature on 26 September 2018, while the voluntary early repayment depend on the actual
settlement dates.
In addition to the refinancing operations, the ECB implemented several outright asset pur-
chase programs (APP) since 2009. Under the expanded APP, the ECB purchases marketable
debt instruments from both the public and private sectors to inject liquidity into the banking
system, with a monthly purchase target of initially 60, and currently, 80 billion EUR. The active
APP consists of the third covered bond (CBPP3), asset-backed securities (ABSPP), and public
sector (PSPP) purchase programs that where initiated on 20 October 2014, 21 November 2014,
and 9 March 2015, respectively. These programs were intended to be carried out “until the
end of March 2017 and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in
the path of inflation that is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close
to, 2 percent over the medium term.” Besides the still-active APPs, there have been several
terminated APP programs in the past years. CBPP was active from July 2009 to June 2010 and
reached a nominal amount of 60 billion Euro. CBPP2 followed from November 2011 to October
2012 with a nominal amount of 16.4 billion Euro. The Securities Market Program (SMP) was
started in May 2010 with the aim of “addressing the severe tensions in certain market segments
which had been hampering the monetary policy transmission mechanism” and provided liquid-
ity in selected secondary sovereign bond markets. In September 2012, SMP was replaced by
outright monetary transactions (OMT), a bailout funding program of the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM).33
30Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 2012.
31See, for instance, http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/ltro-users-manual.
32For instance, the rating threshold was reduced for certain asset-backed securities (ABS), and rated
corporate loans were allowed to be used as collateral under given circumstances.
33Previous the European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilization Mechanism.
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Appendix Note 2: Discussion of LTRO impact on other corporate policies
For the investigation of the effect of the ECB’s LTRO intervention on corporate investment,
it is important to consider that macro-liquidity injections, such as the ECB’s unconventional
LTROs, not always translate (directly) into corporate liquidity. Indeed, unconventional liquidity
interventions may boost bank liquidity, improve corporations’ debt financing conditions and
make it less necessary for corporations to hold precautionary cash. If this were the outcome
of the liquidity injection, the injection would have achieved the ECB’s goal in undertaking
the intervention from a corporate liquidity perspective. However, banks may use Lender-Of-
Last-Resort funding to take on additional sovereign risk rather than lending to corporations,
which may accentuate corporations’ precautionary motives for holding cash. If the latter effect
dominates, particularly Eurozone corporations situated in countries with a high LTRO uptake,
would have higher cash holdings following the LTRO intervention Furthermore, as the aggregate
demand was clearly down at the onset of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis corporations would
have been likely to maintain their precautionary motives for holding significant amounts of cash,
independent of the supply-side effect.
Table A6 presents the results of an analysis of the LTRO impact for corporate liquidity
and debt financing policies in our sample of Eurozone corporations. As a proxy for corporate
liquidity we use Cash, i.e., cash holdings, scaled by total assets. For corporate debt financing we
use Leverage (total debt), Net Debt (current plus non-current liabilities minus cash holdings),
as well as Short-term Debt (all current liabilities), all scaled by total assets. As outlined by
Model (1), we find a positive and significant coefficient estimate for Country LTRO Uptake at
the 1% level when investigating corporations’ cash holdings.34 Specifically, this result suggests
that corporations located in countries in which the excess inflow of liquidity to lenders was high,
on average, increased their cash holdings by approximately 0.55 percent, compared to that of
other corporations. In unreported results we further find that the impact of the LTROs on cash
holdings is amplified for corporations that use bank-related loans and credits as their main source
of debt financing and for more risky corporations, i.e., those with a greater precautionary cash
holdings.35 We conclude from the results that the LTROs did not mitigate corporate uncertainty
about the future (bank) lending supply.
As outlined by Models (2) to (3), we also find positive and significant Country LTRO
Uptake coefficients when analyzing the LTRO impact on corporations’ leverage and net debt
ratios. The results suggest that corporations in high LTRO uptake countries were able to
increase their leverage ratio by approximately 1.1 percent. In addition, the results in Model (4)
regarding corporations’ short-term debt holdings suggests that corporations replaced shorter-
term with more long-term liabilities, which is in line with the fact that the LTRO intervention
for the first time provided longer-term funding opportunities for Eurozone banks.36 In line with
the findings by Darracq-Paries and Santis (2015) we conclude that corporations at least were
able to refinance existing debt contracts following the macro-liquidity injection. This supports
the view that the three-year LTROs can be interpreted as a favorable credit supply shock.
However, we emphasize that we cannot exclude other sources of funding responsible for that
increase/decrease, respectively.
34We follow Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
35This is similar to the discussion of precautionary cash holdings of more financially constrained
corporations as outlined in Azar, Kagy, and Schmalz (2016) and Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2014)).
36A related discussion based upon French data is given in Andrade, Cahn, Fraisse, and Me´sonnier
(2018)
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Figure A1
Time series of the ECB’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
This figure plots the amounts of the ECB’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) for the period 2006 to 2016.
The numbers are given in billion EUR. Unconventional LTROs refers to the two three-year LTROs. The data source is the
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, which publishes monthly numbers for the outstanding amounts.
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Figure A2
LTRO uptake in the Eurozone
This figure presents the total liquidity injection that countries within the Eurozone obtained from the three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), which were initiated by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 21, 2011
(LTRO I) and February 29, 2012 (LTRO II), respectively. The color shading refers to the respective countries’ total LTRO
uptake, scaled by the central government debt. The information about the country-specific LTRO uptake is based upon
hand-collected data from Bloomberg as well as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The information
on central government debt by country is obtained from the World Bank Database. In the case of Greece, we only have
information about the total LTRO amount that, besides the three-year LTROs, also includes the standard one-month and
three-month LTROs. As we cannot separate the latter, the number is not directly comparable to the uptake numbers for
other countries.
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Table A1
Sample countries
Panel A: Eurozone
Country Country Code EU Membership Euro Adoption Region Credit Rating (2011)
Austria AUT 1995 1999 Core AAA
Belgium BEL 1995 1999 Core AA
Finland FIN 1995 1999 Core AAA
France FRA 1995 1999 Core A
Germany DEU 1995 1999 Core AAA
Greece GRC 1995 2001 Periphery CCC
Ireland IRL 1995 1999 Periphery BB
Italy ITA 1995 1999 Periphery BB
Netherlands NLD 1995 1999 Core AAA
Portugal PRT 1995 1999 Periphery B
Spain ESP 1995 1999 Periphery BB
Panel B: Non-Eurozone
Country Country Code EU Membership Euro Adoption Region Credit Rating (2011)
Bulgaria BGR 2007 Periphery A
Czech Republic CZE 2004 Periphery AA
Denmark DNK 1995 Core AAA
Hungary HUN 2004 Periphery B
Lithuania LTU 2004 2015 Periphery A
Latvia LVA 2004 2014 Periphery A
Poland POL 2004 Periphery AA
Romania ROU 2007 Periphery BB
Sweden SWE 1995 Core AAA
United Kingdom GBR 1995 Core AAA
This table presents details of the European countries included in our sample. Panel A covers the countries in our Eurozone
sample, Panel B those in our non-Eurozone sample. The Eurozone sample only includes countries that agreed to use the
euro as a common currency in 1999, and adopted the euro right from its introduction in January 2001, and for which data
are available. The sample Non-Eurozone includes countries that are outside the Eurozone but are part of the European
Union (EU). Accordingly, our sample of EU corporates is the combination of the Eurozone and non-Eurozone samples.
EU Membership shows the year the country became a member of the EU. Likewise, euro Adoption shows the year in
which a given country adopted the euro as its local currency. Credit Rating is based on information from Markit Data as
of end-2011. The overall sample of corporations is taken from Compustat Global and is restricted to EU countries. For
details, please see Section 3.
135
Table A2
Description of main variables
Dependent Variables Description
Investments Capital Expenditures/ Total Assets Corporate capital spending. Quarterly corporate measure.
Source: Compustat.
Wages Log(Total Wage payments) The natural logarithm of total expenses related to salaries and
wages. Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Cash Cash/ Total Assets Corporate cash holdings including marketable securities.
Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Leverage Debt/ Total Assets The book value of the sum of current and long-term debt,
scaled by total assets. Quarterly corporate measure. Source:
Compustat.
Net Debt (Total liabilities - Cash)/ Total As-
sets
The sum of current and non-current liabilities minus cash
holdings, scaled by total assets. Quarterly corporate measure.
Source: Compustat.
Short-term
Debt
(Debt due in one year)/ Total Assets Fraction of long-term debt that is due in one year, scaled by
total assets. Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compus-
tat.
Main Explanatory Variables Description
Country LTRO
Uptake
Total Country LTRO Uptake/ Cen-
tral Government Debt2011
Total Country LTRO Uptake is the sum of the euro amounts
of the two three-year LTROs (LTRO I and II) for each country.
Accordingly, the variable is equal to zero until time Q4-2011
(first round of three-year LTRO) and afterwards equal to each
country’s total uptake, scaled by the central government debt
holdings in the year 2011. Quarterly country measure. Source:
Bloomberg and the World Bank.
Lender LTRO
Uptake
Average (Bank LTRO Uptake/
Bank Size 2011) of related banks
The firm-level average of a related banks’ uptake in the two
three-year LTROs (LTRO I and II), scaled by the size of the
respective bank. Accordingly, the variable is equal to zero
until time Q4-2011 (first round of three-year LTRO) and af-
terwards equal to the average of related banks’ total uptake.
Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Bloomberg and annual
reports.
LTRO-Bank
Relation
Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for corporations that in the five
years prior to Q4-2011 (first round of three-year LTRO) had
a loan relation to a Eurozone bank that participated in the
three-year LTROs as of December 2011 and February 2012.
Corporate measure. Source: LPC Dealscan.
Post-LTRO Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for the post-intervention period,
i.e., Q1-2012 to Q4-2014 (zero otherwise). Quarterly measure.
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
Non-Eurozone Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for corporations located in a
EU-country outside the Eurozone, as of 2014 (zero otherwise).
Country measure. Details are provided in Appendix A1.
GIIPS Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for corporations located in either
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain. Country measure.
Source: Compustat.
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Description of main variables (cont.)
Other Corporate Variables Description
Firm Size Log(Total Assets) Book value of assets, given in logarithms. Quarterly corporate
measure. Source: Compustat.
Market to Book(Total Liabilities + Market Equity)
/ Total Assets
Market value of total assets, scaled by book value of total
assets. Market equity is the amount of shares outstanding
times the share price as of the end of the fiscal quarter/year.
Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Cash Flow EBIT/ Total Assets Operating income before interest and taxes (after deprecia-
tion), scaled by total assets. Quarterly corporate measure.
Source: Compustat.
Industry Sigma Cash-flow risk Average standard deviation of corporate cash flows within the
same two-digit SIC code (minimum 3 observations). Quarterly
industry measure. Source: Compustat.
Net Working
Capital
(Net working capital - Cash)/ Total
Assets
Corporate working capital net of cash holdings, scaled by total
assets. Source: Compustat.
R&D/Sales R&D/ Total Sales Costs related to research and development, scaled by corpo-
rate sales. Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Sales Log(EBIT) Operating income before interest and taxes (after deprecia-
tion), given in logarithms. Corporate measure. Source: Com-
pustat.
Acquisition
Activity
Acquisitions/ Total Assets The amount used for M&A activities, scaled by total assets.
Quarterly corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Dividends Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for corporations with positive
dividends in a given quarter/year (zero otherwise). Quarterly
corporate measure. Source: Compustat.
Bank Debt Bank Debt/ Total Assets Bank debt is the amount of debt from bank loans. Quarterly
corporate measure. Source: Capital IQ.
Rated Dummy Dummy variable equal to one for corporations with avail-
able rating information (zero otherwise). Corporate measure.
Source: S&P Capital IQ.
Other Country Variables Description
Sovereign Risk Log(5-year Sovereign CDS spread) End-of-quarter observation of five-year sovereign CDS spreads.
Quarterly country measure. Source: Markit.
Early LTRO
Repayment
(∆ NCB LTRO Holdings2012−2013)/
Country LTRO Uptake2011/2012
The change in National Central Banks’ LTRO Holdings from
2012 to 2013, scaled by the total intital LTRO uptake in the
respective country. Country measure. Source: National Cen-
tral Bank Reports and Bloomberg.
Corporate Tax Corporate tax rate National corporate tax rates. Quarterly country measure.
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
Government
Investments
Investment expenditures by
governments/ GDP
Local government spending on investments, scaled by GDP.
Quarterly country measure. Source: ECB Statistical Data
Warehouse.
Government
Debt
Government debt/ GDP Total Government debt, scaled by GDP. Quarterly country
measure. Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
This table provides descriptions of all the variables used in the analyses. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles, and in our empirical specifications we use ratios given in percentages.
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Table A3
Summary statistics for non-Eurozone corporations
Country GBR SWE POL DNK ROU BGR LTU LVA HUN CZE Total
Investments 2.55 1.90 4.04 3.36 4.37 4.66 4.66 4.07 6.77 4.32 2.74
Wages 0.09 2.65 2.17 3.76 1.68 1.44 1.96 0.46 7.75 5.36 1.12
Cash 9.38 8.94 5.23 6.05 1.64 4.07 2.36 2.72 7.74 3.33 7.94
Leverage 13.83 14.21 14.32 22.48 0.84 26.14 27.2 14.58 14.47 13.49 14.43
Net Debt 49.81 52.68 47.08 53.49 34.28 46.86 51.57 37.67 41.59 41.70 49.56
Short-term Debt 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Bank Debt 11.86 12.91 12.92 17.38 15.22 19.63 23.4 17.41 23.09 7.89 12.99
Firm Size 3.82 5.57 4.72 6.51 5.23 5.29 5.22 2.04 10.43 8.70 4.47
Market to Book 133.1 146.3 118.3 120.5 85.5 98.9 91.9 70.7 108.7 93.7 129.5
Cash Flow 3.04 2.68 2.54 4.42 6.33 6.07 5.18 4.22 5.13 4.96 3.03
Industry Sigma 11.23 13.66 6.17 5.87 4.18 3.33 6.14 5.56 3.12 4.23 9.19
Net Working Capital -1.62 2.11 6.91 2.96 6.38 5.82 2.32 19.17 8.86 0.02 0.82
R&D/Sales 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Acquisition Activity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sovereign Risk 42.11 13.66 79.50 20.08 213.09 180.56 110.20 125.86 45.50 32.00 34.14
Sovereign Export 0.27 0.46 0.39 0.51 0.33 0.52 0.56 0.43 0.75 0.63 0.30
# N 67801 20122 17319 5980 2576 1018 1317 1370 797 420 118720
# Firms 2213 574 461 159 78 30 30 30 22 14 3611
This table provides sample averages (medians) of corporate characteristics for each country in our sample of non-Eurozone
corporations. Cash is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Investments is the ratio of capital
expenditure to total assets. Wages is the total salaries and wages, given in logarithms. Leverage is the book value of the
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. Net Debt is the ratio of current plus non-current
liabilities minus cash holdings to total assets. Short-term Debt is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. Bank Debt
is the amount of debt from bank loans, divided by total assets. Firm Size is the total assets, given in logarithms. Market
to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book
value of assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of the cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is the earnings after interest and
related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Industry Sigma is industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow
volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Net Working Capital (NWC) is the difference between current assets and current
liabilities net of cash, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of
acquisitions to total assets. Sovereign Risk is the five-year sovereign CDS spread for the country. Sovereign Export is the
country’s export-to-GDP ratio. The sample period for each country is 2002-2014, and the variables are based on quarterly
observations. For the specific definition of each variable we refer to Appendix Table A3. The corporate fundamental data
are obtained from Compustat Global, while country-specific data are obtained from Markit, the World Bank, as well as
the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. For any data unavailable for a specific quarter, we replace the missing values with
yearly observations. Ratios are given in percentages.
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Table A4
LTRO effect on investment and employment: Controlling for lagged corporate measures
Investments Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country LTRO Uptake -1.075*** -0.113
(0.25) (0.09)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.260** 0.072
(0.11) (0.05)
Cash Flow 0.005** 0.011*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.224*** -0.188** 0.364*** 0.407***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Leverage -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.001 -0.002*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.318** 0.430*** 0.136** -0.139
(0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08)
Sovereign Risk -0.322*** -0.420*** 0.038** 0.077**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
Sovereign Export -0.012** -0.025*** 0.003 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged Dividends 0.110*** 0.067 -0.017 0.029
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
Lagged R&D/Sales 0.568*** -0.057 0.031 -0.061
(0.13) (0.22) (0.05) (0.11)
Lagged Acquisition Activity -2.413*** -2.602*** -0.480*** -0.476*
(0.36) (0.46) (0.15) (0.26)
Industry Sigma -0.010 0.009 -0.002 0.011*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Net Working Capital -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log Sales 0.137*** 0.499*** 0.359*** 0.356***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Competition 0.001 0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.598 0.635 0.790 0.719
N 64635 25417 47910 18092
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) on corporate investment and employment compensation in a sample of corporations located in the
Eurozone. Our measure for corporate investment is Investments, which is the corporations’ capital expenditure, scaled by
total assets. Our measure for employment compensation is Wages, which is the corporations’ total salaries and wages, given
in logarithms. Models (1) and (3) include all the base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic
variables. In Models (2) and (4) we include, in addition to basic investment and employment compensation determinants,
lagged values of alternative investment measures and other corporate and industry controls. The variable Country LTRO
Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and is equal to the countries’ total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the countries’
central government debt, afterwards. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the
LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each bank, thereafter. We classify Eurozone
banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO intervention had a loan relation to the bank.
The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-collected data from Bloomberg, as well as
central bank announcements and public commentaries. The loan information data is obtained from LPC Dealscan. In all
models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period is
2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and
* significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table A5
LTRO effect on investment and employment: Robustness with shorter window
Investments Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country LTRO Uptake -0.765*** 0.200**
(0.20) (0.09)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.244*** -0.034
(0.08) (0.05)
Cash Flow -0.002 0.004 -0.002** 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.757*** 0.176** 0.615*** 0.695***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
Leverage -0.006*** -0.017*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rated 0.338* 0.226 0.057 -0.044
(0.19) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12)
Sovereign Risk -0.537*** -0.666*** -0.027 -0.036
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Sovereign Export -0.045*** -0.056*** -0.010*** 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.684 0.738 0.827 0.744
N 37934 14552 32950 12458
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) on investment polices in a sample of corporations located in the Eurozone. Our measure for corpo-
rate investment is Investments, which is the corporation’s capital expenditure, scaled by total assets. Our measure for
employment compensation is Wages, which is the corporation’s total salaries and wages, given in logarithms. Model (1)
and (3) show the estimates of the country-based effect of LTRO in our main sample, while Models (2) and (4) show the
effect of loan-related banks’ LTRO uptake in a subsample of Eurozone corporations with existing loan information in LPC
Dealscan. The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and is equal to the countries’ total LTRO
uptake amount, scaled by the countries’ central government debt, afterwards. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal
to zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each
bank, thereafter. We classify Eurozone banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO interven-
tion had a loan relation to the bank. The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-collected
data from Bloomberg, as well as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The loan information data is ob-
tained from LPC Dealscan. In all models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic
variables. The sample period is 2009-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table A6
LTRO effect on cash and debt financing policies
Cash Leverage Net Debt Short-term Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country LTRO Uptake 1.612*** 2.945*** 3.118*** -0.016***
(0.56) (0.65) (1.15) (0.00)
Industry Sigma 0.012 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.001***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Cash Flow 0.002 -0.058*** -0.122*** -0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.052*** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size -0.103 2.642*** -3.250*** 0.001
(0.07) (0.09) (0.18) (0.00)
Net Working Capital -0.123*** -0.301*** -0.631*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital Expenditure -0.120*** -0.171*** -0.236*** -0.001***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Cash 0.000*** -0.229*** -0.549*** -0.002***
(0.00) ) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Div. Dummy 0.697*** -1.207*** -1.158*** -0.005***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.00)
R&D/Sales 0.016*** -0.013*** 0.014** -0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquisition Activity -0.022*** 0.065*** 0.007 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Sovereign Risk 1.537*** 0.098 0.734*** 0.004***
(0.29) (0.34) (0.15) (0.00)
Sovereign Export 0.531*** 1.162*** -0.038 -0.000
(0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00)
Rated -0.051*** -0.109*** -1.161* -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.65) (0.00)
Time FY Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.767 0.795 0.778 0.801
N 82053 82053 64040 57166
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) on corporate policies in a sample of corporations located in the Eurozone. Cash is defined as cash
and cash equivalents, scaled by total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in
current liabilities, divided by total assets. Net Debt is defined as the ratio of current plus non-current liabilities minus
cash holdings, to total assets. Short-term Debt is defined as the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. The variable
Country LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and is equal to the countries’ total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by
the countries’ central government debt, afterwards. The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon
hand-collected data from Bloomberg, as well as central bank announcements and public commentaries. In all models, we
include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period is 2002-2014,
based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance
at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table A7
Counterfactual analysis of the LTRO effect on cash and debt financing policies
Panel A: Cash holdings
Cash Cash
Full Sample Risky Sovereign Safe Sovereign
(1) (2) (3)
Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone -0.733*** 0.680*** -1.187***
(0.12) (0.24) (0.15)
Post-LTRO 0.749*** 0.397 0.656**
(0.21) (0.34) (0.27)
Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.751 0.678 0.762
N 143731 35385 103686
Panel B: Leverage
Leverage Leverage
Full Sample Risky Sovereign Safe Sovereign
(1) (2) (3)
Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone -0.619*** -0.363 -1.146***
(0.13) (0.29) (0.16)
Post-LTRO 1.230*** 1.451*** -0.176
(0.22) (0.42) (0.28)
Controls Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
R-square 0.793 0.803 0.790
N 143731 35385 103686
This table presents estimates of the “counterfactual” effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on corporate cash and leverage policies, in a sample of corporations located in
the European Union (EU), both inside or outside the Eurozone. Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents, scaled
by total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided
by total assets. The variable Post-LTRO is a dummy variable equal to one, for year-quarter observations after the ECB
had implemented the first three-year LTRO intervention (Q4-2011). The variable Post-LTRO × Non-Eurozone is the
interaction variable between the non-Eurozone dummies and LTRO intervention and captures, accordingly, the effect of
the liquidity intervention on corporate policies in non-LTRO countries (“counterfactual” effect) accordingly, equal to one,
for non-Eurozone corporations after the first LTRO intervention (for details see Appendix A1). In Model (1), we use the
full sample of corporations. In Models (2) and (3), corporations are separated into high and low risk sovereigns, based on
their location and the respective country’s CDS spreads. Risky (Safe) Sovereign is defined as a CDS spread above (below)
the median in the pre-intervention and crisis period (2009 and 2010). In Panel A and Panel B we present the estimates
from our analysis of corporate investment, and wages, respectively. In all models, we include base corporate-level financial
variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. In
all specifications, we use controls, as well as firm- and time-fixed effects. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table A8
LTRO effect on investment: The role of lender characteristics
Panel A: Country LTRO uptake and lenders’ size
Investments Investments
GIIPS Non-GIIPS
Large Lender Small Lender Large Lender Small Lender Large Lender Small Lender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country LTRO Uptake -3.107*** -2.897*** 0.715 -2.451*** -7.011*** -7.154***
(0.94) (0.39) (2.31) (2.31) (1.41) (1.62)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.631 0.613 0.589 0.599 0.642 0.636
N 10245 10068 1336 3534 8909 6534
Panel B: Lender LTRO uptake and lenders’ size
Investments Investments
GIIPS Non-GIIPS
Large Lender Small Lender Large Lender Small Lender Large Lender Small Lender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.439*** -0.584*** -0.322 -2.493*** -0.491*** -0.610***
(0.15) (0.17) (0.31) (0.31) (0.17) (0.16)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.631 0.612 0.589 0.599 0.641 0.635
N 10245 10068 1336 3534 8909 6534
This table presents estimates of the effect of bank characteristics and the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on corporate investment, in a sample of corporations located in the Eurozone. Our
measure for corporate investment is Investments, which is the corporations’ capital expenditure, scaled by total assets.
We separate corporations into Large (Small) Lender. Large (Small) Lender are corporations’ whose lenders in Q4-2010
on average had total assets above (below) the median. Panel A shows the results based upon a sample of corporations
located in the Eurozone and using the country-specific LTRO uptake. The variable Country LTRO Uptake is equal to
zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the country-specific total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the central government debt
of the country, thereafter. Panel B shows the results based upon a subsample of Eurozone corporations with existing loan
information in LPC Dealscan, and using the lender-specific LTRO uptake. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to
zero until Q4-2011, and equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each bank,
thereafter. We classify Eurozone banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO intervention had
a loan relation to the bank. The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-collected data from
Bloomberg, as well as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The loan information data is obtained from
LPC Dealscan. In all models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables.
The sample period is 2002-2014, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance
at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Table A9
Total LTRO holdings by National Central Banks
Total LTRO Holdings Repayment Ratio
2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 to 2013
EUR billion EUR billion EUR billion EUR billion percentage
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Austria 03.49 07.18 15.71 05.87 -62.62
Belgium 04.12 17.97 39.92 14.29 -64.22
France 20.22 123.140 172.880 61.53 -64.41
Germany 33.46 47.11 69.65 13.77 -80.23
Greece 78.38 60.94 01.95 01.39 -28.79
Ireland 56.03 76.29 63.09 34.50 -45.31
Italy 31.01 160.610 268.300 213.710 -20.35
Netherlands 00.92 03.19 24.48 08.81 -63.99
Portugal 22.97 39.03 49.26 42.69 -13.33
Spain 39.66 156.680 315.350 178.060 -43.53
Total 290.260 692.130 1020.5800 574.620 -43.70
This table presents the holdings and repayment of Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by National Central Banks
(NCB) in the Eurozone. Total LTRO Holdings include all Longer-Term Refinancing Operations, i.e., the three-month to
the three-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations initiated by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 21, 2011
(LTRO I) and February 29, 2012 (LTRO II), respectively, and are end-of year values. In column 5, the table outlines
the percentage change in the total LTRO holdings by NBCs from 2012 to 2013. The information about the NCB LTRO
holdings is based upon hand-collected data from the NCBs’ websites.
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Table A10
LTRO effect on employment, cash and debt financing: The role of banks’ early repayment
of LTRO
Panel A: Low Early LTRO Repayment
Wages Cash Leverage Net Debt Short-term Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lender LTRO Uptake -0.075 9.365*** 20.073*** 17.840*** 0.025
(0.25) (1.79) (2.87) (3.47) (0.02)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.843 0.642 0.756 0.768 0.810
N 2879 4615 4615 3847 3673
Panel B: Medium Early LTRO Repayment
Wages Cash Leverage Net Debt Short-term Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lender LTRO Uptake 0.003 -0.882*** -0.456 0.318 -0.012***
(0.06) (0.23) (0.33) (0.46) (0.00)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.683 0.769 0.777 0.812 0.796
N 10769 16001 16001 12636 11981
Panel C: High Early LTRO Repayment
Wages Cash Leverage Net Debt Short-term Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lender LTRO Uptake 1.947 6.991 -25.832** -31.896* -0.200**
(2.25) (11.2) (12.9) (16.4) (0.08)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.771 0.717 0.771 0.784 0.736
N 5143 8343 8343 6973 6268
This table presents estimates of the effect of the liquidity uptake from the ECB’s three-year Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) by loan-related banks, and LTRO repayment policies on corporate polices, in a subsample of Eurozone
corporations with existing loan information in LPC Dealscan. Our measure for employment compensation is Wages, which
is the corporations’ total salaries and wages, given in logarithms. Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents, scaled by
total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total
assets. Net Debt is defined as the ratio of current plus non-current liabilities minus cash holdings, to total assets. Short-term
Debt is defined as the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. In Panel A through Panel C corporations are separated
based on their location and the respective country’s LTRO repayment policy, compared to the initial LTRO-country uptake.
Low (Medium, High) Early LTRO Repayment is defined as a LTRO repayment ratio from 2012 to 2013, i.e., at the first
possible LTRO repayment date, that is below 30% (between 30% and 70%, above 70%). The variable Country LTRO
Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and is equal to the country-specific total LTRO uptake amount, scaled by the
central government debt of the country, thereafter. The variable Lender LTRO Uptake is equal to zero until Q4-2011, and
equal to the LTRO uptake amount of the corporate-related banks, scaled by the size of each bank, thereafter. We classify
Eurozone banks as related if the corporation in the five years prior to the first LTRO intervention had a loan relation to the
bank. The information about the bank-specific LTRO uptake is based upon hand-collected data from Bloomberg, as well
as central bank announcements and public commentaries. The loan information data is obtained from LPC Dealscan. In
all models, we include base corporate-level financial variables in addition to macro-economic variables. The sample period
is 2002-2014, and based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5%
level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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